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The financial crises in the early 2000s have given prominence to the financial markets’ 
exposure to credit risk. To minimize credit risk, the risk that a borrower will fail to meet her 
contractual obligations, lenders seek to identify borrowers with a high probability of default prior 
to granting credit. In my dissertation I examine several screening devices that lenders utilize in 
alleviating adverse selection present on the credit market.  In the first chapter, I ask whether the 
existence of informal collateral signals better loan repayment. Taking advantage of a unique 
dataset of household loans from a Czech commercial bank, I find that housing loans without lien 
on the property default less compared to loans with unspecified purpose. I also show that the 
interest rate differential between specific purpose loans and unspecified purpose loans is 
systematically higher than their default rate differential. In the second chapter, I investigate the 
role of loan contract terms in household loan demand and performance. Utilizing a sample of 
accepted and rejected Czech household loans, I find that loan demand for low-income borrowers 
is more sensitive to liquidity constraint and loan maturity changes than to interest rate changes. 
The results also suggest that by reflecting the borrower’s riskiness in the interest rate, lenders 
discourage risky borrowers from obtaining short-term loans and this might then lead to their 
higher default probability. Finally, in the third chapter, I focus on credit ratings of financial/non-
financial institutions that issued debt. The paper identifies the determinants of credit rating 
changes by the two incumbent rating agencies: S&P and Moody’s. I show that there is a 
statistically significant difference in the rating evaluations of the two incumbent credit rating 
agencies, and that Fitch’s increasing market share deepens the rating splits between S&P and 
Moody’s. The results also suggest that sovereign ceilings ceased to be restrictive for non-
financial institutions throughout the recent financial crises, and that S&P is a follower in its 






Finanční krize po roce 2000 poukázali na důležitost expozice finančních trhů vůči 
úvěrovému riziku. Pro minimalizaci úvěrového rizika, tedy rizika, že dlužník nesplní své 
smluvní závazky, se věřitelé snaží identifikovat dlužníky s vysokou pravděpodobností defaultu 
před poskytnutím úvěru. Ve své disertační práci zkoumám několik prostředků kontroly, které 
věřitelé využívají k zmírnění nepříznivého výběru přítomného na úvěrovém trhu. V první 
kapitole si pokládám otázku, zda existence neformální záruky signalizuje lepší splácení úvěru. S 
pomocí unikátního souboru dat o úvěrech domácností z české komerční banky zjišťuji, že u 
úvěrů na bydlení bez zástavního práva k nemovitosti dochází k defaultu méně často ve srovnání s 
úvěry bez konkrétního účelu. Dále ukazuji, že rozdíl v úrokové míře mezi účelovými a 
neúčelovými úvěry je systematicky vyšší než jejich rozdíl v míře defaultu. Ve druhé kapitole 
zkoumám vliv podmínek v úvěrové smlouvě na poptávku domácností po úvěrech a na jejich 
výkon. S využitím vzorku přijatých a odmítnutých úvěrů českých domácností zjišťuji, že 
poptávka nízkopříjmových dlužníků je citlivější na likvidní omezení a změny data splatnosti než 
na změny úrokových sazeb. Výsledky také naznačují, že tím, že věřitelé zohledňují rizikovost 
dlužníka v úrokové sazbě, odrazují rizikové dlužníky od získání krátkodobých úvěrů, což potom 
může vést k vyšší pravděpodobnosti jejich defaultu. Ve třetí kapitole se zaměřuji na úvěrové 
ratingy finančních a nefinančních institucí, které emitují dluh. Tato studie identifikuje příčiny 
změn úvěrových ratingů u dvou zavedených ratingových agentur: S&P a Moody’s. Ukazuji, že 
existuje statisticky významný rozdíl v ratingových hodnoceních těchto dvou zavedených 
ratingových agentur a že rostoucí tržní podíl agentury Fitch dále prohlubuje rozdíly v ratinzích 
mezi S&P a Moody’s. Výsledky rovněž naznačují, že v průběhu finanční krize ratingové stropy 
jednotlivých zemí přestaly pro nefinanční instituce působit restriktivně a že agentura S&P je 










The rapid growth of the consumer and corporate lending market has drawn 
increased attention to the asymmetric information present between lenders and 
borrowers of credit. Stiglitz and Weiss’s 1981 paper shows that lenders who are 
imperfectly informed about the default probability of borrowers may suffer from 
adverse selection when deciding whether to grant credit or not. Adverse selection occurs 
when, being aware of their own riskiness, “low-risk” borrowers with low probability of 
default are not willing to pay increased prices for credit in the form of higher interest 
rates, while “high-risk” borrowers with a high probability of default will accept them. 
To minimize this, lenders may choose to deny granting the credit rather than to increase 
its price. As the price fails to regain equilibrium in the market, market imperfection 
appears.  
This thesis focuses on the prominence of private information evoking credit 
market failures. It examines several potential devices that might help lenders alleviate 
the adverse selection present on the credit market. Specifically, (1) it studies the effect 
of informal collateral on the default rate of household loans, (2) it offers a joint model 
for estimation of loan demand and loan performance, and examines whether a risk-
based maturity setting improves the quality of granted household loans, (3) and it 
compares the information value and the timeliness of credit rating agencies in assessing 
the creditworthiness of debt issuers. 
The first paper of the thesis focuses on the role of informal collateral in 
explaining household loan default. Consumers with insufficient resources can finance 
purchases by applying for specific purpose loans or unspecified purpose loans. The 
paper examines the default gap of these two types of loans using a unique dataset of 
household loans from a Czech commercial bank. In line with theoretical models that 
perceive collateral as a screening device mitigating adverse selection, the paper 
confirms a negative relationship between the default rate and the presence of informal 





characteristics of the borrower that drive the default rate. The paper also provides 
empirical evidence that the interest rate differential between specific purpose loans and 
unspecified purpose loans is systematically higher than their default rate differential. 
This is in line with the empirical literature according to which financial institutions are 
prudent in household loan pricing and charge high mark-ups when compared to 
mortgage or corporate loans. Nevertheless, this raises the question whether the interest 
rate of housing loans (being subject to tax-deductibility) should not be re-evaluated due 
to lack of their collateralization and higher average amount. The results of the first 
paper imply that information on informal collateral and the applicant’s former loan 
types help reveal the creditworthiness of households, and therefore should be integrated 
parts of financial institutions’ credit scoring methods. 
In the second paper of the thesis I investigate the role of loan contract terms in 
the performance of consumer credit. Taking advantage of a sample of accepted and 
rejected household loans from a Czech commercial bank, I estimate the elasticity of 
loan demand and find that borrowers with a high probability of default are more 
responsive to maturity than interest rate changes. I also argue that risk-based pricing 
may lead to an increase in loan maturity and loan default, rather than alleviating the 
adverse selection present on the lending market. The finding is consistent with the 
theoretical prediction that reduced asymmetric information encourages “high-risk” 
borrowers to either request lower loan amounts or to prolong their loan maturity to 
compensate the lender for their riskiness. Therefore, banks seeking to mitigate adverse 
selection by developing risk-based pricing should also test the increasing riskiness of 
the borrower pool due to the sensitivity to loan duration. Empirical evidence suggests 
that loan performance is time-dependent and default depends on the choice of loan 
duration. The paper implies that in the restriction of the default the borrower’s liquidity 
constraints and the loan maturity should also be considered alongside risk-based pricing. 
The third paper examines the accuracy and timeliness of credit ratings in 
explaining the financial health of debt issuers. Although the desire to assess the 
financial strength of financial and non-financial institutions is strong, the 





financial statement data and macroeconomic indicators covering 2005-2013 for 2 500 
financial and non-financial institutions, this paper identifies the determinants of credit 
rating changes by two rating agencies: Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. Empirical 
evidence suggests that while Moody’s is consistently more conservative in the 
assessment of default risk for non-financial institutions, Standard and Poor’s is 
consistently more conservative in its assessment of default risk for financial institutions. 
Fitch’s increasing market share deepens the rating disagreements between S&P and 
Moody’s. The results also suggest that sovereign ceilings ceased to be restrictive for 
non-financial institutions throughout the recent financial crises, and S&P is a follower 
in its rating actions when compared to Moody’s for both financial and non-financial 
institutions. Overall, the findings imply that policymakers should tighten supervision 
over the rating agencies, as their assessment of credit risk is highly influential for 
financial market participants.  
Although the financial crisis in the early 2000s was expected to represent an 
important structural break in the lending market, the findings of this thesis advocate that 
its impact is distinct across regions and sectors. On the Czech household loan market, 
there is a wide interest rate differential between loan types, though their default rate 
differential is systematically lower. Similar to the results of Horvath and Podpiera 
(2012), this suggests that banks impose a high risk margin on household loans and 
remain prudent in their pricing policy. While the introduction of risk-based pricing aims 
to limit adverse selection, the prolongation of loan maturity is likely to lead to a higher 
default probability even after the financial crisis. On the other hand, the worldwide 
market of debt issuers from financial and non-financial sectors experienced accelerated 
credit quality changes. During pre-crisis and sovereign-debt-crisis periods the reliance 
on prior rating actions of other agencies weakens, but remains highly statistically 
significant when compared to the other determinants of issuer rating change. Overall, 
this diminishing influence of the competitors’ behavior is likely to be caused by the 








Loans for Better Living:  






Since the early 2000s, the ways consumers may finance their expenditures have become 
diversified to a large extent. The range of loan products is particularly wide for 
financing housing-related expenditures. In addition to mortgage loans and building 
savings schemes, individuals can apply for housing loans granted for financing 
investments related to a property (e.g. home purchase, home renovation, home 
equipment). The key distinction between mortgage and housing loans is that the 
repayment of the latter is not secured by a lien on the property. Hence, housing loans are 
notably more attractive to those who are not willing or able to secure their loan with 
property. Alternatively, if the loan is intended to finance expenditures that are not 
housing-related, the borrower can apply for consumer credit. The key distinction 
between consumer credit and housing loans is that housing loans are granted conditional 
on the ownership of the real estate they finance, even though it does not serve as 





are jointly referred to as specific purpose loans (‘purpose-loans’), while consumer credit 
without a designated purpose is referred to as unspecified purpose loans (‘non-purpose 
loans’). The latter is viewed as bearing the highest risk, as no information is available 
on the expenditure they are intended to finance. 
The cost of the loan products varies by their perceived riskiness. Mortgage loans 
are secured (the financed property serves as collateral and can be claimed by the lender 
in case of borrower bankruptcy) - their interest rate and probability of default 
(henceforth referred to as ‘default rate’) is relatively low compared to other types of 
loans. At the end of 2013 in the Czech Republic, the interest rate on new mortgage loans 
was 3.4 percent, while the share of non-performing loans to total mortgage loans was 
3.0 percent. By contrast, housing loans and consumer credit are unsecured loans (there 
is only a general claim on the borrower’s assets in the case of default), and their interest 
rates and default rates are substantially higher than for mortgage loans. As of the end of 
2013 in the Czech Republic, the interest rates on new consumer credit and housing 
loans combined was at 14.5 percent, while the share of non-performing loans to total 
household loans was 12.2 percent for consumer credit and 8.4 percent for housing 
loans.1 Nevertheless, the overall performance of household loans must be evaluated in 
the light of expected loss in case of default. In particular, the two loan types 
significantly differ in their recovery rate (i.e. the percentage of non-performing loan 
amount recovered by the lender). Unlike consumer credit, mortgage loans enjoy the 
presence of high recovery rate in case of default (the expected loss is relatively low), as 
the loans are secured by collateral (the financed property).  
Although previous literature has long emphasized the role of collateral in 
mitigating the asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers at the time of 
loan granting, their conclusions are contradictory. The theoretical predictions of Boot, 
Thakor and Udell (1991), Manove and Padilla (2001) and Inderst and Mueller (2007) 
                                                 
 









suggest that with higher collateral the probability of default rises. The authors support 
their findings with several main arguments: (1) when they require increased collateral, 
financial institutions often weaken their screening mechanisms, (2) to achieve financing, 
borrowers are likely to provide all the required collateral irrespective of their probability 
of default. A contrary view from Jimenez, Salas and Saurina (2006) supports the private 
information hypothesis; it says that collateral sorts loan applicants such that low-risk 
borrowers prefer to pledge their loans (due to their low probability of default) and have 
lower interest rates, while high-risk borrowers prefer not to pledge their loans (given 
their higher probability of default) and have higher interest rates.  
Despite the broad debate on collateral and its impact on loan performance, 
limited research has focused on the role of informal collateral in the housing loan 
market. Housing loans finance home equity (similar to mortgage loans), but are granted 
without collateral (similar to standard consumer credit). Instead, their loan contract 
terms are conditional on informal collateral, which exists whenever the lender has 
evidence of the good the loan is intended to finance. For a housing loan, 
homeownership and an invoice verifying the purpose of the loan serves as evidence of 
informal collateral. These help individuals applying for a housing loan signal their 
better creditworthiness. Because the existence of informal collateral makes the borrower 
eligible for favorable loan contract terms without a lien on the property, the information 
asymmetry between the lender and the borrower might be more severe. This paper 
addresses this issue and tests the effectiveness of informal collateral in alleviating 
adverse selection on the household loan market. It contributes to the findings of 
Kocenda and Vojtek (2011), who were the first to study the default probability of Czech 
household loans with different purposes. 
This empirical paper focuses on three questions. First, I test whether the 
existence of informal collateral influences the likelihood of successful loan repayment, 
by applying a probit model to measure the effect of different loan types on the 
borrower’s default rate. Second, I examine whether the lower default rate on purpose-
loans is driven by the type of product they are intended to finance. This is tested by 





derived from information on multiple loan contracts per applicant and accounts for the 
fact that applicants with different default probability select different loan purposes. 
Third, I test whether applicants with the same application characteristics and loan 
contract terms have the same default rate and interest rate differential, regardless of 
whether they apply for loans with specified or unspecified purpose. I tackle the issue of 
self-selection by using propensity score matching. 
The paper exploits a unique dataset of over 207 000 rejected and accepted 
household loans from a Czech commercial bank.2 It covers three different types of 
household loans granted from 2007 to 2013: housing loans, consumer credit with a 
designated purpose (jointly referred to as ‘purpose-loans’) and consumer credit without 
a designated purpose (referred to as ‘non-purpose loans’). 
1.2 Why the Type of Household Loan Matters 
1.2.1 Description of Household Loan Types 
The share of non-performing loans3 of total loans (hereafter, the “NPL ratio”) varies 
substantially among the household loan types. Its significance is illustrated in Figure 
1.1, which depicts the share of NPL in consumer credit4, mortgage loans and housing 
loans in the Czech Republic. Whereas mortgage loans maintained a solid performance 
between 2002 and 2013, the share of problem loans in the case of consumer credit and 
housing loans sharply increased. Although neither consumer credit nor housing loans 
are backed by collateral, there is a 3.7 percentage point difference in their NPL ratio 
(based on the most recent results from August 2014). 
                                                 
 
2 The Bank does not wish to be explicitly identified. 
3 According to CNB Regulation No. 123/2007, § 196, § 197 non-performing loans are receivables with 
default classified as substandard, doubtful or loss loans. 





The loan-application process for consumer credit (with specified and unspecified 
purpose) and housing loans begins identically.5 In order to assess the creditworthiness 
of their potential debtors and to decide whether to grant a loan, financial institutions use 
automated credit scoring techniques. Their main purpose is to estimate the probability 
that an applicant will default by a given time in the future. Lenders make loan-granting 
decisions based on the loan application information provided by their customers and the 
probability of default. Application information is evaluated by analyzing a sample of 
                                                 
 
5 On the household loan market, loan types and their loan contract terms vary substantially across 
individual loan providers. Prior to loan application, the borrower has indicative information (for random 
loan amount and a minimum interest rate offer, each lender publishes a menu of maturities and annuity 
payments) about the loan products and the lenders’ offer from publicly available marketing materials. 
When entering the loan application process, the borrower uses this information to decide about his/her 
preferred loan type/maturity/amount given liquidity constraints – this requested loan 
type/maturity/amount can be considered the result of the searching process. Any changes in these 
parameters are assumed to be subject to a new loan application. 
 
Figure 1.1: Share of non-performing loans on total loans (by household loan type) 
 
Source: Czech National Bank (CNB) – ARAD database – Monetary and financial statistics. Note: (1) 
The statistic covers household loan provided in the Czech Republic. (2) Non-performing loans include 
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past customers who applied for a loan, whose records provide good information on 
subsequent loan performance history. Credit scoring divides loan applicants into ‘good’  
and  ‘bad’ and assists independent lending institutions in their loan-granting decisions. 
Kocenda and Vojtek (2011) provide an extensive survey of literature on existing credit 
scoring techniques (e.g. logistic regression, classification and regression trees) and 
compare their efficiency and discriminatory power. 
1.2.2 The Role of Loan Contract Terms in Alleviating Adverse Selection  
Loan contract terms for the individual household loan types differ. After 
mortgage loans (secured by a lien on a property), housing loans offer the second lowest 
interest rates. To be eligible for a favorable interest rate in the case of housing loans, the 
applicant must document both loan purpose and proof of homeownership.6 The loan 
must finance a property-related investment, and the real estate should be in the name of 
the applicant. Although housing loans can be used to finance home renovation, home 
purchase (to some upper limit), or home equipment, they are not secured by a lien on 
the property as are mortgage loans.7 Another advantage is that housing loans are also 
subject to favorable tax treatment. Upon fulfilling certain conditions, a borrower can 
deduct the interest expenses of housing loans when tax returns are filed. The interest 
rates of loans for vehicle purchases or other purposes are less favorable8, as the loans 
are not backed by homeownership. Borrowers are obliged to submit an invoice 
verifying that the loan was used for the specified purpose, and are then entitled to the 
lower interest rates. If the borrower does not deliver this evidence, the price of the loan 
is raised to the interest rate level of loans without a specified purpose. Loans for 
                                                 
 
6 The terms and conditions of housing loans usually also include requirements on the share of total costs 
(e.g. 20 or 30 percent) to be financed from the borrowers’ own resources. 
7 After exceeding some upper loan limit, the bank may insist on securing a loan by collateral. 
Nevertheless, if the applicant decides to back his loan with property, then the loan application is changed 
to a mortgage loan request, due to the even lower interest rate it offers. In some cases the bank might 
require the property to be insured (the cost of insurance is paid by the borrower). 
8 Comparing loans for vehicle purchase or other purpose, the former offer more favorable loan contract 





unspecified purposes bear the highest interest rate. This is because individuals who 
cannot or who are not willing to specify the purpose of financing are perceived as risky. 
Although the lender usually keeps a record of whether the borrower owns real estate, 
unless there is a lien on property (as in the case of mortgage loans) or the applicant 
submits the invoice of property-related investment and the proof of homeownership to 
receive a loan (as in case of housing loans), homeownership is not regularly verified and 
cannot be considered as informal collateral.   
Housing loans thus benefit from the presence of informal collateral.9 Individuals 
providing evidence of loan purpose and homeownership can signal their 
creditworthiness and gain favorable loan contract terms. This can prevent market 
inefficiencies that arise on household loan markets when the borrower has private 
information related to loan repayment. To mitigate this asymmetric information 
between lenders and borrowers, the bank can design such loan contract terms (most 
importantly, set interest rates) that aim to reveal the borrower’s risk type. This paper 
tests the effectiveness of informal collateral to alleviate adverse selection on the housing 
loan market, a field that has not previously been studied. 
1.3 Methodology 
This section outlines the identification strategy applied to measure the impact of 
household loan type on the borrower’s default rate.  To estimate the impact of loan type 
on a borrower’s default rate, first the simple probit is applied. Compared to the linear 
probability model, the probit model offers a better modeling of dichotomous outcome 
estimation. Second, the propensity score matching is used to see how the results change 
after the potential selection bias on household loan market is accounted for. This paper 
does not model the process of loan approval and the setting of loan contract terms (loan 
                                                 
 
9 Pavan (2008) is the first to define the role of durable goods as informal collateral in the loan 





amount, interest rate and maturity).10 These are assumed to be the result of equilibrium 
outcome. 
 
1.3.1 Probit Models 
Hypothesis 1. The purpose of the loan has no impact on the probability of loan 
repayment. 
 
The default rate is a function of information available about the borrower at the 
time of loan application. In Model 1 the probability of default is estimated by the 
following probit model: 
 
iiii PURPOSEXY ϕβββ +++= 21
'
0
*                                                              (1.1) 
 
where iY  denotes default for borrower i, 'iX is the vector of application characteristics 
and the loan contract terms of application i, iPURPOSE  is a categorical variable 
indicating the purpose of a loan (Table 1.A.1 in the Appendix summarizes the 
individual variables and their coding) and iϕ  are unobserved factors assumed to have a 
standard normal distribution with zero mean and variance equal to one. Although the 
latent variable *iY is not observed, iY  takes the value of 0 if the borrower does not 
default ( 0* <iY ) and iY  takes the value of 1 if the borrower defaults ( 0* >iY ). 
Assuming the standard normal cumulative distribution (.)Φ the probability of default 
can then be derived as follows: 
                                                 
 
10 Kuvikova (2015) estimates loan demand and loan performance jointly, while accounting for the number 
of successful payments until default using the endogeneity of loan contract terms, the potential sample 
selection on the household loan market. The paper also offers an alternative model for default estimation 









iiiiiii PURPOSEXXPURPOSEY ϕβββ +++Φ==              (1.2) 
 
Although the coefficients of the probit model  (𝜕E(𝑌𝑖
∗)
𝜕𝑋𝑘
= 𝛽𝑘) express the direction 
of the impact of the explanatory variables on the binary outcome, unlike in the linear 
probability model they do not express the marginal effects and hence need to be 
calculated explicitly. To quantify the magnitude of the effect (𝜕Pr(𝑌𝑖=1|𝑋𝑖)
𝜕𝑋𝑘
)  the average 
marginal effect is used. It expresses the impact of a one-unit change in the explanatory 
variable on the average change in the probability of the outcome variable.  
Specifically, the null hypothesis tested in Model 1 is that 0: 20 =βH . 
 
Hypothesis 2. The type of applicant choosing loans with different riskiness does 
not affect the loan default. 
 
Applicants with different default probability might select loans with certain loan 
purpose. To differentiate between the effect of loan type and the type of individuals that 
apply for certain loans, Model 2 is defined as  
 




                                     (1.3) 
 
where the categorical variable iAPPTYPE  indicates the applicant’s type with respect to 
loan purpose. The variable is created using information on multiple loan contracts per 
applicant (both accepted and rejected loans), in which an applicant type dummy is 
assigned to each loan purpose j. This dummy takes the value of one if the loan 
application i is submitted by an individual who has already applied for a loan purpose j. 
This specification enables one to account for the unobserved individual heterogeneity 





quantify whether the default is driven by the riskiness of the applicant or the riskiness of 
the good the loan is intended to finance (Bicakova, 2007). 
Specifically, the null hypothesis tested in Model 2 is that 0: 30 =βH . 
 
1.3.2 Propensity Score Matching 
Hypothesis 3. The average effect of loan purpose on the loan default is not 
significantly different from zero when similar applicants are compared. 
 
In estimating the effect of loan type on the default rate of borrowers, self-
selection becomes an issue. Specifically, borrowers applying for a purpose-loan may 
differ significantly from those applying for a non-purpose loan. To account for self-
selection and check the robustness of results based on probit regression, the matching 
approach is utilized. The method is used for estimating causal effects, and aims to 
resemble a randomized experiment by comparing treated and control groups with 
similar distribution of covariates.11 Contrary to a standard regression approach that 
might suffer from selection on unobservable characteristics, matching is a non-
experimental method that focuses on controlling for observables. As the method is non-
parametric, it does not impose a functional form and requires fewer assumptions than 
the regression approach.12 
In order to see whether the default rate of purpose-loans differ from the default 
rate of non-purpose loans, I take advantage of the non-experimental matching method 
suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). The method allows us to quantify the 
impact of treatment programs that differ across individuals. In particular, it describes 
                                                 
 
11 Stuart (2010) offers a detailed review of matching techniques. 
12 Angrist (1998) argues that the primary difference between the estimates of the approaches lies in the 
weights corresponding to the explanatory variables. Whereas in the regression model the weights are 
larger when the variance of treatment is larger, in the matching approach the weights are larger when the 





what would have happened in the absence of treatment.  The method assumes that the 
selection of individuals into control and treatment groups is based on a sufficient 
number of observables, where the unobservables are assumed to be unimportant. 
Two potential outcomes of probability of default are compared: iy1  is the 
probability of default for purpose-loans and  is the probability of default for non-
purpose loans. I assume that a population of borrowers exists in which everyone is 
equally eligible to choose between the two types of loans. I observe iy1  only if 1=iD  
(the borrower applied for a purpose-loan) and observe  only if 0=iD (the borrower 
applied for a non-purpose loan). 
Assuming the borrower has a choice between loan types, the aim is to measure 
whether the purpose makes a difference in the default rate of borrowers. The average 
effect of treatment on treated (ATT, hereafter) is chosen to quantify the average effect 
of loan type on the probability of default: 
)1|()1|()1|( 0101 =−===− iiiiiii DyEDyEDyyE .  
If the choice of loan type was completely random, i.e. )0|()1|( 10 === iiii DyEDyE , 
we could simply compare the treatment group (the borrower applied for a loan with 
specified purpose) and control group (the borrower applied for a loan with unspecified 
purpose) as in a randomized experiment.  However, as we deal with a non-randomized 
observational dataset on application characteristics, the treatment and control groups are 
not comparable before the treatment. Thus, a non-parametric matching method13 is 
required to estimate the average effect of loan type. This reduces the bias caused by 
confounding factors in observational datasets where the assignment of customers to the 
treatment and control groups is not random. Controlling for confounding factors, the 
                                                 
 
13 The matching estimators can identify and give consistent estimates of the choice of loan type on default 
rates under the following two assumptions:  (1) iD  is independent of ),( 01 ii yy  conditional on xX = . (2) 
cxXDPc i −<==< 1)|1( , for some 0>c . The first assumption (the unconfoundedness assumption) 
ensures that, conditional on the application characteristics of the borrower, the loan type is independent of 
the default rate of the borrower. The second assumption (the identification assumption) allows for 







matching method corrects for the selection bias by balancing the distribution of 
covariates in the treated and control groups.  
As I deal with a large number of application characteristics when testing the null 
hypothesis, I take advantage of the propensity score matching.14 This approach groups 
the pre-treatment characteristics of each individual into a single scalar and the matching 
is realized solely on this propensity score.15 The propensity score matching is done by 
pairing each treated individual with one or more individuals from the control group 
based on their propensity scores. Motivated by Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997), 
who compare different matching methods depending on sample size, I use the “nearest 
neighbor” method for ATT estimation. Specifically, the null hypothesis tested in Model 
3 is that 0)1|(: 010 ==− iii DyyEH .
16 
1.4 Data 
In order to analyze the default pattern of the Czech household loan market, a 
dataset of over 207 000 household loans covering the entire Czech Republic has been 
obtained. The random sample of household loans utilized in this paper is drawn from a 
Bank, which (based on total assets) belongs among the top 3 banks operating in the 
Czech banking sector.17 The dataset consists of application information on those 
individuals who were granted/rejected a household loan between 2007 and 2013, 
together with their monthly repayment status. The data observation period lasts until 
2013. Table 1.A.1 in the Appendix lists the available information on household loans. 
                                                 
 
14 Abadie and Imbens (2002) suggest that a bias of simple matching estimators exists, and the simple 
method might be not suitable in cases where there is a wide range of covariates. 
15 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) define the propensity score as the propensity towards exposure to 
treatment 1 given the observed pre-treatment covariates. In other words, the propensity score is the 
probability of being granted a purpose loan, conditional on the borrower’s application characteristics and 
the loan contract terms. 
16 Admittedly, endogeneity might cause an identification issue, as the certain types of borrowers prefer 
certain types of loans. Nevertheless, as the default probability is analyzed conditional on the type of loan, 
the matching estimation is considered to be appropriate. 
17 The Bank has a market share of 20% for traditional bank products in the Czech Republic. It is part of 





The dataset can be considered as representative for studying household loan 
performance from several aspects. First, the observed default rate and the interest rate in 
the sample (4.9 percent and 13.4 percent respectively) is comparable to the average 
default rate and interest rate statistics in the Czech Republic (4.1 percent and 13.9 
percent) for 2007-2013. Second, the sample includes only CZK-denominated loans, and 
the vast majority of loans in the Czech Republic are CZK-denominated (the share of 
loans to households denominated in foreign currency is below 1 percent).18 Third, the 
structure of households with respect to monthly income is comparable to the national 
statistics.19 As depicted in Figure 1.A.1 in the Appendix, the mean monthly income 
observed in the sample copies the mean monthly income in the Czech Republic for all 
four age buckets. The income of households in the sample is also analogous to the mean 
income in other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, though it is significantly lower 
than the average in the European Union. Importantly, it has to be acknowledged that the 
characteristics of borrowers applying for household loans might be somewhat worse or 
distinct from the characteristics of the entire population.  
The selection of variables predicting default is driven by the information the 
Bank includes on their loan application form (the borrower’s application characteristics 
and the loan contract terms). Nevertheless, following Kocenda and Vojtek (2011), I also 
conduct a single factor analysis to check the discriminatory power of the variables 
applied in the Bank’s credit scoring. The overall information value of the application 
characteristics is calculated as the sum of information values for each category of 
application characteristics, defined for loan application i  as 
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Default                                                                    (1.5) 
 
where Default represents the total number of defaulted loans and NoDefault represents 
the total number of loans that were repaid. The information value of application 
variables summarized in Table 1.A.2 confirms that the majority of application 
characteristics have an information value of between 0.1 and 0.2. The higher the 
information value, the higher the discriminatory power of the variable with the given 
categorization. 
1.4.1 The Expected Impact of Loan Contract and Application Characteristics 
on Default 
Table 1.A.1 in the Appendix summarizes the expected impact of loan term 
characteristics and application characteristics on the probability of loan default based on 
the related literature. The first set of variables include loan contract terms (Table 1.A.1, 
Panel A), which describe the loan the borrower and lender agreed on. Several 
application and loan term characteristics might signal a borrower’s low probability of 
default. Recent literature findings suggest that lower default is likely on loans of high 
amounts (Dobbie and Skiba, 2013), on loans with a specific purpose (Kocenda and 
Vojtek, 2011), and for loans that were evaluated by applying risk-based pricing20 
(Adams, Einav, and Levin, 2009). A high credit bureau score expresses the applicant’s 
low indebtedness (the score is highest if the borrower has no other debt) and a high 
behavioral score expresses the applicant’s good repayment history (the score is the 
highest if the borrower has had no problems in previous debt repayment).  
The second set of variables contains individual application characteristics (Table 
1.A.1, Panel B), which represent the socio-demographic characteristics of the potential 
borrower at the time of loan application. From the application characteristics, the 
                                                 
 
20 The Bank has been applying risk-based pricing (i.e. pricing based on the borrower’s expected riskiness) 





likelihood of bankruptcy is expected to diminish for older (Dobbie and Skiba, 2013), 
female (Chandler and Ewert, 1976), married and university-graduated applicants 
(Kocenda and Vojtek, 2011). In addition, previous literature suggests that employment 
with stable income (Gross and Souleles, 2002), home ownership (Adams et al., 2009) 
and long employment duration (Kocenda and Vojtek, 2011) should also have a positive 
impact on loan repayment. Certain application characteristics might be omitted from 
credit scoring models. Chandler and Ewert (1976) show that if gender is allowed, men 
have a significantly smaller chance of being granted a loan. This can be because other 
variables, like low income and part-time employment, signal good repayment behavior 
in the case of females, but bad repayment behavior in the whole population. In order to 
estimate the probability of default, this paper uses the list application information 
(including gender) that the Bank applies in its credit scoring model. 
1.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the application characteristics and loan contract 
terms are presented in Table 1.A.3 in the Appendix. The mean values of personal loan 
information suggest that an average borrower has been employed for more than 5 years 
and has an average net income above CZK 17 000 monthly. On average the applicants 
were approved for a loan amount of CZK 100 000 with a four-and-a-half-year maturity 
at an interest rate of 14 percent. 
Although there are several different definitions of ‘defaulted’ loans, similar to 
the literature on installment loans (Gross and Souleles, 2002; Barron, Chong, and 
Staten, 2008), I measure loan performance using delinquency rate as a proxy for 
expected default rate. I consider a loan to be in default if the borrower is more than 30 
days overdue on any payment connected with the loan. Later, for the purposes of the 
sensitivity analysis, I use the definition set by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2004): a loan is considered to be in default if the borrower is more than 90 
days overdue on any payment connected with the loan. Table 1.1 summarizes the 





Purpose-loans include loans for home purchase, home renovation, purchase of 
home equipment, purchase of a new/used car and loans for other purposes (e.g. mobile 
phone, computers, etc.) and represent 14% of the total dataset (accepted and rejected 
loans). Table 1.2 presents the default rate and interest rate differentials of accepted 
loans. Consistent with national statistics, housing loans (loans for home purchase, home 
renovation, and purchase of home equipment) have a lower default rate than consumer 
credit with unspecified purpose by around 3.5%. The interest rates reflect how easy it 
would be for the bank to repossess assets from the borrower in the case of default: the 
cheapest are housing loans (connected to the ownership of property), then loans for 
vehicle purchase (connected to car ownership), and the least favorable interest rate is for 
loans with other or unspecified purposes. 
 
1.5 Results 
The results of estimating the effect of application characteristics and loan contract terms 
on borrowers’ probability of default conforms to expectations. The estimation results 
from the probit model and propensity score matching suggest that the impact of loan 
purpose on the probability of default rate is significant. Interestingly, the default rate 
differential between purpose-loans and non-purpose loans is much smaller than the 
interest rate differential. 
Table 1.1: Default rate by loan type 
Loan type No default Default Accepted  loans Acceptance rate 
Unspecified purpose 94.5% 5.5%                  91 305    50.9% 
Specified purpose 98.6% 1.4%                  14 454    51.4% 
Total             100 508                    5 219                   105 759    50.9% 







1.5.1 The Effect of Informal Collateral on Loan Default  
In order to interpret the effect of the individual loan determinants on the probability of 
default while keeping all the other covariates constant, I follow Greene (2003) and 
calculate the marginal effects from the estimation results. Table 1.3 displays the 
calculated average marginal effects of the probit model with corresponding standard 
errors for Model 1 and Model 2. 21  
Panel A of Table 1.3 summarizes the probit estimation results with respect to 
loan term characteristics.  The results from Model 1 indicate that the hypothesis that the 
purpose of the loan has no impact on the probability of loan repayment can be rejected. 
In particular, the probability of default decreases with an indicated loan purpose. 
Applicants with clear intentions and carefully planned objectives default less. 
Specifically, as a result of financing a home purchase, the borrower’s probability of 
default decreases on average by 3.6 percentage points (compared to a non-purpose 
loan). 
 
                                                 
 
21 The reference group for the application factor variables is always the one with the lowest coding 
(summarized in Table 1.A.1 in the Appendix) and the individual estimates refer to indicated changes in 
the dependent variable due to a change in the particular application characteristic compared to its 
reference group. For example, according to the positive sign of education level, relative to primary 
education being the reference group, the higher a customer’s level of education, the lower the predicted 
default is expected to be. 
Table 1.2: Default rates and interest rates per loan purpose 
Loan purpose Default rate Interest rate Accepted loans Acceptance rate 
Unspecified purpose 5.5% 14.0%                  91 305    50.9% 
Home purchase 2.3% 8.1%                    3 171    51.2% 
Home renovation 1.2% 8.2%                    6 818    51.4% 
Home equipment 1.3% 7.8%                        477    38.9% 
New/used car purchase 1.6% 11.6%                        251    48.6% 
Other purpose 0.8% 13.4%                    3 737    54.2% 
Total 4.9% 13.4%                105 759    50.9% 








The effect of financing home renovation, purchase of home equipment or a used car is 
analogous. Applicants funding other purposes (e.g. mobile phones, computers, etc.) are 
also less likely to have repayment difficulties, though the default only declines by 2.8 
Table 1.3: Probit estimation  results (Panel A – Loan term characteristics) 
    Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent variable: Default 
  
dy/dx  
(Delta method - standard error) 
 Risk-based pricing  -0.043*** -0.043*** 
 
    (0.001)    (0.001) 
Approved amount  -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 
    (0.001)    (0.001) 
Loan maturity   0.026***  0.026*** 
 
    (0.001)    (0.001) 
Loan purpose Home purchase -0.036*** -0.028*** 
  
   (0.002)    (0.005) 
 
Home renovation -0.034*** -0.010 
  
   (0.002)    (0.007) 
 
Home equipment -0.037*** -0.039*** 
  
   (0.006)    (0.006) 
 
New/used car purchase -0.036***  0.835 
  
   (0.008)    (17.367) 
 
Other purpose -0.028***  0.031** 
  
   (0.004)    (0.012) 
Applicant type Home purchase 
 
-0.014 
   





   
   (0.008) 
 
Home equipment    0.011 
   
   (0.014) 
 
New/used car purchase 
 
-0.352 
   





   
   (0.006) 







Loglikelihood ratio (LR) chi2   8 647.4 8 864.8 
Note: (1) The estimates denote the calculated average marginal effects for factor levels (dy/dx) 
expressing the discrete change from the base level. (2) The reference groups for the categorical 
variables are the following: Loan purpose - Non-purpose loans; Application type – Applicants only 
requesting non-purpose loans. (3) Only statistically significant results (***, **, and * denote 





percentage points on average (compared to a non-purpose loan). This is natural as these 
applicants most likely finance one-time expenditures that have a relatively short lifespan 
(unlike investments in real estate). These findings complement the results of Kocenda 
and Vojtek (2011), who also utilize data from a Czech commercial bank and find that 
compared to loans for house building, loans with other purposes (e.g. renovation, the 
purchase of an apartment, land or house) have a higher estimated probability of default. 
Nevertheless, this paper goes further and aims to compare the default rate and pricing 
differential of purpose-loans and non-purpose loans after accounting for potential 
selection bias. 
When controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity, the negative 
relationship between loan purpose and default probability is altered. The applicant’s 
type might be viewed as a proxy for assessing the ordering of expenditures by 
borrowers. Based on historical observations the applicant’s type should indicate his/her 
unobserved riskiness (i.e. what type of loan product the individual is more inclined to 
apply for). Housing loans are more likely to be chosen by risk-lover individuals (i.e. 
they invest the borrowed money in a property), while consumer credit with unspecified 
purpose is most likely to be chosen by less thoughtful individuals (i.e. the borrowed 
money is not necessarily invested and might finance unpremeditated consumption).  The 
results summarized in Panel A of Table 1.3 suggest that when controlling for the 
applicant’s type, the role of loan purpose in explaining default might be prevailed by the 
applicant’s type. Specifically, the hypothesis from Model 2 (the type of applicant 
choosing loans with different riskiness does not affect the loan default) can be rejected. 
After accounting for the applicant’s type (j dummies created for borrowers who applied 
for the loan purpose j at least once), the effect of the loan purpose diminishes and it is a 
different type of borrower with unobserved riskiness that drives the default rate. 
Compared to non-purpose loans, home renovations default less by 3.7 percentage points 
solely due to the fact that these borrowers have higher repayment incentives than loans 
without specific purpose. In the case of applicants financing a home purchase, the effect 
of loan purpose overweighs the effect of applicant type in explaining the lower default. 





applicant type has the most extreme impact on loans for other purposes (e.g. loans for 
mobile phones, computers, etc.): although borrowers of these durable goods default 
more, it is the applicant’s lower riskiness that drives the better loan repayment. These 
findings are in line with Bicakova (2007), who presents qualitatively similar results on a 
sample of Italian household loans. 
The remaining loan contract terms have similar influence on default probability 
for Model 1 and Model 2. In line with the findings of Dobbie and Skiba (2013), default 
declines with the approved loan amount. This result is surprising given the asymmetric 
information between lenders and borrowers that stimulates the prominence of moral 
hazard (i.e. default is more likely on larger loans, while borrowers do not pay for the 
increased default costs) on the household loan markets (Adams et al., 2009). On the 
other hand, the default increases with longer loan maturity similar to Adams et al. 
(2009). This is predictable as default is more probable over a longer time period. 
Interestingly, interest rates turn out to be statistically insignificant. A credit bureau score 
(indicating the applicant’s indebtedness) can also successfully reveal the borrower’s 
riskiness. Both Gross and Souleles (2002) and Barron et al. (2008) confirm that the 
higher the credit bureau score, the less likely the borrower will default. The behavioral 
score (indicating the applicant’s repayment history) encompasses information about 
whether the borrower historically accepted/rejected and repaid/defaulted on loans. The 
higher the score, the better the applicant’s credit history and the better his/her future 
loan repayment behavior. These results follow the findings of Marshall, Tang and Milne 
(2010) who argue that a longer lending relationship improves the quality of loan 
portfolios. 
Application characteristics explain loan performance well and conform to 
expectations. Panel B of Table 1.3 indicates that the results are stable across the models. 
From the set of variables, monthly income is perceived as a key indicator of a 
borrower’s creditworthiness. With respect to its relationship to loan repayment, it is 
expected that the higher the applicant’s monthly income, the lower the probability s/he 
will go bankrupt. Similarly to Gross and Souleles (2002), this paper provides empirical 





monthly income on default probability is very low in magnitude. This is also in line 
with Kocenda and Vojtek (2011), who find that including income in the credit scoring 
specification improves discrimination between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ applicants only 
marginally. Although Marshall et al. (2010) highlight that students are less likely to 
default, Model 1 and Model 2 cannot support this finding with statistically significant 
results. Instead, pensioners have on average (by 2.5 percentage points) a lower default 
rate than employed applicants. The level of education is also a key characteristic that 
indicates how reliable the borrower will be in repaying the loan. Applicants with only 
primary school education have the highest probability of default. In line with the results 
of Kocenda and Vojtek (2011), with every additional level of education the likelihood 
of loan default declines. Similarly, I also find that a lower probability of default is 
expected for married applicants (due to the assumption that they have an additional 
source of income in the case of job loss), and borrowers employed for a longer period or 
employed by a public organization (due to the assumption that they are more risk-
averse). The results suggest that borrowers who own real estate are also less likely to 
default (similar to Adams et al., 2009). Application and loan term characteristics not 
presented in Table 1.3 yield statistically insignificant estimation results. 
 
1.5.2 Default and Interest Rate Differential between Purpose-Loans and 
Non-Purpose Loans 
To predict the probability that an applicant for a household loan will default, 
lenders need a credit scoring model that captures the behavior of an average applicant. 
The information most frequently used is the repayment behavior of applicants who were 
granted a loan; the characteristics of those applicants who were denied a loan is not 
recorded.  Yet estimating the probability of default only on a sample of accepted 
applicants and then applying it to the sample of all applicants leads to biased estimates 
of the parameters. This exclusion of rejected applicants then results in an 





Table 1.3: Probit estimation results (Panel B – Application characteristics) 
    Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent variable: Default 
  
 
dy/dx (Delta method - standard 
error) 
Behavioral score  -0.001*** -0.001*** 
     (0.001)    (0.001) 
Credit bureau score  -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  
   (0.001)    (0.001) 
Female  -0.008*** -0.008*** 
  
   (0.001)    (0.001) 
Education Secondary (general)  0.029***  0.029*** 
  
   (0.006)    (0.006) 
 
Post-secondary (technical) -0.020*** -0.020*** 
  
   (0.007)    (0.007) 
 
Secondary (vocational) -0.011** -0.010** 
  
   (0.005)    (0.005) 
 
University -0.026*** -0.025*** 
  
   (0.005)    (0.005) 
Employment status 
   
 
Pensioner -0.025*** -0.025*** 
  
   (0.002)    (0.002) 
Employment duration  -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  
   (0.001)    (0.001) 
    Employment type Bank/insurance company -0.041*** -0.040*** 
  
   (0.003)    (0.003) 
 
Private company -0.014*** -0.013*** 
  
   (0.002)    (0.002) 
 
Public organization -0.018*** -0.018*** 
  
   (0.002)    (0.002) 
Net monthly income   0.001** 0.001** 
  
   (0.001)   (0.001) 
Marital status Married -0.012** -0.012** 
  
   (0.006)    (0.006) 
Housing status Living with parents -0.025*** -0.024*** 
  
   (0.004)    (0.004) 
 
Sharing property -0.021*** -0.020*** 
  
   (0.005)    (0.005) 
 
Personal property -0.026*** -0.025*** 
  
   (0.004)    (0.004) 







Loglikelihood ratio (LR) chi2  8 647.4 8 864.8 
Note: (1) The estimates denote the calculated average marginal effects for factor levels (dy/dx) expressing the 
discrete change from the base level. (2) The reference groups for the categorical variables are the following: 
Education – Secondary (technical); Employment status – Employed; Employment type, Marital status, Housing 
status – Unspecified by the applicant. (3) Only statistically significant results (***, **, and * denote significance 








In order to ensure that borrowers with the same application characteristics are 
compared when quantifying the impact of loan purpose on the probability of default, 
propensity score matching is applied.  The ATT is estimated in the following steps: 
First, on the sample of household loan application data where all individuals 
have a unique observation, I estimate the propensity score on the individual 
characteristics by fitting a logistic regression: 
 
iii XPURPOSEL εββ ++= 10 ,                                                                       (1.6) 
 
Where iPURPOSEL  is the binary variable taking the value of one for purpose-loans 
and taking the value of zero for non-purpose loans, iX is the set of application 
characteristics and iε is the error term. This gives the predicted probability of loan type 
based on the set of application characteristics as a composite score.  
As a second step, I test whether the above specification is applicable. That is, 
after the propensity score is created, I test for the balancing hypothesis. It says that 
observations with the same propensity score must have the same distribution of 
application characteristics independent of loan type. The results of the balancing 
hypothesis summarized in Table 1.A.4 in the Appendix suggest that a significant part of 
the covariates is well-balanced.  
Finally, once the propensity score satisfies the balancing hypothesis, I examine 
the effect of loan type on default by using propensity score matching. Specifically, I 
group applicants with similar application characteristics and loan contract terms to show 
that the variation in default rate remains even after controlling for observable borrower 
risk. The ATT estimation results using the “nearest neighbor” matching method with 
bootstrapped standard errors are summarized in Table 1.4. The results suggest that the 
hypothesis that the average effect of loan purpose on the loan default is not significantly 
different from zero when similar applicants are compared can be rejected. Purpose-loans 





The statistically significant result at a 1% level is achieved by matching over 14 000 
purpose-loans with over 90 000 non-purpose loans (Table 1.A.5 in the Appendix). 
When compared to the unmatched sample results, for the matched sample, the default 
rate differential between purpose-loans and non-purpose loans decreased by 3.4 
percentage points. 
To see the interest rate differential between the two loan types, propensity score 
matching is conducted on the same observable characteristics and loan contract terms. 
The results summarized in Table 1.5 suggest that after controlling for observable 
characteristics, purpose-loans have 3.6 percentage point higher interest rates than non-
purpose loans. The test of the balancing hypothesis (summarized in Table 1.A.6 in the 
Appendix) is favorable and only two observations are off common support (summarized 
in Table 1.A.7 in the Appendix) during the propensity score matching. 
The high interest rate differential for loans with similar default probability is 
further evidence of the heterogeneity in pricing policy for different loan types. In the 
example of the Czech Republic, Horváth and Podpiera (2012) show that the interest rate 
for household loans does not follow the market interest rate as closely as those of other 
types of loans. Alternatively, the authors suggest that the high interest rate for 
household loans is linked to the high risk margin that financial institutions impose on 
these loans. This paper goes further and points out that the high risk margin can be the 
result of mispricing or the conservative loan-granting strategy of the financial 
institution. Therefore, the pricing policy of financial institutions should be closely 
monitored in order to limit subsequent difficulties in household loan repayment. 
Table 1.4: Default rate differential - ATT estimation results 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
Default rate Unmatched  0.0137 0.0550  -0.0413 0.0019 -21.34 
       
 
Sample Treated Controls Difference Bootstrap Std. Err. z 
 
ATT 0.0138 0.0206  -0.0067 0.0023  -2.88  
Note: (1) “Treated” and “Control” stands for purpose-loans and non-purpose loans, respectively. (2) A 








1.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
To test the validity of the identification strategy, propensity score matching is 
performed applying an alternative definition of default. In particular, I use the definition 
set by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004) and consider a loan to be in 
default if the borrower is more than 90 days overdue on any payment connected with 
the loan. Table 1.A.8 in the Appendix summarizes the default rate of loans by loan type 
under the original definition (default occurs after 30 days overdue in payments) and the 
alternative definition (default occurs after 90 days overdue in payments). By relaxing 
the definition of default, the sample of loans in default is significantly reduced (from 
5 219 to 3 744 observations). More importantly, after the definition change there is a 
substantial drop in the default rate differential between purpose-loans and non-purpose 
loans (from 4.1pp to 3.1pp). 
The sensitivity analysis indicates that controlling for observable characteristics, 
the small difference between the default rate of the two loan types remains. The 
estimation results with the alternative definition of default are presented in Table 1.6 - 
the ATT is equal to 0.6 percentage points and is statistically significant at a 1% 
level;22that is, when comparing applicants with same characteristics and loan contract 
terms, purpose-loans have a default rate of only 0.6 percentage points higher than non-
                                                 
 
22 The detailed results of the propensity score matching are available upon request. 
Table 1.5: Interest rate differential - ATT estimation results  
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
Interest rate Unmatched 9.5712 13.9741 -4.4030 0.0214 -206.12 
       
 
Sample Treated Controls Difference Bootstrap Std. Err. z 
 
ATT 9.5714 13.1382 -3.5668 0.0344 -103.80   





purpose loans. Hence, the alternative definition of default confirms the validity of the 
identification strategy and the robustness of the results.  
Borrowers’ sensitivity across loans with and without purpose was tested by 
interacting loan purpose with application characteristics. The results suggest that the 
effect of application characteristics on default does not vary for different types of loans 
as none of the regression coefficients on the interaction terms were statistically 
significant at 1% level.  
1.7 Conclusion 
Loans to households constitute the largest part of the banking loan portfolios in several 
economies.23 This paper addresses a primary problem of lending institutions; that is, 
how to evaluate customers’ probability of default prior to granting loans. Utilizing data 
from a large set of household loans from the Czech Republic, the default rates of 
purpose-loans and non-purpose loans are analyzed and compared. 
The paper offers several contributions to the current literature on the household 
loan market. First, the results provide evidence that housing loans are defaulted less 
                                                 
 
23 For instance, as at the end of 2013 in the Czech Republic, loans to individuals represented (first largest) 
49.0 percent, and loans to non-financial corporations represented (second largest) 38.9 percent of loans 
granted in the economy (Czech National Bank - Financial Market Supervision Report 2013, 
http://www.cnb.cz/en/supervision_financial_market/aggregate_information_financial_sector/financial_m
arket_supervision_reports/index.html) 
Table 1.6: Sensitivity analysis - ATT estimation results 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
Default rate Unmatched 0.0082 0.0397 -0.0315 0.0017  -19.05 
       
 
Sample Treated Controls Difference Bootstrap Std. Err. z 
 
ATT 0.0083 0.0144 -0.0061 0.0019  -3.26 
 
Note: (1) “Treated” and “Control” stands for purpose-loans and non-purpose loans, respectively. (2) A 








often. The existence of informal collateral (i.e. evidence of homeownership and invoice 
about loan purpose) signals better loan repayment. This is in line with theories that 
consider collateral as a tool to alleviate adverse selection on the household loan market. 
Second, the default rate differentials between household loan types are in several cases 
not driven by the purpose they intend to finance, but the type of borrower. This effect is 
most significant in the case of loans for home renovation. Third, controlling for 
observable application characteristics and loan contract terms, the default rate 
differential between purpose-loans and non-purpose loans decreases, though the interest 
rates differential between these two types of loans remains substantial. Specifically, 
while purpose-loans have, on average, only a 0.7pp higher default rate, their interest rate 
is 3.6pp higher than for non-purpose loans.  
These findings provide evidence of the asymmetric information present on the 
household loan market. Borrowers applying for purpose-loans and non-purpose loans 
have very similar default probability, but are charged substantially different interest 
rates.  This is in line with the empirical literature, according to which, financial 
institutions are prudent in household loan pricing and charge a high mark-up when 
compared to mortgage or corporate loans. Nevertheless, this raises a question whether 
the interest rate for housing loans (being subject to tax-deductibility) should not be re-
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Table 1.A.1: The list of personal loan information  
(Panel A – Loan term   characteristics) 
 





     Loan term characteristics  
   Loan approval indicator APPROVED dummy   
Approved amount (in CZK) AAMOUNT continuous        - Dobbie and Skiba (2013) 
   + Adams et al. (2009) 
Interest rate (in %) IR continuous   Approved loan maturity  
(in months) AMATURITY continuous + Adams et al. (2009) 
Risk band  NRISK 
   Very low-risk 
 
1   
Low-risk 
 
2   
High-risk 
 
3   
Very high-risk 
 
4   
Credit bureau information CBINFO dummy   
Purpose-loan PURPOSEL dummy - Kocenda and Vojtek(2011) 
Loan purpose PURPOSE    
Non-purpose loan  1   
Home purchase  2   
Home renovation  3   
Home equipment  4   
New/used car purchase  5   
Other purpose  6   
Risk-based pricing RBPRICING dummy - Adams et al. (2009) 
     






Table 1.A.1: The list of personal loan information 
(Panel B – Application characteristics) 
 





     
Application characteristics  
   Age (in months) AGE continuous - Dobbie and Skiba (2013) 
Female  FEMALE dummy - Chandler and Ewert (1976) 
Marital status MARITS    
Unspecified 
 
1   
Divorced 
 
2 + Barron et al. (2008) 
Married 
 
3 - Kocenda and Vojtek (2011) 
Partner 
 
4   
Single 
 
5   
Widow/er 
 
6   
Education EDU    
Secondary (technical) 
 
1   
Secondary (general) 
 
2   
Post-secondary (technical) 
 
3   
Secondary (vocational) 
 
4   
Post-secondary (vocational) 
 
5   
University 
 
6 - Kocenda and Vojtek (2011) 
Housing status HOUSE    
Unspecified 
 
1   
Living with parents 
 
2   
Sharing property 
 
3   
Personal property 
 
4 - Adams et al. (2009) 
Renting 
 
5   
Student dormitory 
 
6   
Employment status EMPLOYS    
Employed 
 
1   
House wife 
 
2   
Pensioner 
 
3   Student 
 
4 - Marshall et al. (2010) 
Employment duration (in months) EMPLOYY continuous - Kocenda and Vojtek (2011) 
Employment type EMPLOYT    
Unspecified 
 
1   
Bank/insurance company 
 
2   Entrepreneur 
 
3 + Marshall et al. (2010) 
Foreign company 
 
4   
Private company 
 
5   
Public organization 
 
6 - Kocenda and Vojtek (2011) 
Net monthly income (in CZK) INCOME continuous - Gross and Souleles (2002) 
Region (NUTS2) REGION dummy   
Credit bureau score CBSCORE continuous - Barron et al. (2008) 
Application score APPSCORE continuous   Behavioral score BEHAVSCORE continuous - Marshall et al. (2010) 







Table 1.A.2:  Information value of application characteristics 
Variable No default Default Total Odds  Information value  
Education     0.2 
Secondary (technical) 1 108 108 1 216 2 
 Secondary (general) 6 775 690 7 465 2 
 Post-secondary (technical) 1 713 48 1 761 1 
 Secondary (vocational) 43 951 1 813 45 764 1 
 Post-secondary (vocational) 36 512 2 371 38 883 1 
 University 10 480 190 10 670 0 
 Employment type 
    
0.3 
Unspecified 45 331 3 222 48 553 1 
 Bank/insurance company 2 142 20 2 162 0 
 Entrepreneur 2 246 201 2 447 2 
 Foreign company 3 029 380 3 409 2 
 Private company 28 023 912 28 935 1 
 Public organization 19 768 485 20 253 0 
 Marital status 
    
0.1 
Unspecified 896 76 972 2 
 Divorced 17 638 943 18 581 1 
 Married 45 385 1 672 47 057 1 
 Partner 905 63 968 1 
 Single 32 304 2 342 34 646 1 
 Widow/er 3 411 124 3 535 1 
 Gender 
    
0.0 
Male 53 205 3 269 56 474 1 
 Female 47 334 1 951 49 285 1 
 Housing status     0.2 
Unspecified 2 685 245 2 930 2 
 Living with parents 15 922 1 121 17 043 1 
 Sharing property 3 333 248 3 581 1 
 Personal property 59 617 1 892 61 509 1 
 Renting 18 976 1 712 20 688 2 
 Student dormitory 6 2 8 6 
 Employment status 
    
0.0 
Employed 86 999 4 654 91 653 1 
 House wife 1 747 122 1 869 1 
 Pensioner 11 698 437 12 135 1 
 Student 95 7 102 1 
 Loan purpose     0.2 
Non-purpose loan 86 283 5 022 91 305 1 
 Home purchase 3 098 73 3 171 0 
 Home renovation 6 734 84 6 818 0 
 Home equipment 471 6 477 0 
 New/used car purchase 247 4 251 0 
 Other purpose 3 706 31 3 737 0   






Table 1.A.3:  Descriptive statistics (Panel A – Loan term characteristics) 
Variable name Mean Std. Dev.  Min   Max  
     Loan term characteristics  Accepted loans (N=105 759) 
 
    Approved amount (in CZK) 93 653 82 100 4 000 1 000 000 
Approved loan maturity (in months) 54.0 26.5 1.0 134 
Interest rate (in %) 13.4 2.8 3.7 25.9 
Default indicator 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Purpose-loan 0.102 0.303 0 1 
Credit bureau score 318 269 -40 1 120 
Application score 178 222 -4 998 
Behavioral score 454 192 0 1 012 
          





Table 1.A.3:  Descriptive statistics (Panel B – Application characteristics) 
Variable name Mean Std. Dev.  Min   Max  
     Application characteristics  Accepted and rejected loans (N=207 640) 
 
    Age (in months) 485 155      216    1 159 
Female  0.479 0.500 0 1 
Marital status 
    Divorced 0.184 0.387 0 1 
Married 0.418 0.493 0 1 
Partner 0.012 0.107 0 1 
Single 0.335 0.472 0 1 
Widow/er 0.010 0.100 0 1 
Education 
    Secondary (general) 0.103 0.303 0 1 
Post-secondary (technical) 0.015 0.120 0 1 
Secondary (vocational) 0.400 0.490 0 1 
Post-secondary (vocational) 0.387 0.487 0 1 
University 0.084 0.278 0 1 
Housing status 
    Living with parents 0.170 0.375 0 1 
Sharing property 0.033 0.180 0 1 
Personal property 0.541 0.498 0 1 
Renting 0.220 0.414 0 1 
Student dormitory 0.000 0.009 0 1 
Employment status 
    House wife 0.030 0.172 0 1 
Pensioner 0.142 0.349 0 1 
Student 0.001 0.029 0 1 
Employment duration (in months) 71 90 0 579 
Employment type 
    Bank/insurance company 0.017 0.129 0 1 
Entrepreneur 0.027 0.161 0 1 
Foreign company 0.032 0.176 0 1 
Private company 0.261 0.439 0 1 
Public organization 0.178 0.383 0 1 
Net monthly income (in CZK) 17 451 11 861 1 500 000 
Credit bureau information 0.756 0.429 0 1 
Risk band  
    Low-risk 0.362 0.480 0 1 
High-risk 0.122 0.327 0 1 
Very high-risk 0.029 0.167 0 1 
Loan approval indicator 0.510 0.500 0 1 
          






Table 1.A.4: Balancing hypothesis – Default rate estimation 
Application and loan term characteristics Mean t-test 
Treated Control %bias t p>|t| 
            
Risk-based pricing 0.342 0.569 -51.4 -39.45 0.000 
Behavioral score 476.66 516.14 -20.0 -17.66 0.000 
Credit bureau score 385.14 513.48 -47.1 -39.92 0.000 
Interest rate 9.642 10.344 -26.8 -23.78 0.000 
Loan maturity 2.736 2.739 -0.5 -0.50 0.615 
Approved amount (in CZK) 2.713 2.731 -2.0 -2.24 0.025 
Age 485.14 507.5 -16.1 -14.74 0.000 
Female 0.435 0.462 -5.5 -4.59 0.000 
Secondary (general) 0.037 0.036 0.2 0.19 0.849 
Post-secondary (technical) 0.020 0.016 3.5 2.96 0.003 
Secondary (vocational) 0.471 0.471 -0.1 -0.08 0.934 
Post-secondary (vocational) 0.293 0.300 -1.4 -1.24 0.216 
University 0.170 0.173 -0.8 -0.60 0.549 
House wife 0.018 0.016 1.5 1.29 0.196 
Pensioner 0.063 0.081 -6.4 -6.03 0.000 
Student 0.001 0.001 0.8 1.00 0.317 
Employment duration (in months) 82.11 88.965 -7.6 -6.12 0.000 
Bank/insurance company 0.029 0.020 5.5 4.58 0.000 
Entrepreneur 0.023 0.016 4.3 3.97 0.000 
Foreign company 0.022 0.011 6.5 7.06 0.000 
Private company 0.331 0.487 -34.2 -27.04 0.000 
Public organization 0.215 0.182 8.3 6.99 0.000 
Net monthly income 22585 24360 -12.4 -9.26 0.000 
Divorced 0.171 0.201 -8.0 -6.57 0.000 
Married 0.522 0.537 -2.9 -2.44 0.015 
Partner 0.011 0.011 0.1 0.11 0.910 
Single 0.266 0.225 9.0 8.01 0.000 
Widow/er 0.020 0.023 -2.1 -1.96 0.050 
Living with parents 0.114 0.101 3.9 3.66 0.000 
Sharing property 0.028 0.009 10.6 11.53 0.000 
Personal property 0.690 0.747 -11.8 -10.63 0.000 
Renting 0.148 0.125 6.0 5.61 0.000 
            
   Summary of the distribution of |bias| 
       Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 MeanB MedB 
  0.089 3488.96 0.000 8.7 5.5 






Table 1.A.5: Common support – Default rate estimation 
Treatment assignment Common support Total 
Off support On support 
Untreated 0 91 297 91 297 
Treated 294 14 160 14 454 
Total 294 105 457 105 751 






Table 1.A.6: Balancing hypothesis – Interest rate estimation 
Application and loan term characteristics Mean t-test 
Treated Control %bias t p>|t| 
 
     Risk-based pricing applied 0.342 0.336 1.2 0.98 0.326 
Behavioral score 474.34 478.92 -2.3 -2.00 0.045 
Credit bureau score 384.51 381.06 1.3 1.07 0.286 
Loan maturity 2.740 2.735 0.8 0.87 0.387 
Approved amount (in CZK) 2.717 2.725 -0.9 -1.09 0.276 
Age 486.52 488.2 -1.2 -1.11 0.269 
Female 0.436 0.444 -1.5 -1.32 0.188 
Secondary (general) 0.037 0.037 0.1 0.06 0.950 
Post-secondary (technical) 0.020 0.020 0.2 0.17 0.866 
Secondary (vocational) 0.470 0.466 0.8 0.71 0.479 
Post-secondary (vocational) 0.292 0.301 -1.8 -1.58 0.113 
University 0.171 0.167 1.4 1.05 0.293 
House wife 0.018 0.017 0.6 0.54 0.589 
Pensioner 0.064 0.062 0.7 0.75 0.453 
Student 0.001 0.001 0.0 -0.00 1.000 
Employment duration (in months) 82.267 84.032 -2.0 -1.62 0.106 
Bank/insurance company 0.028 0.028 0.0 0.04 0.972 
Entrepreneur 0.023 0.021 1.3 1.13 0.259 
Foreign company 0.022 0.021 0.5 0.49 0.624 
Private company 0.330 0.333 -0.5 -0.41 0.680 
Public organization 0.216 0.219 -0.8 -0.66 0.512 
Net monthly income 22467 22253 1.5 1.15 0.250 
Divorced 0.171 0.166 1.2 1.05 0.293 
Married 0.525 0.529 -0.8 -0.71 0.480 
Partner 0.011 0.012 -0.5 -0.38 0.702 
Single 0.263 0.258 1.0 0.88 0.377 
Widow/er 0.020 0.022 -1.3 -1.26 0.206 
Living with parents 0.113 0.112 0.2 0.22 0.823 
Sharing property 0.028 0.027 0.5 0.47 0.638 
Personal property 0.693 0.690 0.5 0.45 0.656 
Renting 0.147 0.149 -0.7 -0.66 0.508 
            
      Summary of the distribution of |bias| 
       Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 MeanB MedB 
  0.001 39.89 0.475 0.9 0.8 









Table 1.A.7: Common support – Interest rate estimation 
Treatment assignment Common support Total 
Off support On support 
Untreated 0 91 297 91 297 
Treated 2 14 452 14 454 
Total 2 105 749 105 751 
 Note: “Treated” and “Control” stands for purpose-loans and non-purpose loans, respectively. 
 
Table 1.A.8: Default rate by loan type 
  Default = 30 days  overdue Default = 90 days  overdue 
Loan type No default Default No default Default 
Unspecified purpose 94.5% 5.5% 96.0% 4.0% 
Specified purpose 98.6% 1.4% 99.2% 0.8% 
Total    100 508           5 219          101 983      3 744    








Does Loan Maturity Matter in Risk-Based Pricing? 






Over recent decades, substantial increases in the number of household loans24 have been 
observed worldwide. Lending to individuals to finance the purchase of goods or 
services has become particularly popular in emerging markets. Despite the initial 
difficulties related to the availability of only minimal credit history on borrowers and 
pioneering methods used to evaluate the creditworthiness of borrowers, lending 
institutions instituted extensive provision of household loans. The quantitative 
                                                 
 
24 The European Central Bank defines household loans in the following way: Credit for consumption 
(loans granted for mainly personal consumption of goods and services) includes loans to sole 
proprietors/unincorporated partnerships if the loan is predominantly used for personal consumption. 
Loans included in this category may or may not be collateralized by various forms of security or 
guarantee. Typical examples of loans in this category are loans granted for the financing of motor 
vehicles, furniture, domestic appliances and other consumer durables, holiday travel, etc. Loans to cover 
overdrafts and credit card loans also typically belong in this category. Lending for house purchase is 
excluded from this category.  







importance of household loans in emerging markets can be illustrated using the example 
of the Czech Republic, where between 2000 and 2012 the total volume of household 
loans rose from CZK 31.1bn to CZK 157.3bn. 25 
The rapid growth of the consumer credit market has drawn increased attention to 
the asymmetric information present between lenders and borrowers. Stiglitz and 
Weiss’s 1981 paper shows that lenders who are imperfectly informed about the default 
probability of borrowers (henceforth referred to as a borrower’s ‘riskiness’) may suffer 
from adverse selection when deciding to grant a loan or not. Adverse selection occurs 
when, being aware of their own riskiness, “low-risk” borrowers with low probability of 
default will not be willing to pay increased prices for loans in the form of higher interest 
rates, while “high-risk” borrowers with a high probability of default will accept them. 
To minimize this, lenders may choose to deny loans rather than raise interest rates. As 
the price fails to regain equilibrium in the market, market imperfection appears. Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) define the solution of limiting the amount of credit as credit rationing 
equilibrium, a situation when certain borrowers are refused funds even if they are 
willing to pay higher interest rates, as lenders are already maximizing profit. According 
to Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990) lenders can also react to adverse selection by offering 
multiple loan contract terms (i.e. loan packages with a distinct loan amount, interest rate 
and maturity). 
Differentiating interest rates based on the borrowers’ riskiness (i.e. applying 
risk-based pricing of interest rates) is one such attempt to mitigate asymmetric 
information on the household loan market. A number of studies (Edelberg, 2006; Einav, 
Jenkins, and Levin, 2012) argue that borrowers are highly responsive to interest rate 
variations. Specifically, they provide evidence that risk-based pricing raises the 
borrowing costs of “high-risk” applicants’; and hence restricts the level of their debt.  
Addressing excess loan demand under imperfect information becomes more 
important in a loan market where borrowers have liquidity constraints. An individual 
with liquidity constraints does not have sufficient funds to finance present consumption 
                                                 
 






with income that will be accumulated in the future. Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009) 
show that this inability to reallocate funds over time can result in notable adverse 
selection (i.e. borrowers with a high probability of default increase their debt amount). 
Supporting the results of the previous literature, Adams et al. (2009) highlight that risk-
based pricing can effectively diminish the severity of the information problem (i.e. 
“high-risk” borrowers receive lower loan amounts). Nevertheless, in identifying loan 
demand and loan repayment the authors did not consider an important aspect for 
borrowers with liquidity constraints, the role of loan maturity. 
Although practitioners and policymakers consider interest rates as a key driver 
of loan demand, the sensitivity of loan demand to maturity might be equally crucial. 
Estimating the demand elasticity with respect to both interest rate and maturity, 
Attanasio, Goldberg, and Kyriazidou (2008) and Karlan and Zinman (2008) show that 
borrowers with low income are more responsive to maturity changes than to interest rate 
changes. Their finding is consistent with binding liquidity constraints, a situation when 
borrowers with limited available cash choose longer loan maturity in order to reduce 
monthly payments, rather than decreased interest rates. The authors shed light on the 
role of maturity on purchasing behavior; however, limited and inconclusive empirical 
evidence exists about its implications for loan performance or pricing decisions. 
The current paper attempts to fill this gap by estimating loan demand and loan 
performance jointly and highlighting the implications of maturity choice for screening 
out risky borrowers. First, I derive the econometric specifications for loan granting and 
repayment. I use these to estimate the elasticity of loan demand and probability of 
default with respect to both interest rate and loan maturity.  Specifically, I test the null 
hypothesis that loan interest rate and maturity have no role in loan demand, whether 
borrowers are liquidity constrained or not. Second, I point out the role of a risk-based 
maturity setting in decreasing the information asymmetries on the loan market. In 
particular, I test the null hypothesis that maturity choice after risk-based pricing has no 
impact on loan default. Third, I show that the time of default is maturity-dependent and 
differs across borrowers in the different risk categories. The key contribution of this 





both loan maturity and loan defaults increase. Specifically, liquidity constrained “high-
risk” borrowers are offered high interest rates and most often choose long-term loans. 
This eventually increases their probability of default. Hence, a risk-based maturity 
setting does not necessarily improve the quality of household loans granted or alleviate 
the adverse selection present on the lending market. 
This paper utilizes a unique dataset of rejected and accepted household loans 
from a Czech commercial bank (hereafter, the “Bank”).26 These include loans granted 
for the purchase of goods and services, loans granted for the 
modernization/reconstruction of housing and loans without a stated purpose. The unique 
dataset contains extensive information on borrower application characteristics, loan 
contract terms, and loan performance information of over 220 000 individuals who 
applied for a household loan between 2007 and 2013. From January 2012, the Bank has 
applied risk-based pricing, which is reviewed and developed periodically. 
2.2 The Lending Process 
Altman (1980) defines the lending process as a sequence of activities involving two 
principal parties whose association spans from loan application to successful or 
unsuccessful loan repayment. Figure 2.1 illustrates the five key levels of the lending 
process.  
Level 1  
The individual enters the household loan market by submitting an application 
form for a loan.27 The borrower discloses information about his/her socio-demographic 
characteristics such as age, marital status, education, etc. (application characteristics) 
                                                 
 
26 The Bank does not wish to be explicitly identified. The anonymized data is available for replication. 
27 On the household loan market, loan contract terms vary substantially across individual loan providers. 
Prior to loan application, the borrower has indicative information (for random loan amount and a 
minimum interest rate offer, each lender publishes a menu of maturities and annuity payments) about the 
lenders’ offer from publicly available marketing materials. When entering the loan application process, 
the borrower uses this information to decide about his/her preferred loan maturity/amount given liquidity 






and information related to the requested loan such as the loan amount, loan maturity, 
etc. (loan term characteristics). The loan maturity is initially set by the applicant and is 
assumed to be driven by the long-term unemployment incidence of the region where the 
loan is requested.28  
Level 2 
The lender determines whether to grant the requested loan to the applicant. In 
order to assess the creditworthiness of their potential debtors, financial institutions use 
credit scoring techniques. The main purpose of these techniques is to estimate the 
probability that an applicant for credit will default by a given time in the future.29 In its 
credit scoring model, the Bank estimates the default probability using 3 types of credit 
scores: behavioral score (derived from the applicant’s repayment history), application 
score (derived from the applicant’s descriptive socio-demographic characteristics) and 
credit bureau score (derived from information about the applicant’s existing and prior 
debt). Using these scores the bank assigns each applicant a risk band (four groups of 
“very low-risk”, “low-risk”, “high-risk” and “very high-risk” borrowers). If the 
applicant’s loan is pre-accepted (based on his/her aggregate credit score), the lender 
then assigns an interest rate for the requested loan maturity/amount. The interest rate is 
set primarily by the lender.30 The lender offers loan contract terms that maximize its 
expected profit (taking into account the expected profit from an alternative investment 
of the loan amount). The interest rate is assumed to be driven by the applicant’s risk 
margin, which is the price for the riskiness of the borrower and reflects the lender’s risk 
aversion at the time of the loan request. 
 
 
                                                 
 
28 The change of loan maturity is subject to a new loan application. 
29 These are evaluated by analyzing a sample of customers who applied for loans in the past, where there 
is good information on subsequent loan performance history. 
30 The assumption that loan maturity is primarily set by the borrower and the approved loan 
amount/interest rate is set primarily by the lender is made based on the Bank’s best practice applied in the 
household loan market. It is also in line with the related literature. In Karlan and Zinman (2008) the 
lender identifies the loan price based on the borrower’s pre-approved riskiness; and Attanasio et al. 






Given the approved loan amount, interest rate and maturity the applicant has a 
chance to accept (open the account) or reject the loan contract conditions (no loan is 
originated). The borrower’s decision is driven by his/her risk awareness and by the 
amount of monthly annuity payment (especially if the applicant is liquidity constrained). 
A loan is considered to be approved if it is approved by both the lender and the 
applicant. A loan is considered to be rejected if it is rejected by either the lender or the 
applicant. 
Level 4 
Given that the lender and the borrower agree on loan contract terms31 and the 
borrower is granted the loan, the borrower starts repaying the principal and interest in 
the form of monthly annuity payments. The borrower can either follow the agreed 
repayment schedule, or renegotiate the loan contract terms (e.g. early repayment).32 
Level 5 
The borrower either fully repays the loan or defaults. The borrower is considered 
to be in default if he/she is more than 90 days overdue with any payment connected with 
the loan.  
                                                 
 
31 The final loan contract terms are determined by the relative risk aversion across the borrower and the 
lender. The Bank’s lending process is designed such that the lender reflects his/her risk aversion primarily 
through interest rate level and the borrower reflects its risk aversion primarily through maturity choice. In 
line with Adams et al. (2009) I assume that the competitive outcome is the contract that maximizes the 
borrowers’ utility subject to lenders making non-negative profits. 
32 Early repayment might be more likely for “high-risk” borrowers, since they can have then better credit 
after successful payments. However, early repayment is connected with additional borrowing costs in the 





Figure 2.1: The lending process and data availability 
 
 
Note: Author’s illustration of the lending process based on the description of the Bank. For loan request i the following information is available: li - loan amount, ri - 
loan interest rate, ti - loan maturity, xi - the borrower’s application characteristics, ni - the region in which is loan is requested, ui - the region’s long-term unemployment 
incidence, ai - approved loan, bi - number of debtors registered at the Czech Banking Credit Bureau at the time of loan request, mi - risk margin, yi - dummy for risk-
based pricing, yi - dummy for renegotiated loan, di - dummy for default, tdi - months until default. The individual equations of the econometric specification are 
described in Section 1.3 Methodology. 
Level 1 Borrower: Loan application Borrower: No loan application
 (207 640 obs) (no obs) (2.3)
Level 2 Lender: Loan offer Lender: No loan offer (2.4)
 (114 944 obs) (92 696 obs)
(2.2)
Level 3 Borrower: Loan agreement          Borrower: No loan agreement
(105 759 obs)      (9 185 obs) (2.6)
Level 4 Renegotiation Regular payments
(2 090 obs) (103 669 obs)
Level 5 No Default Default (2.8)

































































tiiiiii snuxt εχχχχ ++++= 4321
riiiiii snmxr εββββ ++++= 4321
)0(1 54321 >+++++= biiiiiii sbumxa εδδδδδ










Overall, the main objective of this paper is to develop an econometric model that 
demonstrates the role of risk-based pricing and loan maturity on a consumer credit 
market with asymmetric information. I start by estimating the loan demand elasticity 
with respect to maturity and interest rate. Then I highlight the time dependency of 
default and examine the maturity specific factors of loan performance.  
The expected impact of selected variables and the predictions of the related 
literature are summarized in Table 2.A.1 in the Appendix. 
2.3.1 Modeling Loan Demand 
The loan demand estimation is complicated by the endogeneity of loan contract terms 
and sample selection (the non-random character) present in the household loan data. 
These can cause the parameter estimates to be biased. This section discusses how this 
paper deals with these two key issues in the loan demand estimation. 
 
Loan Interest Rate 
       
Interest rate endogeneity arises as lenders can change the loan price based on loan 
demand, and vice versa, the borrower can adjust his/her loan demand based on offered 
interest rates. In setting the price, the profit-maximizing lender aims to increase the 
interest rate, whereas the borrower aims to receive a loan at the lowest possible rate.  
The literature deals with the endogeneity of interest rates in different ways. In 
Alessie, Weber, and Hochguertel (2005), the Italian usury law of 1997 (which limited 
interest rate charges) is used as an instrument for the identification of endogenous 
interest rate in loan demand estimation. The authors find evidence for the interest-rate 
elasticity of loan demand and argue that it is region specific. In Attanasio et al. (2008), 
the endogeneity of loan interest rate is addressed by exploiting data on the U.S. tax 
reform of 1986 (the change in interest deductibility affected the after-tax interest rate on 




market by exploiting variation in list prices (i.e. catalogue car prices that differ from 
negotiated prices) and variation in the level of down payments. 
Similarly to Karlan and Zinman (2008), this paper captures the variation in the 
interest rate by information on the applicant’s risk category. Applicants are classified 
into risk bands based on their estimated riskiness. These bands are then translated into 
risk margins taking into account the (conservative or aggressive) loan granting strategy 
of the lender. The higher the lender’s risk aversion, the higher the risk margin and the 
final loan interest rate.  I assume that the lender sets the final interest rate based on the 
loan’s risk margin (the lender’s willingness to accept the expected risk of the borrower). 
The interest margin has no effect on the loan amount, as the borrower is not aware of 
the lender’s (frequently changing) loan granting strategy when setting its preferences 




Endogeneity of maturity is a further issue if the borrower cares primarily about monthly 
borrowing costs rather than the ultimate price of the loan. If the borrower is credit 
constrained and offered monthly payments (as result of maturity chosen by the borrower 
and interest rate set by the lender) that s/he cannot afford, s/he can either apply for a 
lower loan amount (which might decrease the interest rate) or prolong the maturity of 
the initially requested loan (accepting the initial interest rate). I assume that setting loan 
maturity is primarily the decision of the borrower, who aims to decrease the cost of 
lending by choosing shorter loans. S/he is willing to prolong the length of the loan only 
to such an extent that the decreased monthly payments are acceptable for her expected 
future financial resources. The lender aims to prolong the loan maturity, as this is 
associated with higher interest income, while the higher riskiness of the borrower is 
implicitly reflected in the interest rate. It is questionable how successful the lender is in 
transferring the riskiness of borrower into the loan price or how significant the adverse 
selection is on the market. I discuss this issue in more detail in the next section. 
The majority of studies neglect the effect of loan maturity on loan demand 
(Edelberg, 2006; Adams et al., 2009), and only limited empirical literature focuses on 




endogeneity of loan maturity is addressed by using data on the increased durability of 
cars (due to slower car depreciation, the maturity of loans is prolonged). Karlan and 
Zinman (2008) cooperate with the lender to generate exogenous variation in loan 
maturity. Specifically, randomly assigned “maturity suggestions” (loan offers for 
different maturities) are used to identify the elasticity of loan demand with respect to 
maturity. The randomized trial was conducted by a microfinance institution in South 
Africa.  
To identify loan maturity in the loan demand equation, this paper utilizes data on 
the region’s unemployment duration. Specifically, I follow Jurajda and Munich (2002) 
and use the long-term unemployment incidence (hereafter, the “LTU incidence”) as a 
measure of unemployment duration. The LTU incidence is defined as the share of 
persons unemployed for 12 months or more in the total number of unemployed persons, 
expressed as a percentage.33 There are two reasons to use LTU incidence as a measure 
of unemployment duration. First, as opposed to the LTU rate (the share of the number 
of long-term unemployed to the size of the labor force), the definition of LTU incidence 
is more transparent in transition countries where the concept of labor-force participation 
has been adopted gradually. Second, LTU incidence allows a researcher to capture the 
specifics of the business cycle (during recession it first declines driven by the increase 
in short-term unemployed workers, then it rises driven by the difficulty of the short-
term unemployed to find employment) with the required regional granularity.  
Several studies emphasize the role of unemployment in determining the duration 
of household loans. Navratil (1981) is the first to highlight that in periods of high 
unemployment rates, the short-term lending for auto loans is likely to increase, thus 
decreasing loan maturity. A contrary finding is provided by the more recent paper by 
Chetty (2008), who shows that for the unemployed, the welfare gains of longer loans 
are much higher than the welfare gains of shorter loans. In particular, by prolonging the 
loan maturity, borrowers can decrease the monthly repayment amount and overcome 









financial difficulties during longer periods of unemployment. Attanasio et al. (2008) and 
Stephens (2008) argue that liquidity constraints determine the length of loans.  
Motivated by the above studies, this paper utilizes the incidence of regional 
unemployment for the identification of loan maturity. Higher unemployment is expected 
to prolong household loans, as obtaining loans with longer maturity enables borrowers 
to take precautions against the risk of a long period of unemployment. On the other 
hand, the region’s long-term unemployment incidence does not influence the number of 
loans requested, because the requested loan is primarily the result of the borrower’s 
preferences about smoothing his/her consumption. If the borrower prefers to borrow 
some amount (rather than to save over a period of time for an expenditure), s/he is not 
discouraged from borrowing because s/he lives in a region which has experienced an 
increase in its long-term unemployment incidence. What s/he primarily cares about in 




Sample selection arises for two reasons: 
1) no information is available on those who did not wish to borrow;  
2) information on rejected applicants is limited - loan contract terms are available 
only for those who were approved for a loan. 
The related empirical literature acknowledges the difficulties in correcting for sample 
selection on the household loan market. Alessie et al. (2005) accept that the sample 
selection cannot be corrected, using Heckman’s (1979) model, as the authors fail to find 
a variable that predicts loan approval but does not influence loan demand. They assume 
that a bank with a leading market position attracts applicants with good repayment 
behavior. Their solution is to estimate loan demand by controlling for the observable 
characteristics of the borrowers. Specifically, Alessie et al. (2005) correct for the 
composition effect connected to observable characteristics by p-score weighting the 
individual observations. Using data on auto loans, Attanasio et al. (2008) correct the 
sample selection in the loan demand equation through characteristics that have impact 





In line with the literature, this paper could not account for individuals who did 
not apply for a loan. I assume that the probability that an individual will apply for a loan 
has no endogenous effect on the probability of default. An individual can apply for a 
loan regardless of his/her expectation of the default probability it will be granted, as 
credit bureaus collect only information on borrowers who were eventually provided a 
loan.34 If a potential borrower is rejected by the credit scoring evaluation, this is 
recorded in the credit bureau system for a maximum of 12 months. Thus, unless the 
customer has a bad loan repayment/default history connected with a previously 
provided loan, being rejected has no direct impact on the quality of his future loans after 
12 months. In such cases, the probability of being accepted is equal in all institutions 
with no rejection history. The only cost implied by loan application is the time cost. 
On the other hand, this paper does take into account the limited information on 
those who applied, but did not ultimately sign the loan contract. This includes both 
cases when the Bank rejects the applicant or when the applicant does not accept the loan 
contract terms offered by the Bank. To solve this problem of missing data on rejected 
loans, I follow Heckman (1979) and first estimate the selection equation on the whole 
sample of applicants. Similarly to Haas, Ferreira, and Taci (2010) and Bicakova, 
Prelcova, and Pasalicova (2010), the level of information-sharing about the borrowers’ 
indebtedness is used to capture the variation in loan approval. Specifically, in this paper 
the exclusion restriction for the selection equation is the number of debtors monitored 
by the Czech Banking Credit Bureau. Over the past ten years, the credit bureaus have 
achieved substantial development both in the quality of information and the coverage of 
debt in the financial sector. This allows the use of information about a varying number 
of debtors to identify loan approval. The more positive information that is available 
about the debt level of a borrower, the more likely it is that the borrower is reliable and 
will maintain regular monthly loan repayments. At the same time, the borrower’s 
decision about the requested loan amount is independent of developments in credit 
                                                 
 
34 The CBCB - Czech Banking Credit Bureau was established in 2002 for the purpose of operating the 
Client Information Bank Register (CIBR). It contains data on contractual (loan) relations between banks 




bureau information. His/her available credit history affects the decision of the 
prospective borrower to apply for a loan rather than the amount he/she applies for. 
 
Model Specification   
  
I specify the borrower’s loan demand with respect to interest rate and maturity by the 
following econometric specification: 
 
liiiiiii strxLl εαααα ++++== 4321)log( ,                                              (2.1)  
riiiiii snmxr εββββ ++++= 4321 ,                                                               (2.2)                                                                                  
tiiiiii snuxt εχχχχ ++++= 4321 ,                                                                (2.3)  
 
where for each loan application i = 1…N the following is known: iL  is the approved 
loan amount (takes logarithmic form as loans are non-negative) , ix  is the vector of the 
information on application characteristics, behavioral and credit bureau score; ir  is the 
loan interest rate set primarily by the lender, it  is the loan maturity set primarily by the 
borrower, im  is the borrower’s risk margin, iu is the long-term unemployment 
incidence in the borrower’s region, in  is the region where the application I was 
submitted to the lender, is  is a dummy for risk-based pricing introduced by the Bank in 
January 2012; and tiri εε , , liε  are the unobserved error terms. Consequently, using a 
loan repayment schedule with equal total payments, the lender charges the borrower a 
monthly annuity payment of ))1(1/()*()( itiiiii rrLLp
−+−= . 
To jointly account for both endogeneity and sample selection, I extend the 
sample selection model for endogenous explanatory variables suggested by Wooldridge 
(2002) and estimate the structural equation of interest (2.1) together with the two 
equations describing the endogenous interest rate (2.2) and maturity (2.3), and the 
selection equation (2.4):     
 





where ia  is a binary variable indicating whether the loan is accepted )1( =ia or rejected 
)0( =ia  either by the borrower or the lender, im  is the borrower’s risk margin, iu is the 
long-term unemployment incidence in the borrower’s region, ib is the number of 
debtors registered at the Czech Banking Credit Bureau at the time of the loan request 
and biε  is the unobserved error term.  
The following assumptions are made: 
(a) ),,,,,( iiiiii sbumnx  is always observed, ),,( iii trl  is observed when 1=ia ; 
(b) ),( bili εε  is independent of ),,,,,( iiiiii sbumnx ; 
(c)  bε ~ Normal (0, 1); 
(d) bibili εγεε 4)|( =Ε ; 
(e) 0)'( 1 =Ε riz ε  (where iiii snmxz 43211 βββββ +++= ) and ;02 ≠β  
0)'( 2 =Ε tiz ε  (where iiii snuxz 43212 χχχχχ +++= ) and .02 ≠χ  
Assumption (a) emphasizes the non-random nature of the sample. The exogeneity of 
application characteristics ix  and the two exogenous variables ii um ,  is formalized by 
assumption (b). Assumption (c) states that the error term of the selection equation 
follows standard normal distribution. Linearity in the regression of liε  on biε  is 
required by assumption (d).  Lastly, assumption (e) results from the endogeneity of loan 
contract terms in the loan demand equation (2.1). It states that (i) the error terms tiri εε ,
have zero mean and are uncorrelated with the right-hand-side variables, and (ii), 
),( 22 χβ  are non-zero, requiring that at least two exogenous variables  ),( ii um  do not 
appear in the loan demand equation (the order condition). Under this assumption the 
parameters 2β  and 2χ are identified. 
The derived estimating equation has the following form: 
 





where ),,,,,,|(),,,,,,( iiiiiiiliiiiiiii asbumnxasbunmxg εΕ≡ and 
),,,,,,|( iiiiiiililigi asbumnxεεε Ε−≡ . By definition the error term is uncorrelated with 
the exogenous variables: 0),,,,,,|( =Ε iiiiiiigi asbumnxε . Equation (2.5) is estimated 
by 3SLS on the sample of accepted loan applications )1( =ia  using the exogenous 
variables and the estimated inverse Mills ratio, where  
)()1,,,,,|( 543214 iiiiiiiiiiili sbumxasbumx δδδδδlαε ++++==Ε .   
Specifically, the estimation is performed in two steps. First, using all 
observations the selection equation is estimated by probit and the estimated inverse 
Mills ratio i
^
l  is obtained. Second, using the subsample for which both ),( ii tr  are 
observed, the equation 
 




21                                                    (2.6) 
 
is estimated by 3SLS, using the exogenous variables ),,,(
^
iiii bum l . 
35 In particular, I 
test the null hypothesis that interest rate and loan maturity have no effect on the 
approved loan amount: )0:( 20 =αH and )0:( 30 =αH . The sensitivity of loan demand 
to loan contract terms is estimated both on the pooled sample (including all 
observations) and on the subsample of low-income borrowers (liquidity constrained 
borrowers36 whose net monthly income at the time of loan application is below the 
sample’s median net monthly income).   Finally, the null hypothesis of no selection bias 
( 0: 50 =Η α ) is tested by exploiting the 3SLS t statistic for 5α̂ ; and the null hypothesis 
of no endogeneity is tested by estimating the structural model (2.1) that includes the 
residuals from the two equations describing the endogenous interest rate (2.2) and 
maturity (2.3). 
                                                 
 
35 The sample selection correction is also present in the equations for interest rate (2.2) and maturity (2.3) 
as these are estimated on approved loans. 
36 Borrowers with liquidity constrains cannot be easily identified. This paper utilizes the approach of 





2.3.2 Modeling Default Probability 
The goal of this section is to propose an econometric model that uses demand estimates 
for predicting default probability. The model should reflect how the different loan 
contract terms influencing consumer behavior affect the loan performance. Specifically, 
I focus on the time dependency of default (the length of time the borrower avoided 
default has an impact on the probability of default) and test for the significance of 
asymmetric information hidden in the maturity choice.37 
To do this, I take advantage of the semi-parametric proportional hazard model, 
which relates the individual covariates and the time of event (or failure, as I refer to 
default) occurrence in multiplicate form.  If ),( idi xtl is the probability that an individual 
defaults at time dit  (conditional on making regular payments until default), ix are 
application characteristics, the relationship between the distribution of failure times and 
the vector of application characteristics can be expressed by the semi-parametric 
proportional hazard model developed by Cox (1972) as 
 
)exp().(),( 7654321 iiiiiiiidioidi ynrstysxtxt φφφφφφφll ++++++= ,         (2.7)              
 
where is  is a dummy variable taking  the value 1 if the application was evaluated using 
risk-based pricing, and iy  is a dummy variable taking  the value 1 if the application 
renegotiated ex post. The advantage of proportional hazard models is that whereas 
parametric models use information over the whole time horizon (distributional 
assumption for baseline hazard )(0 ditl ; estimation of the cumulative hazard), semi-
                                                 
 
37 Flannery (1986), Diamond (1991) and Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame, and Miller (2005) were the first 
to suggest that the size of asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers can significantly affect 




parametric models use only the information at failure times (no distributional 
assumption for baseline hazard; estimation of the direct hazard). 
The incomplete information on the occurrence of events during the observation 
period belongs among the specifics of duration time estimation. As the information 
about the loan performance after the end of the observation period is missing, I deal 
with right censored data. There are three possibilities of the event status: the event 
occurred by *dit   (duration time), the event did not occur by the end of observation 
period or the event did not occur before loan completion ( ct ). For each individual one 
observes dit , where ),min(
*
cdidi ttt = .   
Loan amount and default jointly are modelled jointly: 38 
 
)ˆexp().(),( 7654321 giiiiiiiidioidi nrststxtxt εφφφφφφφll ++++++= ,      (2.8)             
 
I test the null hypothesis that loan maturity choice after risk-based pricing has no impact 
on the loan default; formally I test 0: 20 =φH . Similarly to Adams et al. (2009), the 
identification is through the two-stage control function approach – to estimate the loan 
default, the estimated residual giε̂  from loan demand estimation is used as a control 
variable. The main goal is to identify the borrowers’ private information at the time of 
loan application that affects both loan amount and loan default. The models for loan 
demand (2.6) and the default probability (2.8) are also estimated for short-, medium- 
and long-term loans39 and across borrowers in the different risk categories. 
                                                 
 
38 In line with Adams et al. (2009), the hazard model does not control for general macroeconomic 
conditions, as the loan amount and default are modeled jointly. Loan demand is assumed to reflect the 
macroeconomic development, as it is likely to decrease during recessions and grow during booms. 





2.4.1 Data Description 
The data sample consists of the household loan information of over 220 000 individuals. 
The dataset includes application characteristics (e.g. age, marital status, education, etc.), 
loan contract information (e.g. interest rate, loan maturity, loan amount, etc.) and 
performance indicators (e.g. date of default, monthly outstanding balance, overdue 
payments, etc.).  The consumers requested the loans between 2007 and 201340, where 
the last performance observation is from April 2013. Table 2.A.2 in the Appendix 
summarizes the list of available information on household loans. Table 2.A.3 in the 
Appendix, reporting the basic descriptive statistics, suggests that an average borrower is 
40 years old, receives a net monthly income above CZK 17 000 and has been employed 
for more than 5 years. 
In order to measure the performance of the loans, monthly data on repayment 
status are used. For each loan, one piece of the following information is available: the 
number of the months until default, the number of months until on-time repayment or 
the number of months until the end of the data observation interval (April 2013). That 
is, each loan has its survival time: either time to default or time to non-default (being 
repaid or censored data). This enables a more precise estimation of default, as the 
number of successful payments until default is also taken into account.  
When monitored on 30th April 2013, 3.6% of those who had obtained a loan had 
defaulted and the rest of the borrowers had performed well.  Although there are several 
different definitions of “defaulted” loans, the one of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2004) is applied: a loan is in default if the borrower is more than 90 days 
overdue with any payment connected with the loan. 
Rejected loans comprise 48.9% of the total number of household loans. These 
include those applications that were either rejected by the lender (due to application 
                                                 
 
40 The dataset differentiates between the date of loan request and loan opening. Year dummies are created 




characteristics or credit history) or the borrower (due to unfavorable loan terms offered 
by the lender). Figure 2.1 illustrates the number of rejected loans by the lender (92 696 
loans) and by the borrower (9 185 loans). Rejection by the borrower is not identified 
separately, as 90% of the applicants are rejected based on the information gained from 
the credit bureau. 
In addition to information on interest rate, data on risk margin are also limited. 
Risk margin is observed only after risk-based pricing is implemented (January 2012). I 
solve this issue by multiple imputation (similar to Adams et al. 2009). For each 
approved loan application prior to January 2012, the missing risk margin is replaced 
with predicted values from a regression analysis of the complete data. The development 
of risk margin over the observation period is summarized in Table 2.A.4 in the 
Appendix. The sample statistics indicate that there is a gradual increase in the risk 
margin and lenders requested the highest risk margin during 2012. 
The household loan data utilized in this paper is application-specific – for one 
application I observe only one outcome (loan contract terms, loan performance) and the 
change of loan contract terms is subject to a new unidentified loan application. 
Renegotiated loans were first signed with initial loan contract terms, and then during the 
loan repayment period the loan contract terms were renegotiated. As information on the 
renegotiated interest rates is not available, renegotiated loans cannot be used to study 
the incidence of change in loan maturity before and after the introduction of risk-based 
pricing. 
Figure 2.1 summarizes how the data availability differs over the individual 
levels of lending process. 
 
2.4.2 Data Analysis 
Although there are several estimation techniques of the survival functions, non-
parametric methods are very useful for descriptive purposes in the first place. They 




introducing the covariates into the model. Specifically, the survivor and the hazard 
functions are easily interpretable and effective in describing the duration dependence. 
Figure 2.A.1 in the Appendix depicts the cumulative hazard function (with 95% 
confidence intervals) estimated by the Nelson-Aalen method. It suggests that at the end 
of the household loan observation period, almost 90% of the sample remained without 
default. Figure 2.2 plots the estimated hazard rate (with 95% confidence intervals), 
which expresses the instantaneous probability of default conditional on making regular 
payments until a particular month during the time under analysis. According to the 
smoothed hazard function that treats all household loans equally and does not 
distinguish between maturity or risk bands (‘pooled’), defaults are most likely to occur 
around the 30th month from the date of loan provision. On the other hand, the smoothed 
hazard function by maturity suggests that default is not only time-dependent, but also 
maturity dependent. 
Table 2.1 presents the preliminary sample statistics of average maturity (Panel 
A) and average default rate (Panel B) before/after the introduction of risk-based pricing. 
Due to the limited observation period after the introduction of risk-based pricing 
(January 2012), the before/after periods are represented only by one year (2011/2012). 
After the introduction of risk-based pricing, borrowers in all risk bands increase their 
average loan duration, but the “very high-risk” group remains almost unchanged. This is 
mostly likely driven by the low number of observations in the “very high-risk” group. 
The statistics from Table 2.1 (Panel A) are in line with Karlan and Zinman (2008), who 
show that by longer maturity the borrower can lower the amount of monthly payments 
and, hence, afford a higher loan amount. Panel B summarizes the observed average 
default rate for risk bands and loans with different maturities. One year before the 
introduction of risk-based pricing, “very high-risk” borrowers with medium-term loans 
(2-year to 5-year) have the highest incidence of default. One year after the introduction 
of risk-based pricing, borrowers with long-term loans (more than 5-year) default the 
most frequently.  
Hence, the main focus of this paper is whether banks applying risk-based pricing 




increase their debt amount) for liquidity constrained borrowers who are more sensitive 







Figure 2.2: Smoothed hazard function pooled and by maturity 
 
Note: (1) The figure on the left depicts pooled data, i.e. treats all household loans equally and does not 
distinguish between maturity or risk bands. (2) The figure on the right depicts smoothed hazard 
functions for short-term loans with maturity up to 2 years, medium-term loans with maturity between 








Table 2.1: Sample statistics on before/after risk-based pricing 
Panel A - Average maturity 
 
Average loan maturity Number of observations 







Very low-risk 4.4 4.6 8 667 9 902 
Low-risk 4.5 4.7 6 443 6 624 
High-risk 4.1 4.2 1 450 1 580 
Very high-risk 3.5 3.5 551 454 
Total 4.4 4.5 17 111 18 560 
 
Panel B - Average default rate 
Risk band Before  risk-based pricing 
After  risk-
based pricing 
Very low-risk 0.6% 0.1% 
<2Y 0.1% 0.0% 
2Y-5Y 0.4% 0.1% 
>5Y 1.0% 0.2% 
Low-risk 1.8% 0.4% 
<2Y 1.0% 0.3% 
2Y-5Y 1.8% 0.4% 
>5Y 2.1% 0.4% 
High-risk 3.9% 1.3% 
<2Y 2.9% 1.0% 
2Y-5Y 4.0% 1.3% 
>5Y 4.2% 1.3% 
Very high-risk 5.3% 4.0% 
<2Y 3.1% 2.9% 
2Y-5Y 6.2% 3.3% 
>5Y 5.2% 6.4% 
Total 1.5% 0.4% 
 
Note: (1) The Bank classifies borrowers into risk bands based on the estimated riskiness. (2) Before 








This section starts with the estimation of the loan demand model that accounts for both 
the presence of sample selection and the issue of endogeneity. Then I discuss the 
estimates of default probability derived from the Cox proportional hazard model and 
highlight the implications of risk-based pricing on the quality of granted loans, i.e. on 
the probability of default. Both loan demand and loan performance are examined with 
respect to loan contract terms and with respect to the borrower’s application 
characteristics. Finally, I illustrate the maturity-dependent default probability for 
borrowers in the different risk categories. 
 
2.5.1 The Elasticity of Loan Demand to Interest Rate and Maturity 
First, I correct for the non-random feature of the data, by estimating the probability of 
loan approval based on selection equation (2.6).41 The non-random issue of the sample 
arises as there is no information available on those individuals who do not apply for a 
loan and limited information on those who apply but do not sign the loan contract. 
Therefore, I estimate the Heckman (1979) selection model that corrects for this type of 
incomplete information. The number of individuals monitored in the Czech Banking 
Credit Bureau at the time of loan application is used as an exclusion restriction. 
Second, using the estimated inverse Mills ratio from the Heckman (1979) model 
I estimate the loan demand equation (2.1) with the two equations describing the 
endogenous interest rate (2.2) and loan maturity (2.3). The three equations are estimated 
using 3SLS, where the two exclusion restrictions are the borrower’s risk margin and the 
average long-term unemployment incidence in the borrower’s region.  
I reject the null hypothesis that loan interest rate and maturity have no role in 
loan demand (Table 2.2). Consistent with Alessie et al. (2005), the results suggest that 
                                                 
 
41 I follow the variable (non-)categorization of the Bank. In all models the variables are used in the same 
manner as they enter the Bank’s credit scoring model. The individual estimates refer to indicated changes 





increasing interest rates discourage individuals from borrowing (loan demand 
decreases), whereas with longer maturity the loan amount increases (similar to 
Attanasio et al.’s 2008 study).  
The test results suggest that both the null hypothesis of no-sample-selection and 
the null hypothesis of no-endogeneity can be rejected at 1%.  First, I use the t statistic 
on the inverse Mills ratio (variable INVMILLS) as a test for the presence of sample 
selection 0: 40 =Η α . The z-value of 15.6 is strong evidence against the null hypothesis 
of no-sample-selection (Table 2.2, Column 2). Second, I test the endogeneity of interest 
rate and maturity jointly. Specifically, for both endogenous variables I obtain the 
reduced form residuals, and then I test the joint significance of these residuals in the 
structural equation using an F test.  The F (2, 105723) being equal to 188.8 is well 
above the 1% critical value in the F distribution, so I reject the null hypothesis that 
interest rate and loan maturity have no effect on the approved loan amount. In addition, 
I reject the null hypothesis that risk margin has no effect on the loan interest rate (at 1% 
significance level) or that LTU incidence has no effect on the loan maturity (at 5% 
significance level). One percentage point increase in the risk margin leads to a 0.3 
percentage point increase in the interest rate (similar to Karlan and Zinman’s2008 
findings); and a one-year increase in the region’s long-term unemployment leads to a 
0.4-year increase in the loan maturity rate (similar to Chetty’s  2008 findings). 
In Table 2.2, I also compare the interest rate and maturity elasticity of loan 
demand for the pooled sample (Column 2) and for the subsample of low-income 
borrowers (Column 4). The results suggest that the loan amount of a low-income 
borrower increases with longer maturity (a one-month increase in the loan maturity 
results in a 2.1% increase in the loan amount), while the interest rate has statistically no 
significant effect for these borrowers. The increasing importance of loan maturity for 
low-income borrowers is in line with Karlan and Zinman’s 2008 findings. However, 
this paper goes further and uses the maturity elastic demand estimates to see the 
probability of default they imply (see the details in the next section).  
Table 2.A.5 in the Appendix summarizes how the borrower’s application 
characteristics affect loan demand. The parameter estimates have the expected signs. If 




and borrowers who rent housing borrow less. Interestingly, married borrowers, with a 
university education who are employed in a banking/insurance company have the higher 
loan demand. The results are qualitatively comparable to the loan demand determinants 
derived by Attanasio et al. (2008) and Adams et al. (2009). 
2.5.2 The Impact of Risk-Based Pricing on Loan Performance 
The borrower’s probability of default is estimated on the loan contract term and the 
borrower’s application characteristics using the Cox proportional hazard model. In 
addition to the loan and application characteristics, the estimated residual from the loan 
Table 2.2: Estimation results of loan demand and default probability 
Dependent variable Loan demand Default probability 
  Pooled sample Low-income subsample Pooled sample 
Low-income 
subsample 





  (0.004)    (0.006)  (0.010)   (0.017)  





  (0.001)    (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.001)  





   (0.000)    (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.000)  





   (0.000)     (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  
Inverse Mills ratio 0.326***            0.013 
       (0.028)    (0.037)    
Risk-based pricing 0.060***  0.020**  0.442***  
       0.328**  








   (0.294)   (0.415)  
Approved maturity 
*Risk-based pricing             1.009** 
 
       1.013  









      (0.024)   (0.032)  





N 105 759  46 598  105 759  46 598  
Log likelihood     -38 221  -20 223  
Prob> chi2     0.000  0.000  Loglikelihood ratio 
(LR) chi2        4 858   2 639   
Note: (1) For loan demand estimation the logarithmic form of approved loan amount is used. (2) 
Estimation results presented only for variables that were statistically significant at least in one model. 






demand equation is included in the model as a control variable. Table 2.2 summarizes 
the estimation results (hazard rates) for the pooled sample (Column 6) and for the 
subsample of low-income borrowers (Column 8). The Cox partial likelihood model 
provides a semi-parametric specification for the relationship between hazard rates and 
the application characteristics.42 Column 6 and Column 8 in Table 2.2 quantify the 
hazard rate, )exp(β , for the application characteristics as a percentage of the hazard rate 
for their reference groups. The results provide evidence of the effect of risk-based 
pricing (variable RBPRICING) introduced by the Bank over the observation time (in 
January 2012). As the elasticity of loan demand with respect to maturity has been 
shown to be statistically significant, I introduce an interaction term of risk-based pricing 
with approved maturity (RBPRICING*AMATURITY). The hazard ratio on this 
interaction term suggests that the null hypothesis that maturity choice after risk-based 
pricing has no impact on loan default can be rejected. Given risk-based pricing, 
prolonging loan maturity increases the probability of default for the pooled sample of 
borrowers by 1.3% (derived from coefficients in Table 2.2 Column 6) and for the sub-
sample of low-income borrowers by 1.2%.43 The time-dependence in default described 
below suggests that the negative impact of long-term loans is likely to increase as the 
observation period is extended (loan performance after introducing risk-based pricing is 
examined only over the fourteen-month period between January 2012 and April 2013). 
In other words, differentiating between borrowers solely through different interest rates 
causes borrowers to choose either to reduce the loan amount or to prolong maturity to 
compensate the lender for their riskiness. The latter then leads to higher default 
probability for both the liquidity constrained and liquidity unconstrained borrowers. 
Thus, banks seeking to mitigate adverse selection by developing risk-based pricing 
should also test for the increasing riskiness of the borrower pool with respect to loan 
duration. These results complement the findings of Adams et al. (2009), who quantify 
                                                 
 
42The reference group for the application factor variables is always the one with the lowest coding. For 
the coding of variables refer to Table 3.A.3 in the Appendix. 
43 As a robustness check the simple probit of loan default was performed on all observations (with default 
occurring within 24 months after loan origination). This alternative specification yields similar 




the positive impact of risk-based pricing on loan performance without controlling for 
the endogeneity of loan maturity.  
The effect of individual application characteristics on default probability 
presented in Table 2.A.5 in the Appendix is in line with the expectations. For instance, 
consistent with Kocenda and Vojtek (2009), the hazard ratio for low-income borrowers 
with a university education is only 56% of the hazard rate for those who have a 
secondary technical education. A longer survival time without default increases with a 
longer period of employment as in Bicakova (2007). Borrowers who own property are 
associated with a 43% lower risk of default than those who do not own property. These 
results are in line with the predictions of Einav et al. (2012). 
Figure 2.A.2 in the Appendix plots the fitted Cox proportional hazards 
regression by loan maturity. It depicts the estimated default probability for the pooled 
sample and for the subsamples with different maturity: borrowers of short-term loans 
(maturity up to two years) are the most likely to be defaulted after the 18th month of 
granting; medium-term loans (maturity between two and five years) are the most likely 
to be defaulted at the 30th month, and long-term loans (more than five years maturity) 
are defaulted most frequently around the 34th month. Comparing the pooled 
proportional hazards and the proportional hazards by maturity, all achieve their peak 
before the end of the third year.44 These results suggest that the timing of default is 
maturity-specific. While Glennon and Nigro (2005) find that between 1983 and 1998 
the default most frequently occurs before the end of the second year after loan 
origination, Figure 2.A.2 shows that between 2007 and 2013 the default occurrence 
peaks around the third year. This can be explained by the overall prolongation of 
household loans. 
                                                 
 
44 It has to be highlighted that the results would be more precise by extending the observation period. 
Specifically, the timing of default might be influenced by the observed length of the loan (time span 
between loan origination and the date of default, maturity or the end of the observation period). At the 
time of monitoring (in April 2013), 64% of loans originated between 2007-2013 are right censored (did 
not reach default or maturity), with the average loan length for the observed loans being 29 months. 
Therefore, to see the sensitivity of loan performance, I estimate the Cox proportional hazards regression 
only for loans originating between 2007-2009 with an average loan length of 42 months. Compared to the 
findings derived based on the original sample the overall hazard rate increases, but the default for the 




To see how significant the time-dependent default is across borrowers in the 
different risk categories, I also report the brief description of the data and plot the 
proportional hazard by maturity and by risk band (Figure 2.3). In line with expectations, 
the basic survival-time data statistics suggest that the default rate (i.e. number of failures 
per subject) increases with risk band for each sample. Nevertheless, after accounting for 
the application and loan contract characteristics in estimating the Cox model, “high-
risk” borrowers prevail over “very high-risk” borrowers in default. This might be 
explained by the prudent loan granting strategy of the Bank, which aimed to closely 
monitor the quality and strictly limit the number of “very-high risk” households in the 
sample.  
The overall model fit of the individual hazard regressions is assessed by 
computing the Cox-Snell residuals. If the model is correct, the real cumulative hazard 
function based on the covariate vector has an exponential distribution and a hazard rate 
of one. The default variation plotted in Figure 2.3 is the most significant for long-term 
loans. Comparing the dashed line with Cox-Snell residuals in Figure 2.3, it can be 
concluded that the maturity-specific models fit the data equally as well as the model for 
the pooled sample. The results suggest that in addition to risk-based household loan 
pricing, maturity-based credit scoring is also inevitable. 
 
Figure 2.3: Cox proportional hazards regression pooled and by maturity/by risk bands     
 














Driven by the sharp increase in household loan demand, the role of credit scoring 
methods in assessing a borrowers’ creditworthiness is becoming more and more 
important.  Thanks to the wide range of credit history collected by credit bureaus, 
lenders can screen out risky borrowers in their credit scoring models, not only based on 
application characteristics, but also on behavioral and credit history information. 
However, the ultimate effect of different loan contact terms on loan demand and loan 
performance has not yet been examined in the process of loan provision. 
The aim of this paper is to present empirical evidence about whether a risk-
based maturity setting improves the quality of granted household loans and alleviates 
the adverse selection present on the lending market. Taking advantage of a sample of 
both accepted and rejected household loans from a Czech commercial bank, this paper 
is the first to point out the importance of maturity in loan demand and loan 
performance. 
This study contributes to the existing literature on household loan markets in 
several ways. First, it shows that low-income borrowers can be credit-constrained and 
thus have limited access to credit at market interest rates. Empirical evidence suggests 
that loan demand for low-income borrowers is more sensitive to available cash and loan 
maturity changes than to interest rate changes. This is consistent with the assumption 
that borrowers with liquidity constraints are likely to prolong the maturity of their loans 
in order to borrow the desired loan amount. Second, by reflecting the borrower’s 
riskiness in the interest rate, lenders discourage risky borrowers from obtaining short-
term loans. This then leads to higher default probability for both liquidity-constrained 
and liquidity-unconstrained borrowers. The finding is consistent with the theoretical 
prediction that reduced asymmetric information encourages “high-risk” borrowers to 
either demand lower loan amounts or to prolong their loan maturity to compensate the 
lender for their riskiness. Therefore, banks seeking to mitigate adverse selection by 
developing risk-based pricing should also test the increasing riskiness of borrower pool 
due to the sensitivity to loan duration. Finally, this paper provides evidence that the time 




categories. Hazard models that differentiate between loan maturities and risk bands have 
an equally good model fit as one that treats all household loans as pooled and does not 
distinguish between these two factors. These results further advocate the necessity of 
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Figure 2.A.1: Nelson-Aalen estimator of the cumulative hazard function 
 




Figure 2.A.2: Cox proportional hazards regression pooled and by maturity 
 
Note: The figure on the upper left corner depicts Cox proportional hazards for pooled data, i.e. treats all 
household loans equally and does not distinguish between maturity. The other three figures depict the 
Cox proportional hazards for short-term loans with maturity up to 2 years, medium-term loans with 





Table 2.A.1: Expected relationship between selected dependent 
and independent variables 
Dependent 
variable Independent variable 
Expected 
relationship Literature 
Loan approval Car ownership + Alessie et al. (2005) 
 Use of credit bureau information + Bicakova et al. (2010) 
Loan demand Interest rate - Alessie et al. (2005) 
 Maturity + Attanasio et al. (2008) 
Loan interest rate Risk category + Karlan and Zinman (2008) 
 
Tax reform on phase out of interest 
deductibility + Attanasio et al. (2008) 
 Usury law on max interest rate level - Alessie et al. (2005) 
Loan maturity Unemployment rate + Chetty et al. (2008) 
 Durability of cars + Attanasio et al. (2008) 
Default 
probability Interest rate + Adams et al. (2009) 
  Maturity + Adams et al. (2009) 




Table 2.A.2: The list of personal loan information (Panel A) 
Variable description Variable name  in dataset Encoding 
Application characteristics   Age (in months) AGE continuous 
Female  FEMALE dummy 




































Housing status HOUSE  Unspecified 
 
1 



























Employment duration (in months) EMPLOYY continuous 


















Net monthly income (in CZK) INCOME continuous 
Region (NUTS2) REGION dummy 
Credit bureau score CBSCORE continuous 
Application score APPSCORE continuous 
Behavioral score BEHAVSCORE continuous 




Table 2.A.2: The list of personal loan information (Panel B) 
Variable description Variable name  in dataset Encoding 
Loan term characteristics  
 Requested amount (in CZK) RAMOUNT continuous 
Year of loan request RYEAR dummy 
Loan approval indicator APPROVED dummy 
Approved amount (in CZK) AAMOUNT continuous 
Interest rate (in %) IR continuous 
Risk margin (in %) RM continuous 
Approved loan maturity (in months) AMATURITY continuous 
Risk band  NRISK 












Credit bureau information CBINFO dummy 
Loan with specified purpose PURPOSE dummy 
Number of individuals monitored in the CBCB (in mil.) CBIND continuous 
Long-term unemployment rate (in %) UNDUR continuous 
Risk-based pricing RBPRICING dummy 
Default indicator DEF dummy 
Renegotiated loan RENEG dummy 
Number of months to default DEFAULT continuous 




Table 2.A.3:  Descriptive statistics (Panel A) 
Variable name Mean Std. Dev.  Min   Max  
     Application characteristics  Accepted and rejected loans (N=207 640) 
Age (in months) 485 155 216 1 159 
Female  0.479 0,500 0 1 
Marital status 
    Divorced 0.184 0.387 0 1 
Married 0.418 0.493 0 1 
Partner 0.012 0.107 0 1 
Single 0.335 0.472 0 1 
Widow/er 0.010 0.100 0 1 
Education 
    Secondary (general) 0.103 0.303 0 1 
Post-secondary (technical) 0.015 0.120 0 1 
Secondary (vocational) 0.400 0.490 0 1 
Post-secondary (vocational) 0.387 0.487 0 1 
University 0.084 0.278 0 1 
Housing status 
    Living with parents 0.170 0.375 0 1 
Sharing property 0.033 0.180 0 1 
Personal property 0.541 0.498 0 1 
Renting 0.220 0.414 0 1 
Student dormitory 0.000 0.009 0 1 
Employment status 
    House wife 0.030 0.172 0 1 
Pensioner 0.142 0.349 0 1 
Student 0.001 0.029 0 1 
Employment duration (in months) 71 90 0 579 
Employment type 
    Bank/insurance company 0.017 0.129 0 1 
Enterepreneur 0.027 0.161 0 1 
Foreign company 0.032 0.176 0 1 
Private company 0.261 0.439 0 1 
Public organization 0.178 0.383 0 1 
Net monthly income (in CZK) 17 451 11 861 1 500 000 
Loan with specified purpose 0.102 0.303 0 1 
Existence of credit bureau information 0.756 0.429 0 1 
Risk band  
    Low-risk 0.362 0.480 0 1 
High-risk 0.122 0.327 0 1 
Very high-risk 0.029 0.167 0 1 
Loan approval indicator 0.510 0.500 0 1 




Table 2.A.3:  Descriptive statistics (Panel B) 
Variable name Mean Std. Dev.  Min   Max  
     Loan term characteristics  Accepted loans (N=105 759) 
Approved amount (in CZK) 93 653 82 100 4 000 1 000 000 
Approved loan maturity (in months) 54.0 26.5 1.0 134 
Interest rate (in %) 13.4 2.8 3.7 25.9 
Long-term unemployment rate (in %) 2.8 1.2 0.7 6.1 
Risk margin (in %) 1.8 1.4 -5.2 10.6 
Number of individuals monitored in the CBCB (in mil.) 4.9 0.3 4.2 5.3 
Default indicator 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Credit bureau score 318 269 -40 1 120 
Application score 178 222 -4 998 
Behavioral score 454 192 0 1 012 
          
Note: Loan characteristics are available only for approved loans. 
 
 
Table 2.A.4: Summary statistics of risk margin by year 
Year of loan request N Mean Standard deviation 
2007 12 167 1.40 1.44 
2008 16 567 1.52 1.38 
2009 18 378 1.79 1.39 
2010 17 784 1.88 1.39 
2011 17 122 1.99 1.44 
2012 36 866 2.65 2.32 
2013 10 523 2.47 2.18 
Total 129 407 2.06 1.84 
Note: Prior to January 2012 the missing risk margin data is derived based on predicted value from a 




Table 2.A.5: Estimation results of loan demand and default probability 
Dependent variable Loan demand Default probability 
  Pooled sample Low-income sample Pooled sample Low-income sample 
 Coef.  Coef.  Haz.ratio  Haz.ratio  
Age -0.001*** 
 
        -0.001 
 
       1.000** 
 
0.999  
    (0.001)       (0.001)    (0.001)       (0.001)  
Female  -0.125*** 
 




    0.710***  
    (0.004)        (0.006)     (0.028)      (0.035)  
Education 
   
  
    Secondary (general) -0.125*** 
 




  1.592** 
    (0.178)        (0.023)    (0.216)      (0.253)  
Post-secondary        






  0.449** 
    (0.021)         (0.031)     (0.127)      (0.158)  






  0.674** 
   (0.016)        (0.022)     (0.088)      (0.105)  
Post-secondary   
(voc.)       -0.054** 
 
  -0.048** 
 
        1.067 
 
        1.017 
      (0.017)        (0.022)     (0.124)      (0.156)  
University  0.130*** 
 
    0.076*** 
 
  0.396*** 
 
  0.559** 
   (0.173)        (0.026)     (0.059)      (0.134)  
Employment status 
   
  
    House wife -0.129*** 
 
    0.063***          1.050 
 
        0.956 





  0.529*** 
 
   0.573***  
 0.010      (0.011)     (0.040)      (0.052)  
Student -0.257*** 
 
       -0.119* 
 
        1.597 
 
        1.409 
    (0.056)        (0.064)    (0.717)      (0.712)  
Employment duration        -0.001*    -0.001*** 
 
  0.996*** 
 
   0.997*** 
       (0.001)      (0.000)     (0.001)      (0.001)  
Employment type 
   
  
    Bank/insurance   
company        -0.038** 
 




        0.635 
       (0.018)      (0.040)    (0.111)      (0.243)  
Entrepreneur        -0.013 
 
        0.021 
 
        1.180* 
 
        1.148 
       (0.012)     (0.014)      (0.102)      (0.124)  
Foreign company    0.060*** 
 
        0.017 
 
        0.986 
 
        1.152 
       (0.010)     (0.016)     (0.062)       (0.102)  






        1.129 
      (0.005)      (0.009)     (0.046)      (0.085)  






  0.786** 
    (0.006)     (0.010)   (0.042)      (0.066)  




Table 2.A.5: Estimation results of loan demand and default probability 
 Dependent variable Loan demand Default probability 
  Pooled sample Low-income sample Pooled sample Low-income sample 
 Coef.  Coef.  Haz.ratio  Haz.ratio  
Net monthly income  0.001***   0.001***  1.001     0.999***  
   (0.001)   (0.001)        (0.001)      (0.001)  
Marital status          
     Divorced         0.022  -0.063***  1.013          0.984  
   (0.019)    (0.023)        (0.144)     (0.173)  
     Married  0.116***   0.080***    0.793*          0.840  
   (0.018)    (0.022)        (0.111)     (0.144)  
     Partner  0.091***          0.078**  0.929          0.928  
   (0.026)     (0.033)       (0.188)     (0.243)  
     Single  0.098***          0.026  0.979          1.001  
    (0.019)    (0.023)        (0.138)     (0.173)  
     Widow/er  0.072***         -0.012  0.908          1.001  
   (0.021)      (0.024)       (0.159)     (0.213)  
Housing status          
      Living with parents  0.104***    0.093***      0.564***    0.564***  
   (0.012)     (0.015)       (0.048)     (0.061)  
      Sharing property         0.030**         -0.031      0.616***  0.670**  
   (0.014)     (0.019)      (0.066)     (0.094)  
      Personal property  0.035***          0.005      0.562***    0.574***  
   (0.011)     (0.014)       (0.046)     (0.060)  
      Renting  0.030***         -0.026*           1.000          1.015  
  (0.011)      (0.015)      (0.079)     (0.104)  
      Student dormitory  0.089***          0.067           1.812          1.685  
           (0.199)    (0.234)      (1.294)     (1.213)  
Region. Loan Purpose Yes 
R2 0,5093   0,4639           
N 105 759  46 598  105 759  46 598  
Log likelihood     -38 221  -20 223  
Prob> chi2     0.000  0.000  Loglikelihood ratio (LR) chi2         4 858   2 639   
Note: (1) For loan demand estimation the logarithmic form of approved loan amount is used. (2)  ***, **, 








Credit Ratings and Their Information Value: 





The financial crisis in the early 2000s has underscored the financial markets’ reliance on 
credit ratings. Credit ratings express rating agencies’ opinion about the ability and 
willingness of debt issuers to meet their financial obligations in full and on time. They 
assist investors in evaluating the financial health of debt issuers and regulatory 
authorities in overseeing the financial market through rating-contingent policies. 
Nevertheless, there are at least three issues financial market participants should 
consider when relying on credit ratings. First, inflated credit ratings failed to predict the 
recent financial crises. This has evoked widespread debate on the quality of credit 
ratings. Second, credit ratings are costly for companies.  Although unrated companies 
may have financial difficulties they do not wish to reveal, the lack of a credit rating does 
not necessarily convey a negative signal about the company’s creditworthiness in 
certain markets. Third, credit ratings can differ across the three rating agencies, 
Standard and Poor’s (hereafter, S&P), Moody’s Investor Services (hereafter, Moody’s), 
and Fitch Ratings (hereafter, Fitch), depending on their prevailing rating methodology. 
Inconsistency in credit ratings becomes essential when ratings are used to fulfil 
financial regulatory requirements. Although a debt issuer can be rated by more than one 




related to the issuer. For instance, the capital requirements of banks can substantially 
increase when banks use the more conservative (worse) rating. Recent empirical papers 
(Morgan, 2002; Livingston, Wei, and Zhou, 2010) find that disagreement in issuer 
ratings is substantial both in the case of financial and non-financial institutions. 
Livingston, Naranjo, and Zhou (2008) argue that rating splits (disagreement) between 
rating agencies might trigger subsequent rating changes. The authors show that rating 
splits can increase the probability of rating upgrade/downgrade within one year by up to 
6%, and rating splits influence the pricing (credit spreads) of the issued debt. However, 
no study has tested which rating agency is consistently more prudent45 within the 
individual industry sectors, crisis periods or rating grades. The information whether 
rating splits are industry-, time- and rating-dependent might be of high prominence for 
bond investors, as they often alter their behavior based on rating actions, and bond 
yields often rely on the rating of the more prudent agency (Livingston et al., 2010). The 
first hypothesis tested in this paper is that the distribution of credit ratings across the 
two major rating agencies46 (Moody’s and S&P) is identical for different industry 
sectors, crisis periods and rating grades. 
Regulators and policymakers view increasing competition between credit rating 
providers as a fundamental driver of precise and prompt ratings. Nevertheless, rating 
agencies’ reputational concerns and their costs of information acquisition vary over the 
business cycle. The theoretical model of Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013) suggests that the 
accuracy of ratings is determined by the extent of competition (the reputation losses) 
among rating agencies. Becker and Milbourn’s (2011) empirical findings support this 
prediction and find that the rating quality (defined as ‘the ability of rating to be 
informative about bond values and the ability to be accurate in predicting issuer 
default’) of S&P and Moody’s decreased after Fitch’s market share increased. The 
                                                 
 
45 While more prudent rating agencies prefer to protect their reputational capital by assigning timely and 
accurate ratings; less prudent rating agencies prefer to increase their own profits (credit ratings are issuer-
paid) by assigning favorable issuer ratings.  
46 Fitch was established in 1997 and over 2005 and 2014 it had a much smaller rating coverage than S&P 
and Moody’s (established in the early 1900s). Thus, unless stated otherwise, this paper focuses on credit 
ratings assigned by the two incumbent rating agencies, S&P and Moody’s. Fitch’s credit ratings are only 





existence of a third rating opinion is highly relevant for regulatory rating classification, 
which accepts only one credit rating classification (the Basel Accord). If an issuer is 
rated by two or more rating agencies, the prevailing institutional rule is to use the 
‘second best’ rating. In their recent paper, Bongaerts, Cremers, and Goetzmann (2012) 
find that gaining a third rating opinion results in regulatory rating improvement. 
Nevertheless, while the above studies focus on the ratings information value for 
investors and their accuracy in predicting default, no empirical evidence exists on how 
the incidence of rating split was affected by increased competition over the recent 
financial crises. The question is important due to the risk of ‘rating shopping’ (the 
hypothesis positing that issuers are prone to paying for a third rating opinion in the hope 
of enhancing their rating) that might result in more favorable ‘second best’ ratings. This 
paper tests the hypothesis that any disagreement between the issuer ratings of S&P and 
Moody’s is independent of the competition between rating providers.  
The recent financial crisis attracted the attention of the financial market to the 
severity of sovereign rating deterioration. This also has a direct effect on the private 
sector, as distressed economies often restrict the financial leverage of corporations 
(Borensztein, Cowan, and Valenzuela, 2013). Consequently, rating agencies may cap 
issuer ratings by the country rating in which they operate (henceforth referred to as 
‘ceiling effect’). Chen, Chen, Chang, and Yang (2013) emphasize that sovereign 
downgrades have a significant impact on declines in private investments. The influence 
of sovereign rating change is more substantial in low-rated economies (Ismailescu and 
Kazemi, 2010). Despite the broad empirical research on the effect of sovereign ratings 
on issuer ratings, no previous literature has explored its importance over the recent 
sovereign debt crisis for both financial and non-financial industry sector. The third 
hypothesis of this paper tests whether the sovereign ceilings cease to be restrictive for 
issuer ratings.  
Rating agencies aim to provide timely information about the credit quality of 
issuers. When rating changes occur, they have extensive power to alter the decisions of 
financial market participants. Thus, identifying the rating agency that is consistently 
more prompt in capturing the changing creditworthiness of the issuers is of crucial 




find interdependence in sovereign rating actions, there is limited related research into 
the timeliness of rating actions for corporations. Thus, the final hypothesis tested in this 
paper is that there is no leader-follower relationship between rating agencies for 
financial and non-financial institutions. 
The empirical results of this paper draw on extensive financial statement and 
credit rating data of over 2500 financial and non-financial institutions. Credit ratings 
assigned by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch are available both for financial/non-financial 
institutions that issued debt (i.e. issuer company rating) and their country of domicile47 
(i.e. issuer sovereign rating). The panel data includes information about the companies 
from December 2005 to October 2014. 
3.2 Credit Ratings 
3.2.1 The Process of Credit Rating Assessment 
Accurate and timely information is one of the key prerequisites of credit risk assessment 
and investment decisions. Information, however, is not evenly distributed among 
investors, borrowers, lenders and other market participants. Rating agencies, which 
assess the creditworthiness of debt issuers and issues (corporate or government financial 
obligation, such as a bond), aim to mitigate information asymmetry on the financial 
market by translating their credit risk assessment of issuers/issues into a rating grade 
from AAA to D. There are three major global rating agencies, each providing a 
comparable and independent credit risk assessment of debt issuers/issues. The rating 
assessment is based on publicly available methodologies, which creates a common 
comparison basis for all end users. Thus, rating agencies offer two pivotal benefits for 
financial markets in the form of credit rating: i) easy comparability of ratings in a global 
context, ii) favorable access to capital market funding for rated issuers. 
                                                 
 
47 The country of domicile  (country in which the company has its headquarters) is a good proxy for 
‘country of risk’ (International Organization for Standardization country code taking into account 
management location, country of primary listing, country of revenue and reporting currency of the issuer) 




Rating requests are assumed to be randomly ordered, as credit ratings are issuer-paid 
and one rating is sufficient to fulfill most rating-based regulations (Livingston et al. 
2010). Nevertheless, as issuers pay for the rating, they have incentives to solicit positive 
bias in credit rating by switching between rating agencies or by paying for multiple 
rating assessments. The motivation of issuers to pay for multiple credit ratings can be 
interpreted by three hypotheses. First, according to the ‘information production’ 
hypothesis, multiple ratings reduce the market participants’ uncertainty about the 
creditworthiness and the default probability of the issuer (Güntay and Hackbarth, 2010). 
Second, according to the ‘rating shopping’ hypothesis, issuers will apply for an extra 
rating assessment if they anticipate an enhancement in average credit rating (Skreta and 
Veldkamp, 2009). Third, according to the ‘regulatory certification’ hypothesis, issuers 
rated close to the investment– non-investment grade boundary (i.e. with BBB and BB 
ratings) are often highly motivated to pay for two or more credit ratings. The main 
reason is that when an issuer is differently rated by two or more rating agencies, the 
prevailing institutional rule is to use the ‘second best’ rating. Thus, avoiding non-
investment grade ‘second best’ rating might allow debt issuers to borrow at lower 
interest rates (Bongaerts et al., 2012). In general, most thorough issuers seek rating 
services from at least two agencies. This approach strengthens the issuer’s reliability 
compared to its peers who seek ratings by a single agency only, and appreciates its debt 
issuances (rated companies can issue debt/borrow at lower interest rates). 
Based on the best practice of rating agencies, the process to obtain a rating takes 
approximately 90 days. In the first 30 days contracts are set up and signed. The issuer is 
then transferred to the analytical team within the rating agency, which collects the 
required documentation and sets meeting dates with the issuer over the next 30 days. 
During the meetings, the agencies’ analysts and the issuer’s representatives discuss all 
outstanding points required for credit rating assessment. After this rating visit, the 
analytical team has an additional 30 days to carry out the rating analysis, present the 
rating to an internal rating committee for approval48 and announce the rating to the 
                                                 
 
48 A rating committee has at least 5 voting members: the lead analyst for the issuer, three other attendees 
with voting rights and a rating chair who is usually the most senior committee attendee. The chair casts 




issuer. Subsequently, depending on the timeliness of the issuer’s publication consent, 
the credit rating is publicly released. 
Once the rating is released to the market, the issuer is regularly monitored until 
the rating is withdrawn or, in the case of debt issue ratings, the debt matures. The rating 
agency’s analytical team monitors the rated issuer regularly (reviews financial reports, 
industry development) and arranges a meeting with the issuer prior to the update of the 
rating analysis (usually annually). Nevertheless, the issuer’s rating can be changed 
outside of the dates reserved for annual review. If the rating agency identifies material 
changes in the issuer’s idiosyncratic risk profile or material shocks in exogenous factors 
(for instance, overall deterioration of the industry’s performance or a change in the 
issuer’s country rating), the rating is immediately adjusted. The rating action (rating 
downgrade, rating upgrade, change in rating outlook) can be released quickly, within 
days from the moment the rating agency learns the new information. In the case of 
issuers rated by multiple rating agencies, a rating change from one rating agency does 
not necessarily trigger a rating change by its competitor(s). 
The building block of any rating assessment is an industry-specific methodology 
that describes in detail the rating scorecard used to derive the credit rating. The rating 
scorecard is comprised of quantitative and qualitative rating factors. In general, 
quantitative factors (financial profile) play a key role (70-90% weight on the final 
rating). The qualitative factor assessment (business profile) often rests on the subjective 
evaluation of the rating analysts (10-30% weight on final rating). 49 The rating derived 
based on the scorecard serves then as a basis for approval by the internal rating 
committee. If the rating committee members fail to reach mutual agreement, the 
assigned rating may deviate from that proposed by the scorecard. 
                                                 
 
49 Similarly to the existing research on credit ratings, this paper cannot fully control for the qualitative 




3.2.2 Why Financial Institutions Are Different 
Before examining the determinants and the quality of credit ratings, the specific features 
of the financial sector must be highlighted. Unlike non-financial corporations, the 
creditworthiness of financial institutions is particularly difficult to evaluate for at least 
two reasons. One is that their asset quality is determined mainly by their leading line of 
business. For instance, a bank mainly issues loans to different types of borrowers (e.g. 
individuals, corporations, and public organizations), so the financial strength of the 
institution stems from the quality of loans that it provides to borrowers with different 
levels of riskiness. Nevertheless, external market participants cannot accurately estimate 
the embedded riskiness of these loans. The second difficulty is that financial institutions 
are highly leveraged, and therefore the shareholders’ equity (i.e. capital) at stake is low. 
Consequently, regulators and investors view the high (low) capital-to-asset ratio as a 
particularly useful signal of a financial institution’s conservative (aggressive) business 
strategy, reflecting asset quality with low (high) risk. Recent research by Mehran and 
Thakor (2011) provides theoretical justification that higher capital has a positive impact 
on financial institutions’ asset and liability structure. This view is supported by the 
empirical findings of Berger and Bouwman (2013), which show that companies with 
higher capital monitor their asset bases more strictly and focus on more conservative 
investment strategies. 
The importance of capital in the performance of financial institutions has been 
highlighted over the recent financial crisis. To restrain risk and potential losses by the 
financial sector, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision set out specific 
requirements regarding the capital of financial institutions. These regulatory capital 
requirements aim to strengthen the stability of the financial sector and define how much 
capital the financial institution must hold. The level of capital becomes a concern as 
soon as the assets of the company shrink due to losses in the company’s business (e.g. 
defaults on granted loans). As the volume of assets drops, the volume of liabilities and 
shareholders’ equity (capital) must also decrease on the balance sheet. In the first place, 
the shareholders’ equity is used to cover the losses on the company’s assets. If the level 




individuals lose their deposits). To protect the financial sector from such scenarios, 
capital must be at a level that absorbs the company’s losses before depositors’ funds 
must be tapped. 
Although financial institutions must strictly follow the regulatory capital 
requirements, the recent financial crises have shown that these were insufficient to 
restore prudent risk-taking at the financial institutions. Hence, the determinants, the 
quality and the implications of credit ratings as important inputs for financial market 
regulations should be closely monitored. 
3.3 Methodology 
The four key hypotheses of this paper can be summarized as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1). The distribution of credit ratings across the two major rating 
agencies (Moody’s and S&P) is identical for different industry sectors, crisis periods 
and rating grades. 
 
The alternative hypothesis to H1 is that a significant disagreement exists between the 
credit rating of the two incumbent rating agencies. This would suggest that given the 
same public information, the ratings of S&P or Moody’s are systematically different 
when compared for the same company. Rating splits across industry sectors, crisis 
periods and rating grades might appear for the following reasons: (i) Rating splits are 
likely to vary by the industry coverage of the rating agency (i.e. if the two agencies have 
different rating coverage in the given industry, the probability of rating split is higher); 
(ii) Rating disagreements are expected to deepen over time (i.e. as a result of 
improvements in the credit rating agencies’ regulation during the recent financial 
crises50, rating agencies are gradually forced to protect their reputational capital and to 
                                                 
 
50 For example, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (effective from July, 




restrict ratings that follow the issuers’ preferences or other rating agencies’ actions); (iii) 
Rating splits are anticipated to be more frequent around the investment-non-investment 
grade boundary (i.e. as the difference in bond credit spreads is often the highest between 
investment-non-investment grade bonds). 
In order to test for the null hypothesis that the distribution of credit ratings 
across rating agencies differ, the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank sum test is 
conducted. It tests the equality of matched pairs of observations  
( PSsMoody medianmedianH &'0 : = ). As opposed to previous studies (Galil and Sofer, 
2011), the distribution of credit ratings is also compared across industry sectors, crisis 
periods and rating grades. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Any disagreement between the issuer ratings of S&P and 
Moody’s is independent of the competition between rating providers. 
 
The alternative hypothesis to H2 is that besides the analysts’ different expert judgments, 
the rating disagreement (split) is affected by the increased competition on the credit 
rating market after the expansion of Fitch. If Fitch’s issuer rating is different from the 
ratings assigned by S&P or Moody’s, then Fitch’s entry to the market might serve as a 
trigger for the two main rating agencies to reassess the creditworthiness of the issuer. 
This might then result in the rating split of S&P and Moody’s issuer ratings.    
To test whether competition on the credit rating market also contributes to rating 
disagreement, the probit model51 is estimated with fixed effects controlling for average 
industry-, region- and time-characteristics: 
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf 
51 One of the drawbacks of the identification strategy is that it does not account for the selection having 
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where tcjiSPLIT ,,, is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if credit ratings (of issuer i 
from industry j, region c, at year t) assigned by Moody’s and S&P are different, and 
takes the value of 0 if the credit ratings of the two agencies are consistent.52  
tcj PERIODREGIONINDUSTRY ,,  are categorical variables for industry sector, 
geographical region and crisis period. The variable tiFINANCIALS ,  expresses the 
financial statement data53, which is industry-specific. For financial institutions the 
choice of financial indicators is motivated by the CAMEL model (Caouette, Altman, 
Narayanan, and Nimmo, 2008; Golin and Delhaise, 2013), and for non-financial 
institutions it is motivated by the Altman Z score model (Altman, 1968; Altman and 
Rijken, 2004). Both are discussed in detail in a later section. Variables
tcSOVEREIGNNIG ,_  and tiISSUERNIG ,_  are dummy variables that take the value 
of 1 if the sovereign rating / issuer rating (assigned by S&P, as the rating agency with 
widest rating coverage) is non-investment grade. The error term tcji ,,,µ  is assumed to be 
normally distributed. 
Similarly to Becker and Milbourn (2011), Fitch’s market share is used as a 
measure of competition in the ratings industry. The variable 
tjFITSHAREMARKET ,__ denotes the share of debt issues rated by Fitch on the total 
number of debt issues rated by the three rating agencies (the ratio is derived based on 
                                                 
 
52 The rating split between the two main rating agencies is evaluated at year-ends. Rating updates on 
arrival of new information are disregarded in testing the effect of increased rating completion on the 
rating split. This paper focuses on the sequence of rating updates when studying the leader-followership 
between the rating agencies. 
53 The incorporation of financial statement data as determinant of rating split is motivated by Morgan 
(2002), who estimates the disagreement between rating agencies based on the banks’ asset structure. The 
author suggests that disagreement between rating agencies is a gauge of uncertainty about the financial 
health of the company. He argues that banks with a high share of loans and trading assets might 
encompass risk that is difficult to assess (due to the unknown risk of borrowers and counterparties), and 




Bloomberg’s rated debt issue universe). Fitch’s market share captures the variation in 
the competition between rating providers both across industry sectors and over time. 
This paper focuses on testing the null hypothesis that the increased competition of Fitch 
has no effect on the disagreement between ratings assigned by S&P and Moody’s  
( 0: 40 =δH ). 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3). The sovereign ceilings cease to be restrictive for issuer 
ratings. 
 
The alternative hypothesis to H3 is that the issuer’s credit rating remains inherent to its 
operational or regulatory environment.  
To estimate which predictors carry significant weight in explaining credit rating 
changes, the probit model is adopted. Motivated by the literature (Williams, Alsakka, 
and Gwilym, 2013) this paper explores the determinants of credit ratings separately for 
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where A tcjiR ,,,D , B tcjiR ,,,D , C tcjiR ,,,D are binary variables of rating upgrade/downgrade 




Besides fluctuations in the issuer’s financial ratios (defined by the Altman Z-
score model for non-financial institutions and defined by the CAMEL model for 
financial institutions), the variable tiFINANCIALS ,  also considers the size of the 
company (Hau, Langfield, and Marques-Ibanez’s 2013 study shows that larger banks 
are more highly rated) and the earnings per share (Ederington and Goh’s 1998 empirical 
paper argues that a decline in earnings is a good proxy for market expectations and 
efficiently forecasts downgrades). As deteriorations in the macroeconomic conditions 
(in the issuer’s country of domicile) might enhance the exposure of public and private 
debt and hence influence credit ratings, selected macroeconomic indicators ( tcMACRO , ) 
are also incorporated in the model (similarly to Borensztein et al., 2013). Motivated by 
Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010), who show that rating changes are more severe in 
countries with low ratings, dummy variables for countries/issuers rated by non-
investment grade ( tcSOVEREIGNNIG ,_ and tiISSUERNIG ,_ ) are part of the empirical 
specification. 
refers to the rating of the issuer’s country of domicile. It is 
expected to be a significant determinant of issuer rating as negative fluctuations in 
sovereign ratings also have an adverse impact on the issuer’s rating (Cantor and Packer, 
1996; Hills et al., 2010; Borensztein et al., 2013 and Williams et al., 2013). On the other 
hand, the magnitude of sovereign risk on issuer rating might be fundamentally different 
before (pre-crises period, subprime lending crisis) and during the sovereign debt crisis. 
Using the above econometric specification, this paper tests the null hypothesis that 
sovereign ceilings cease to be restrictive for issuer ratings ( ).   
Apart from financial statement data, macroeconomic indicators or sovereign 
ratings, rating actions of the competitors ( A tcjiR ,,,D , B tcjiR ,,,D , C tcjiR ,,,D ) might also 
contribute to the yearly changes in the issuer’s credit assessment. As replicating the 
rating upgrades/downgrades of the competitor is less time- and cost-intensive than 
performing their own independent credit assessment, rating agencies tend to react to the 
competitors’ behavior (Guttler and Wahrenburg, 2007). These prompted rating actions 
are then highly appreciated by investors, who after the downgrade/upgrade might 







Hypothesis 4 (H4). There is no leader-follower relationship between rating 
agencies. 
 
The alternative hypothesis is that some rating agencies are systematically 
dependent on their competitors’ rating actions, even though investors are highly 
sensitive to timely and accurate information about credit quality changes. 
In order to quantify the effect of an issuer rating change (i.e. rating 
upgrade/downgrade) by rating agency A on an issuer rating change by rating agency B, 
the Granger-like ordered logit model54 is utilized. The Granger-like model reflects the 
serial correlation in rating changes. It assumes that past rating changes influence the 
future rating changes, and past rating actions carry unique information about the future 
rating changes.55 The ordinal model’s key advantage is that it accounts for the ordinal 
scale of credit ratings. Similarly to Guttler and Wahrenburg (2007) and Alsakka and 
Gwilym (2010), the daily rating change is modelled for the two major rating agencies 
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54The model assumes that rating agencies have access to the same publicly available information, and past 
rating changes internalize any shocks affecting the rating. 
55Rating changes indicate the speed of rating analysis required to re-assess the issuer’s creditworthiness. 
They do not correspond to the sequence of the initial rating requests (as rating agencies are obliged to 
update the issuer’s rating immediately after observing changes in its idiosyncratic risk profile or material 
shocks in exogenous factors), but might reflect the initial rating mistakes made by one of the rating 




where AdiR*,D and BdiR*,D  are the unobserved latent variables of rating changes of issuer i at 
day d originated by the rating agencies A and B, respectively, while diR ,D  refers to the 



















































    (3.6) 
 
The terms AhíU , and BhíU ,  are dummy variables for an issuer rating upgrade, AhíD ,  
and BhíD ,  are dummy variables for an issuer rating downgrade.  
The leader-follower relationship might take several forms. Specifically, as a 
result of one agency’s rating action, the second agency might update the issuer’s rating 
methodology (e.g. changing thresholds or weights that drive the rating change), review 
the issuer’s credit quality or it might make a rating change release strategically 
dependent on the first-mover (Güttler and Wahrenburg, 2007). As any of these scenarios 
are equally likely, the leader/follower sequence is examined in time span ranging from 1 
day to 180 days. Specifically, following Alsakka and Gwilym (2010) the rating changes 
of the potential follower (dependent variable) are examined in h time windows after the 
rating change by the potential leader: 1=h denotes 1-15 days, 2=h denotes 16-90 days, 
3=h denotes 91-180 days, and 4=h  denotes more than 180 days. Rating reaction within 
a few days might indicate that the rating agencies independently reacted to the same 
publicly available rating drivers, but the follower was either slow in processing the 
rating change or made its rating change strategically dependent on the leader’s reaction. 
On the other hand, rating reaction after 180 days is expected to have no relation to the 
original rating changes and it can be considered as a result of a new fundamental event 





The dataset is described in three steps. First, I outline how the sample of financial and 
non-financial companies was acquired. Next, separately for the financial and non-
financial sectors, I describe the selected financial indicators and their expected impact 
on company performance. Finally, I illustrate the credit rating distribution of the 
companies across industry sectors and credit rating agencies.  
3.4.1 Data Collection 
Bloomberg, one of the largest market data providers, is the source of financial statement 
and credit rating data used. The data were collected in the following steps: 
1) Index members of major equity indices create the basis of the sample of debt 
issuers. In particular, using Bloomberg’s IMEN function, the list of 500 major 
equity indices traded on Bloomberg was gained. The equity indices are 
performance indicators of a particular equity market and are derived from the 
prices of selected stocks (most frequently using a weighted average). The index 
members are companies based in 65 countries worldwide.  
2) The initial list of financial and non-financial institutions was defined using the 
constituents of these 500 major equity indices. 
3) To enlarge the sample, Bloomberg’s peer group assignment was utilized to 
identify competitive companies for the initial list of financial and non-financial 
institutions.  
4) After eliminating duplicates of companies on several markets, the final list 
consists of over 2 500 financial and non-financial institutions. 
5) For the final list of 600 financial and 1 900 non-financial institutions, 
comprehensive financial statement and credit rating data (observed at the end of 




downloaded: (1) basic company information (industry sector56, country of 
domicile, parent company), (2) financial statements and financial indicators, (3) 
long-term issuer company and sovereign ratings57 assigned by S&P, Moody’s 
and Fitch. Sovereign ratings are available for 61 countries (48% of issuers are 
from the USA) observed for 9 years (2005-2013). The dataset covers 10 regions 
(United States, Euro Area, Japan, Other Advanced Economies, Commonwealth 
of Independent States, Emerging and Developing Asia, Emerging and 
Developing Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and 
North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa).58  
6) Finally, daily data on company and sovereign rating actions (over 14 000 
downgrades, upgrades, and changes in rating outlook) were obtained. The rating 
changes were implemented by the three rating agencies from December 2005 to 
October 2014. In particular, for the sample of 2 500 financial and non-financial 
institutions both initial 59 and new ratings are observed along with the date of the 
rating change. 
Bloomberg’s rated universe is used for the derivation of the individual rating 
agencies’ market share across industry sectors and over time. Specifically, the market 
share of S&P, Moody’s and Fitch is derived for 9 industry sectors (Basic Materials, 
Communications, Consumer – Cyclical, Consumer – Non-cyclical, Diversified, Energy, 
Industrial, Technology and Utilities) and 9 years (2005-2013). The market share of a 
rating agency is determined as a portion of debt issues rated by this agency and the total 
                                                 
 
56 Table 3.A.1 (Panel A) in the Appendix summarizes the average issuer ratings by industry sector. It 
suggests that the ratings reflect the specifics of individual industry sectors. All three agencies agree that 
the highest average ratings (on average A-) are assigned in the financial sector (due to the presence of 
governmental or parental external support), while the lowest average ratings (on average BB+) are 
assigned in the sector of Cyclical Consumer Goods (as highly dependent on the economic cycle). The 
highest disagreement between the three agencies is in the case of sectors such as Industrial, Basic 
Materials and Communications. 
57 The issuer is attributed a sovereign rating based on its country of domicile.  
58 Table 3.A.1 (Panel B) in the Appendix presents the share of issuer ratings in the individual regions. The 
vast majority of debt issuers in the sample have their country of domicile in the United States 
(approximately 60 percent). Debt issuers from the Euro Area and Japan are represented in the sample only 
by 8-16 percent (depending on the rating agency).  




number of debt issues rated by the three rating agencies in a given year and industry 
sector. 
The World Bank, the database of World Development Indicators60, is the 
source of the macroeconomic indicator data. The downloaded dataset includes current 
account balance (% of GDP), GDP growth (annual %), GDP per capita (US$ of 2014) 
and inflation (GDP deflator, annual %). 
3.4.2 Sample Statistics of Financial Indicators 
A wide range of industry sectors is represented in the dataset. The data on the 
financial sector includes primarily banks, insurance companies and real estate 
investment trusts (REITS). The data on the non-financial sectors cover the following 
industry sectors (defined by Bloomberg Industry Classification System61): Basic 
Materials (e.g. Chemicals, Mining, Iron/Steel), Communications (e.g. 
Telecommunications, Media, Internet), Consumer – Cyclical (e.g. Retail, Entertainment, 
Auto Manufacturers), Consumer – Non-cyclical (e.g. Food, Commercial Services, 
Pharmaceuticals), Diversified (e.g. Holding Companies), Energy (e.g. Oil&Gas, 
Pipelines, Coal), Industrial (e.g. Transportation, Electronics, Building Materials), 
Technology (e.g. Semiconductors, Computers, Software) and Utilities (e.g. Electric, 
Gas, Water).  
It is necessary to distinguish between the credit rating determinants based on 
industry sector. Caouette et al. (2008) and Golin and Delhaise (2013) suggest that 
financial institutions should be evaluated according to the Capital-Assets-Management-
                                                 
 
60 The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
61 The BICS (Bloomberg Industry Classification System) classification is based on the issuer's business 
characteristic and, similarly to GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard), it consists of 10 sectors. 
The classification of BICS (Basic Materials, Communications, Consumer - Cyclical, Consumer - Non-
cyclical, Energy, Industrial, Utilities, Financial and Diversified) and GICS (Materials, 
Telecommunication Services, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Energy, Industrials, Utilities, 




Earnings-Liquidity (CAMEL) model, which defines a set of financial indicators that 
capture capital adequacy, asset quality, profitability and liquidity assessment. 62 
Panel A in Table 3.A.2 in the Appendix shows the selected financial indicators 
for the credit rating prediction of financial institutions. In particular, the industry sub-
sector of banks is used as an example to illustrate the mean values of these ratios across 
companies with different rating grades. 
- Capital Adequacy – Basel III63 requires that the Tier 1 Capital of banks must be 
at least 6.0% of risk-weighted assets. The Tier 1 ratio, calculated as the sum of 
core capital and disclosed reserves relative to risk-weighted assets, measures the 
company’s financial strength. The higher the ratio, the higher the company’s 
buffer against unexpected losses. 
- Asset Quality – The non-performing Loans / Total Loans ratio indicates the 
severity of problems regarding the credit quality of the company’s borrowers. A 
loan is considered to be non-performing if the borrower is more than 90 days 
overdue on any payment connected with the loan. Indeed, the higher the Non-
performing Loans / Total Loans ratio, the worse the company’s asset quality.  
The situation is even worse if the bank does not create enough Loan Loss 
Reserves to cover Non-Performing Loans (NPL), that is, it has low NPL 
coverage. 
- Profitability – The profitability of banks is most frequently measured by the 
Return on Equity (ROE) and the Return on Assets (ROA). ROE expresses the 
profit generated from the shareholders’ investments, while ROA shows how 
efficiently the management uses the company’s assets to generate earnings. The 
rule of thumb in most markets is that an ROE of between 10 and 20 percent and 
an ROA of between 1 and 2 percent indicate acceptable performance. 
Companies below (above) these ranges have weak (very strong) profitability. 
                                                 
 
62 As management (corporate governance) quality is a qualitative factor and it is hard to find a proxy for 
that indicator, this paper had to neglect its impact on the company’s rating. 





- Liquidity – The ratio between Total Loans and Total Deposits is a key measure 
of a company’s liquidity. A ratio below 100 percent means that the company is 
funding its loan portfolio from core deposits, while a ratio above 100 percent 
signals that it also uses other types of market funding. The strength and stability 
of the bank’s customer deposit base can be also measured by the Deposit to 
Funding ratio. If the ratio is high, it indicates that the company is less dependent 
on more volatile interbank or commercial sources of funding. 
A broad set of control variables is also available for non-financial institutions. 
However, to avoid multicollinearity, only selected financial ratios are used to assess the 
credit quality of the company. Guided by Altman (1968) and Altman and Rijken (2004), 
non-financial institutions are evaluated based on the Z-score model. The model is 
comprised of five financial ratios that have the highest discriminating power in 
predicting corporate bankruptcy (Altman, 1968). These include proxies for liquidity 
(Working Capital / Total Assets), profitability (Retained Earnings / Total Assets, 
Earnings before Interest and Taxes / Total Assets), leverage (Total Equity / Total 
Liabilities) and the efficient use of assets (Sales / Total Assets). 
Panel B in Table 3.A.2 in the Appendix presents descriptive statistics of selected 
financial ratios for the non-financial sector. Specifically, on the example of cyclical 
consumer goods the mean values of financial indicators are summarized by rating 
grades. 
- Working Capital / Total Assets – The ratio is a measure of liquidity; the 
company’s short-term financial health. Working Capital is calculated as the 
difference between Current Assets and Current Liabilities and expresses the 
ability of the company to cover its short-term obligations with short-term assets. 
Thus, the Working Capital / Total Assets ratio shows the percentage of 
remaining liquid assets (after repayment of current liabilities) on the total assets. 
As reported in Panel B of Table 3.A.2, this measure increases with the credit 
quality of the company. 
- Retained Earnings / Total Assets - The ratio provides insight into the 
cumulative profitability of the company. Altman (1968) argues that the ratio 




bankruptcy: companies in their earlier years accumulate relatively low retained 
earnings and, accordingly, are more exposed to financial difficulties. As the 
company grows older, it should enhance its Retained Earnings / Total Assets 
ratio. The higher the ratio, the better the company’s financial performance. 
- Earnings before Interest and Taxes / Total Assets – The ratio expresses the 
general profitability of the company’s assets. It considers the company’s 
earnings before tax and leverage reductions are taken into account. As Panel B 
in Table 3.A.2 indicates, the Earnings before Interest and Taxes / Total Assets 
ratio can take negative values if the company generates losses and is close to 
default.  
- Total Equity / Total Liabilities – The ratio is the measure of the company’s 
leverage. It shows how much short-term and long-term debt the company can 
take and still be covered by its equity. The lower the Total Equity / Total 
Liabilities ratio, the lower the company’s solvency. 
- Net Sales / Total Assets – The ratio indicates how efficiently the company 
deploys its assets to generate net sales. Net sales (calculated as the difference 
between total revenue and any allowances or discounts provided to the 
customer) compared to total assets are heavily industry-specific. For instance, 
industries with low (high) assets and high (low) sales may have a ratio above 
200 (below 50) percent. Panel B in Table 3.A.2 reports that the Net Sales / Total 
Assets ratio of cyclical consumer goods increases with higher credit ratings, but 
does not reach 100 percent. 
3.4.3 Sample Statistics of Issuer Ratings 
To express the forward-looking predictions of rating agencies about the credit 
risk of the individual financial and non-financial institution, long-term issuer credit 
ratings64 assigned by three rating agencies (Moody’s, S&P and Fitch) are utilized. 
                                                 
 
64 “Credit ratings express the agency’s opinion about the ability and willingness of an issuer, such as a 




Credit ratings assessing the creditworthiness of obligors range from AAA (highest 
quality) to D (default). Nevertheless, S&P/Fitch and Moody’s rating grades differ 
slightly. To make them comparable, the ratings need to be mapped into a common 
numeric scale. Table 3.A.3 in the Appendix summarizes the credit ratings together with 
their interpretation and the assigned rating grades on finer/wider scales. 
The following sample statistics of issuer ratings guide the hypotheses formulated 
in this paper: 
Figure 3.1 indicates that the rating coverage of rating agencies across the 
individual industry sectors (i.e. the share of each agency in the total number of issuer 
ratings within industry sectors) differs significantly. The sample statistics confirm the 
expectations that S&P and Moody’s (both established in early 1900) have much higher 
rating coverage than Fitch (established in 1997). While in each industry sector both 
S&P and Moody’s rate at least 40% of the issuer ratings, the rating coverage of Fitch is 
                                                                                                                                               
 
can also speak to the credit quality of an individual debt issue, such as a corporate note, a municipal bond 
or a mortgage-backed security, and the relative likelihood that the issue may default.” 
Standard & Poor’s, http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/definitions-and-faqs/en/us 
Figure 3.1: Industry coverage by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch 
 
Note: The figure depicts the share of each agency on total number of issuer ratings within industry 
sectors. The total number of 3 955 issuer ratings is gained using the sample of 2 486 issuers. The 






well below 20% (except in the financial industry sector). Therefore, this paper examines 
the credit ratings of S&P and Moody’s (if not stated otherwise), and the rating coverage 
of Fitch is only used as a measure of varying competition between rating agencies. 
Table 3.1 suggests that the discrepancy in issuer ratings between these agencies 
is substantial. It summarizes the number of times Moody’s and S&P differently rated 
the issuer, given the issuer was rated by both agencies. The disagreement is measured in 
a sample of 2 486 issuers at the end of years 2005-2013. From a total amount of 22 374 
observations, the two agencies assigned different rating to the issuers in 5 839 cases. 65 
In the case of financial institutions, the two rating agencies significantly disagree when 
assigning ratings A and BBB. In the case of non-financial institutions, credit ratings 
across the two agencies also vary for issuers rated BBB and BB (i.e. at the investment– 
non-investment grade boundary). 
From the early 2000s, rating agencies have gradually changed their approach to 
reflecting the country ratings in the issuer’s rating. The cases in which issuer ratings are 
higher than their country rating have become more frequent.  Figure 3.2 provides some 
preliminary insight into the relationship of issuer and sovereign ratings during the pre-
crisis period (2005-2007), during the subprime lending crisis (2008-2010) and during 
the sovereign debt crisis (2011-2013). It suggests that after the subprime lending crises, 
rating agencies ceased restricting company ratings by sovereign rating. When 
comparing the three rating agencies, Moody’s relaxes the sovereign cap most 
frequently. 
                                                 
 
65 Although the distance between the two ratings would provide a more precise measure of the rating 
split, this paper focuses only on the existence of a disagreement between Moody’s and S&P. In the 





Table 3.1:  Disagreement between S&P and Moody’s in issuer ratings 
(A) Financial institutions 
  
Number of Moody's Issuer Ratings Different from S&P Issuer Ratings 
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Total 10 73 99 170 245 224 156 192 183 141 75 50 78 82 21 23 20 1 1 1844 
 




(B) Non-financial institutions 
  
Number of Moody's Issuer Ratings Different from S&P Issuer Ratings 
 
 



































AAA   7                                     7 
AA+     7 2                                 9 
AA   53   13 21 1                             88 
AA-   17 37   44 24 4 2                         128 
A+     17 45   70 31 2                         165 
A     4 8 90   84 29 1                       216 
A-     1   29 90   174 63 9 12                   378 
BBB+         3 16 113   249 43 5                   429 
BBB 1       1 2 29 131   271 37 3         1       476 
BBB- 2     5   2 2 6 147   157 41 9             1 372 
BB+             2 2 15 47   142 33 2 1           244 
BB             1   12 6 117   203 47 2 1       6 395 
BB-                 1 1 15 106   193 36 3       2 357 
B+                   1 1 10 106   139 20 5 1   2 285 
B                         12 83   115 23 5 2   240 
B-                         5 7 51   61 11 7 4 146 
CCC+                             3 16   5 2 4 30 
CCC                               2 2   5   9 
CCC-                                   1     1 
CC                                 1 2 4   7 
D                             3 1 1 1 3 4 13 
 
Total 3 77 66 73 188 205 266 346 488 378 344 302 368 332 235 158 94 26 23 23 3995 
Note: The table summarizes the number of times Moody’s and S&P differently rated the issuer, given the issuer was rated by both agencies. It is based on credit ratings 
of 2 486 issuers observed at the end of years 2005-2013 (i.e. over 9 years totaling 22 374 observations). While for financial institutions a rating disagreement is 
observed in 1 844 cases, for non-financial institutions the disagreement is observed in 3 995 cases. 





To see whether there is a potential leader-follower relationship between S&P 
and Moody’s, daily information on rating actions are utilized. For the sample of rating 
actions observed for 2 486 issuers between December 2005 and October 2014, Figure 
3.3 depicts the distribution of time elapsed between rating actions originated by 
Moody’s and S&P. Specifically, it illustrates the probability that the potential follower’s 
rating action is within a certain time window after the potential leader’s rating action. 
The figures suggest that while upgrades of the potential leader do not evoke immediate  
Figure 3.2: The relationship between company and sovereign ratings 
(A) Ratings assigned by S&P                           (B) Ratings assigned by Moody’s 
 
(C) Ratings assigned by Fitch 
 
Note: (1) The figures illustrate the relationship between company and sovereign ratings using a 
sample of 2 486 issuer ratings and their sovereign ratings assigned by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch during 
three periods: pre-crisis period (2005-2007), subprime lending crisis (2008-2010) and sovereign debt 
crisis (2011-2013). It depicts to what extent issuer ratings are capped by sovereign ratings. (2) The 




actions by the potential follower, both agencies most likely react to the downgrade of 
the other agency within 50 days. 
Table 3.2 summarizes the magnitude of the follower’s rating change on the 
preceding rating change of the leader.66 In particular, Panel A and B show what share of 
                                                 
 
66 Rating change refers only to a downgrade or an upgrade in the issuer’s rating. New rating assignments 
(by an additional rating agency) or rating withdrawals are not considered in the analysis of leader-
follower relationship, as these are driven by the decision of the issuer and there might be several reasons 
for them. For example, new rating assignments might correspond to the issuer asking for a second rating 
opinion either because the first agency assigned an unfavorable rating, or because the industry peers are 
strengthening their market position through an additional rating opinion. The opposite logic might 
motivate rating withdrawals. 
Figure 3.3: The distribution of time between rating actions 
 
Note: (1) The figures illustrate the distribution of time between S&P and Moody’s rating changes 
observed in a sample of 2 486 issuers between December 2005 and October 2014. (2) The figures 
illustrate the probability that the potential follower’s rating action is in a certain time window after the 






S&P’s rating change is a reaction to a prior rating change by Moody’s, and Panel C and 
D present what share of Moody’s rating change is a reaction to a prior rating change by 
S&P. Panel B for non-financial institutions suggests that if Moody’s 
downgrades/upgrades at some point in time, on average 80% of these rating actions are 
followed by S&P within 90 days. Panel D for non-financial institutions shows that 
Moody’s reaction to S&P’s rating changes is lower, at 67% on average. The leader-
follower relationship for financial institutions is slightly different. Considering the same 
time window, around 65% of Moody’s downgrades/upgrades are followed by S&P 
(Panel A), while only 56% of S&P’s rating actions are copied by Moody’s (Panel C). 
These preliminary statistics suggest that S&P is likely to be the follower on the credit 
rating market. 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Disagreement in Rating Assessments across Industry, Time and Rating 
As investors tend to differentiate between ratings, and bond yields often reflect the 
rating of the more prudent agency, the rating disagreement across industry sectors is of 
high prominence for the financial market participants. Based on the results of the 
Wilcoxon signed rank sum test summarized in Table 3.3 (Panel A), I reject the null 
hypothesis that the choice of rating agency has no effect on the credit rating of the 
issuer. Moody’s is consistently more prudent in rating non-financial institutions. This 
finding is in line with Livingston et al. (2010) who on the sample non-financial U.S. 
corporations show that conservative ratings assigned by Moody’s are also detected by 
the investors (when two ratings are available and Moody’s rating is higher, bond yields 
are at a lower level than when S&P’s rating is higher). Nevertheless, this paper extends 
the results of the recent literature by examining rating split also within the nonfinancial 
sector. Contrary to expectations, the results of the Wilcoxon signed rank sum test 
suggest that rating agencies agree in creditworthiness of issuers from the Technology 




Table 3.2: The magnitude of the follower’s rating change on the preceding rating change of the leader 
 
Panel A - Leader: Moody’s, 








































S&P downgrade by 2 or more notches 28.2% 18.4% 11.6% 5.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
130 
S&P downgrade by 1 notch 43.6% 42.9% 25.6% 43.5% 0.0% 4.2% 0.0% 13.0% 
 
447 
No rating change 28.2% 36.7% 53.5% 34.8% 40.0% 29.2% 14.8% 35.9% 
 
2266 
S&P upgrade by 1 notch 0.0% 2.0% 9.3% 15.9% 60.0% 62.5% 77.8% 50.0% 
 
400 
S&P upgrade by 2 or more notches 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.2% 7.4% 1.1% 
 
29 
Grand Total 39 98 43 69 5 24 27 92   3272 
 
 









































S&P downgrade by 2 or more notches 26.2% 18.3% 8.0% 3.4% 0.0% 1.1% 1.5% 1.0% 
 
427 
S&P downgrade by 1 notch 55.9% 54.3% 45.0% 38.2% 3.0% 0.0% 3.0% 8.9% 
 
1576 
No rating change 16.6% 26.4% 43.0% 31.4% 16.7% 13.8% 22.4% 34.0% 
 
7543 
S&P upgrade by 1 notch 0.7% 0.0% 3.0% 25.0% 63.6% 71.3% 68.7% 53.6% 
 
1593 
S&P upgrade by 2 or more notches 0.7% 1.0% 1.0% 2.0% 16.7% 13.8% 4.5% 2.4% 
 
227 
Grand Total 145 197 100 204 66 87 67 291   11366 




Panel C – Leader: S&P, 
Industry: Financial 
Downgrade 
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Moody's downgrade by 2 or more notches 28.6% 31.4% 16.7% 3.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
142 
Moody's downgrade by 1 notch 20.4% 26.7% 16.7% 37.7% 5.4% 0.0% 0.0% 4.9% 
 
306 
No rating change 51.0% 41.9% 66.7% 54.7% 21.6% 57.1% 55.6% 53.4% 
 
2473 
Moody's upgrade by 1 notch 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.8% 43.2% 14.3% 38.9% 35.0% 
 
285 
Moody's upgrade by 2 or more notches 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 29.7% 28.6% 5.6% 6.8% 
 
66 
Grand Total 49 105 18 53 37 7 18 103   3272 
 
 
Panel D – Leader: S&P, 
Industry: Non-financial 
Downgrade 






































Moody's downgrade by 2 or more notches 23.2% 19.2% 10.1% 2.7% 1.3% 2.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
205 
Moody's Downgrade by 1 notch 46.4% 46.6% 46.8% 28.7% 1.3% 2.5% 4.3% 6.7% 
 
889 
No rating change 29.8% 32.4% 43.0% 55.3% 34.8% 25.3% 21.3% 44.2% 
 
9323 
Moody's upgrade by 1 notch 0.7% 0.5% 0.0% 12.8% 53.5% 55.7% 66.0% 46.8% 
 
838 
Moody's upgrade by 2 or more notches 0.0% 1.4% 0.0% 0.5% 9.0% 13.9% 8.5% 2.2% 
 
111 
Grand Total 151 219 79 188 155 79 94 267   11366 
Note: The table presents the magnitude of the rating changes of the follower (downgrade by more than 2 notches, downgrade by 1 notch, no rating change, upgrade by 
1 notch, upgrade by 2 notches), given the leader’s actions (downgrade, upgrade) in the previous 1-15 days, 16-90 days, 91-180 days or more than 180 days. For 
example, the first column of Panel C suggests that 15days after S&P downgraded the issuers; Moody’s subsequently downgraded the issuers by more than 2 notches in 
28.6% of cases, downgraded the issuers by 1 notch in 20.4% cases and did not change its rating in 51% of cases. The rating change statistics express the magnitude and 
the timing between subsequent rating updates (rating changes could be faster for the agency that was more wrong in its previous rating), where the initial rating is the 
first rating in the dataset. In total, the table covers 5 572 rating changes by Moody’s and 9 066 rating changes by S&P observed on the sample of 2 236 issuers between 




For the other non-financial industry sectors the numerical rating grades provided by 
S&P are lower (indicating a better rating) than the numerical rating grades provided by 
Moody’s (Column 8 of Table 3.3, Panel A) and the disagreement is statistically 
significant at least at the 5% level (Column 5 of Table 3.3, Panel A).Interestingly, in the 
assessment of default risk for financial institutions S&P is the more conservative rating 
agency. These results might be explained by the difference in rating methodologies or 
the higher costs of overrating67 financial institutions for S&P. 
The difference between S&P and Moody’s credit ratings deepens over time 
(Table 3.3, Panel B). During the pre-crisis period (2005-2007), it is statistically 
significant only at a 10% level, while during the subprime lending crisis (2008-2010), it 
is statistically significant at a 5% level and during the sovereign debt crisis (2011-2013), 
it is statistically significant at a 1% level. 
According to Table 3.3 (Panel C), the two rating agencies also differ across 
rating grades divided into investment grade (ratings from AAA to BBB) and non-
investment grade (ratings from BB to D). For investment grade ratings, the Wilcoxon 
sum rank test for the equality of median ratings is rejected at a 5% statistical 
significance level, while for non-investment grade ratings, the equality of median 
ratings between S&P and Moody’s is already rejected at 1%. 
 
                                                 
 
67 Although credit ratings are issuer paid, rating agencies seek to protect their reputational capital by 












        





issuers rated by 
both S&P & 
Moody's 
   Sub-sample of issuers with different rating  from S&P & Moody's  










 Mean  Median  Standard deviation 
Basic Materials       S&P 1 728  792 0.016  330 19% 




     10.3        10.0     2.7 
Communications        S&P 1 827  787 0.530  388 21% 




     10.8        11.0     3.7 
Cyclical    S&P 2 853  1 298 0.000  661 23% 




     12.2        13.0     3.4 
Non-cyclical  S&P 2 898  1 427 0.000  743 26% 




       9.7        10.0     3.6 
Diversified         S&P 126  53 0.004  18 14% 




     11.4        12.5     2.5 
Energy             S&P 1 620  947 0.000  449 28% 




     10.8        11.0     4.1 
Financial              S&P 5 490  2 874 0.000  1 844 34% 




       7.6          7.0     3.5 
Industrial            S&P 3 411  1 465 0.000  726 21% 




     10.6        11.0     3.8 
Technology          S&P 1 008  308 0.764  161 16% 




       9.8          9.0     3.8 
Utilities            S&P 1 413  883 0.000  519 37% 




       8.3          8.0     2.8 
Total                S&P 22 374  10 834 0.000 
 
5 839 26%        9.4          9.0     3.5 
Moody's   
       9.5          9.0     3.9 






           




issuers rated by 
both S&P & 
Moody's 
 
 Sub-sample of issuers with different rating  
from S&P & Moody's  















(2005-2007)       S&P 7 458  3 179 0.073 
 
1 705 23% 




9.1 9.0 3.9 
Subprime lending crisis  
(2008-2010)        S&P 7 458  3 686 0.025 
 
2 055 28% 




9.5 9.0 4.0 
Sovereign debt crisis 
 (2011-2013)    S&P 7 458  3 969 0.000 
 
2 079 28% 
9.6 9.0 3.4 
  Moody's  
 
9.9 10.0 3.7 
Total S&P 22 374  10 834 0.000 
 
5 839 26% 9.4 9.0 3.5 
Moody's   
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issuers rated by 
both S&P & 
Moody's 
 
 Sub-sample of issuers with different rating  
from S&P & Moody's  














Investment grade  
(AAA to BBB-)       S&P 10 699  7 195 0.025  3 801 36% 
7.3 7.0 2.0 
 
Moody's   7.3 8.0 2.6 
Non-investment grade 
 (BB+ to D)        S&P 11 675  3 639 0.000  2 038 17% 13.3 13.0 1.8 
  Moody's   13.6 14.0 2.1 
Total S&P 22 374  10 834 0.000 
 
5 839 26% 9.4 9.0 3.5 
Moody's   
9.5 9.0 3.9 
Note: (1) The table compares Moody’s and S&P issuer ratings by industry sector (Panel A), by time 
period (Panel B) and by rating grade (Panel C). The first part of the table summarizes the complete 
sample that consists of credit ratings of 2 486 issuers observed at the end of years 2005-2013 (i.e. over 9 
years totaling 22 374 observations). The second part of the table shows the results of Wilcoxon signed-
rank test conducted on the sub-sample of issuers rated by both S&P and Moody’s at year-ends. The third 
part of the table presents the descriptive statistics of credit ratings on the sub-sample of issuers with 
different rating from S&P & Moody's. (2) Cyclical denotes consumer goods industries that rely heavily on 
the business cycle and economic conditions. Non-cyclical denotes consumer goods industries that are 






3.5.2 Rating Split is Dependent on Competition between Rating Providers 
A simple probit model was used to estimate the relationship between rating splits and 
selected rating determinants. The estimation results conducted separately for financial 
and non-financial institutions are summarized in Table 3.4. These show that Fitch’s 
increasing market share has a positive and statistically significant (at a 5% level) effect 
on the rating split between S&P and Moody’s in the non-financial sector (the impact in 
the financial sector is not statistically significant). These results extend the findings of 
Becker and Milbourn (2011), who show that the quality of issuer-paid credit ratings 
lowered (the rating’s information value for investors and their accuracy in predicting 
default decreased) after Fitch entered the market.68 Nevertheless, Fitch’s increasing 
market share not only lowers the rating quality of S&P and Moody’s, but it also 
increases the likelihood of rating split (as shown in Table 3.4). If Fitch’s issuer rating is 
different from the ratings assigned by S&P or Moody’s, then Fitch’s entry to the market 
might serve as a trigger for the two main rating agencies to reassess the creditworthiness 
of the issuer. This might then result in the rating split of S&P and Moody’s issuer 
ratings. Another possible explanation is that some rating agencies might prefer to 
protect their reputational capital by assigning timely and accurate ratings (i.e. likely to 
issue lower ratings); other rating agencies might prefer to increase their own profits 
(credit ratings are issuer-paid) by assigning favorable issuer ratings (i.e. likely to issue 
higher ratings). The results of this paper suggests that rating shopping (acquiring an 
additional rating opinion in the hope of rating improvement) fosters further 
disagreement between rating agencies, and hence reinforces the use of ‘second best’ 
issuer rating for regulatory purposes. 
Other determinants of rating splits are also in line with expectations. The 
disagreement between issuer ratings deepens over time. During the sovereign debt 
crisis, the rating split is, on average, higher by 3.4 percentage points than during the pre-
crisis period. Interestingly, for non-investment grade issuers, the rating split is less 
frequent. The results also suggest that rating disagreement is present even in relation to 
                                                 
 
68 Xia (2014) and Cornaggia and Cornaggia (2013) show that rating quality increases when investor-paid 




the key financial indicators (the choice of key financial indicators predicting the rating 
of financial and non-financial institution is in line with the literature - Altman, 1968; 
Altman and Rijken, 2004; Caouette et al., 2008; Golin and Delhaise, 2013; Hau et al., 
2013). This can be partially explained by the different weights the rating agencies place 
on individual financial fundamentals. 
A one-year change in the earnings-per-share (EPS), as the measure of 
performance volatility, does not influence rating splits. Although Ederington and Goh 
(1998) argue that a decline in earnings is a good proxy for market expectations and 
efficiently forecasts downgrades, the estimation results summarized in Table 3.4 
suggest that the volatility of EPS has no statistically significant effect on the rating 
disagreement between Moody’s and S&P. 
3.5.3 Sovereign Ceilings Are Restrictive Only for Financial Institutions 
Table 3.5 summarizes the key determinants of S&P and Moody’s issuer rating 
changes estimated based on model (3.2) and (3.3). The regressions are run separately for 
financial and non-financial institutions. Panel A of Table 3.5 demonstrates that in the 
case of financial institutions, S&P increased the reliance of issuer rating on sovereign 
(i.e. country of domicile) rating over the observed period. Specifically, while during a 
pre-crisis period a one-notch sovereign upgrade has no impact on issuer rating (one 
notch sovereign downgrade decreases the likelihood of issuer rating downgrade - as the 
sovereign ceiling is most likely not low enough to imply a burden on the financial 
sector), over a sovereign debt crisis a one-notch sovereign upgrade leads to a 13.2% 
higher likelihood of issuer upgrade (a one-notch sovereign downgrade leads to an 8.6% 
higher likelihood of issuer downgrade). On the other hand, Panel C of Table 3.5 
suggests that Moody’s reflected the country ratings in its issuer ratings over all the 
examined periods, but the magnitude of sovereign effect is decreasing. Over the 
subprime lending crisis both agencies overhauled their rating methodologies with 
respect to their perceptions of government support, and slightly changed the weight of 




(JDA)69, in which the issuer rating has no explicit country rating restrictions and 
government support depends on the bank’s systemic importance. In 2011, S&P 
introduced the Banking Industry Country Risk Assessments (BICRA)70, according to 
which the macroeconomic indicators and industrial/regulatory environment 
(determining country rating) might explicitly affect the stand-alone rating of the issuer. 
The change in the two agencies’ approach underscores that there is no unique metric in 
measuring the systemic risk (the industrial, financial and economic environment) to 
which financial institutions are exposed. 
Another explanation for the high reliance of financial sector on sovereign rating 
change is the dominant foreign ownership of financial institutions, where the high rating 
of the parent company is limited by the lower rating of the issuer’s country. A recent 
contribution from Williams et al. (2013) similarly shows the importance of sovereign 
ratings for financial institutions in emerging markets for 1999-2009. Nevertheless, the 
findings in Table 3.5 suggest that the role of sovereign rating change is also essential in 
other than emerging markets and remains statistically significant at 1% in the sovereign 
debt crisis. Possessing a non-investment grade issuer/sovereign rating has no 
statistically significant impact on rating downgrade/upgrade. 
The two major rating agencies put significantly less weight from sovereign 
ratings on the rating of non-financial institutions. In almost all time periods the 
sovereign rating change does not affect the issuer rating for S&P or Moody’s (Panel B 
and D). Borensztein et al. (2013) analyze the relationship between sovereign and issuer 
ratings and find the same results for ratings assigned by S&P. This paper contributes to 
the literature with an important finding – throughout the recent financial crises, neither 
of the two incumbent rating agencies applied sovereign restriction on the rating of non-
financial institutions. 
                                                 
 
69 Moody's Investors Services (2007): Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank 












Table 3.4: Determinant of rating disagreement between S&P and Moody’s 
Dependent variable – 
Rating disagreement 
Financial institutions 
 (Marginal effects)   
Non-financial institutions 
(Marginal effects) 
    Sovereign debt crisis                     0.003 
 
                0.034*** 
  (0.033)   (0.011) 
Fitch market share                     1.310 
 
                0.281** 
   (2.152)   (0.127) 





Non-investment grade sovereign                    0.256*** 
 
-0.002 
  (0.052)   (0.031) 




























Deposits to funding                    -0.002*** 
 
- 
  (0.001)   - 

















































Emerging and Developing Asia                    -0.138*** 
 





Emerging and Developing Europe                    0.304*** 
 












Middle East, North Africa                    0.180*** 
 
- 





























Observations 1 553   10 238 
R-squared 0.2001   0.0938 
Note: (1) The results are derived using issuers that are rated by S&P or Moody’s over 2005-2013. 
Estimation results presented only for variables that were statistically significant at least in one model. 
(2) For Sovereign debt crisis the reference value is the Pre-crisis period, for Region the reference 
value is USA, for Industry sector of non-financial institutions the reference value is the financial 
sector. (3) Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 




Turning to the other determinants of issuer rating change, Table 3.5 shows that 
competition is one of the key triggers of rating action. While the effect of the rating 
agencies’ industry coverage is particularly strong in the case of financial institutions, for 
non-financial institutions the competitors’ rating actions drive the rating update. When 
comparing the determinants of issuer rating change during pre-crisis and sovereign debt 
crisis periods, the reliance on the competitors’ rating action weakens, but remains 
statistically significant. For instance, while for financial institutions a one-notch 
upgrade of Moody’s (Fitch) issuer rating during a pre-crisis period increases the 
likelihood of an S&P upgrade by 25.6 percent (12.4 percent), this same change during 
the sovereign debt crisis increases the probability of an S&P upgrade by only 7.5 
percent (8.7 percent). Although during a pre-crisis period a one-notch downgrade of 
Moody’s (Fitch) issuer rating might even decrease the likelihood of an S&P downgrade, 
this same change increases the S&P downgrade during a subprime lending crisis by 8 
percent (8.4 percent) and during a sovereign debt crisis by only 3.2 percent (2.5 
percent). The competitors’ impact on Moody’s issuer rating change is similar, though 
much less significant. Overall, this diminishing influence of the competitors’ behavior 
might be explained by the increased motivation of rating agencies to protect their 
reputational capital.  
Table 3.A.4 in the Appendix reports the responses of rating agencies to 
macroeconomic, financial, geographical71 and sectoral variables from models (3.2) and 
(3.3). In the case of financial institutions, the two agencies agree that a one-year change 
of macroeconomic indicators is statistically more significant than the fluctuation or the 
absolute level of the financial results. This also explains the importance of sovereign 
ceiling in this sector. For non-financial institutions, rating upgrades/downgrades are 
more influenced by changes in financial results, even though their magnitude and 
statistical significance are weak. For instance, a 1 percent improvement in Earnings 
before Interest and Taxes / Total Assets increases the likelihood of rating upgrade only 
by 0.7 percent. Moody’s rating changes are less likely in geographical regions other 
than the United States. In the case of S&P the dependence of issuer rating change on 
                                                 
 
71 As the sample includes debt issuers from over 60 countries, dummy variables for geographical region 




geographical region is limited. The behavior of rating agencies for the individual non-
financial industry sectors does not vary essentially. Nevertheless, during the subprime 
lending crisis and the sovereign debt crisis the probability of rating changes was higher 
for the majority of non-financial sectors (by around 10 percent) than for the financial 
sector. 
3.5.4 S&P Tends to Be the Follower in Rating Actions 
Having confirmed a close link between several rating actions, this sections turns to 
examining the leader-follower relationship of rating agencies. Table 3.6 presents the 
results of the ordered logit model for rating changes, where S&P (Moody’s) is a 
potential follower and Moody’s (S&P) is a potential leader. The estimation is conducted 
using daily rating changes between December 2005 and October 2014. The rating 
actions are analyzed in four time windows: the follower’s rating action is 1-15 days72, 















                                                 
 




Table 3.5: Determinants of issuer rating change 
Panel A – Issuer rating: S&P, Industry: Financial 
    
Dependent variable - Issuer rating 
upgrade by S&P 
Dependent variable - Issuer rating 
downgrade by S&P 
        






































                
Upgrade of Sovereign by S&P 
 
0.135 0.096*** 0.132*** 
   
  
(0.086) (0.032) (0.040) 
   Upgrade of Issuer by Moody's 
 
0.256*** 0.020 0.075* 
   
  
(0.053) (0.034) (0.039) 
   Upgrade  of Issuer by Fitch 
 
0.124* 0.051* 0.087** 
   
  
(0.066) (0.026) (0.043) 
   Downgrade of Sovereign by S&P 
    
-0.144* -0.034 0.086*** 
     
(0.078) (0.028) (0.021) 
Downgrade of Issuer by Moody's 
    
-0.104*** 0.080*** 0.032* 
     
(0.040) (0.021) (0.018) 
Downgrade of Issuer by Fitch 
    
-0.016 0.084*** 0.025 
     
(0.064) (0.024) (0.027) 
Sovereign rating by S&P 
 
0.018 -0.008* -0.004 0.007 0.012* 0.004 
  
(0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) 
Non-investment grade issuer 
 
-0.246*** -0.056** -0.112*** -0.255*** -0.082** -0.139*** 
  
(0.092) (0.025) (0.029) (0.095) (0.038) (0.041) 
Non-investment grade sovereign 
 
0.047 0.124*** 0.012 0.144 0.141** 0.046 
  
(0.117) (0.038) (0.057) (0.127) (0.062) (0.072) 
S&P industry market share 
 
21.359***  0.483 1.004* 13.223** -15.778** 0.021 
  
(6.039) (4.591) (0.590) (6.268) (6.872) (0.790) 
        Pseudo R2   0.2804 0.3506 0.3335 0.2172 0.3860 0.3197 
Observations   293 496 638 293 631 638 











Panel B – Issuer rating: S&P, Industry: Non-financial 
    
Dependent variable - Issuer 
rating upgrade by S&P 
Dependent variable - Issuer rating 
downgrade by S&P 
                













































                
Upgrade of Sovereign by S&P 
 
0.088*** 0.026 0.042 
   
  
(0.025) (0.026) (0.032) 
   Upgrade of Issuer by Moody's 
 
0.185*** 0.150*** 0.152*** 
   
  
(0.019) (0.013) (0.014) 
   Upgrade  of Issuer by Fitch 
 
0.143*** 0.123*** 0.099*** 
   
  
(0.028) (0.022) (0.022) 
   Downgrade of Sovereign by S&P 
    
-0.131*** -0.030 0.021** 
     
(0.032) (0.025) (0.010) 
Downgrade of Issuer by Moody's 
    
-0.029 0.048*** 0.029* 
     
(0.022) (0.013) (0.015) 
Downgrade of Issuer by Fitch 
    
 0.074*** 0.039** 0.022 
     
(0.024) (0.017) (0.023) 
Sovereign rating by S&P 
 
 0.001 -0.003 -0.006* -0.015 0.006 0.004 
  
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) 
Non-investment grade issuer 
 
-0.010  0.006  0.002 -0.053*** -0.021 -0.032** 
  
(0.014) (0.009) (0.010) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) 
Non-investment grade sovereign 
 
-0.002  0.034 -0.024 -0.046 0.034 -0.031 
  
(0.047) (0.034) (0.032) (0.062)   (0.046) (0.046) 
S&P industry market share 
 
 0.144  0.149 -0.243   0.074 -0.021 -0.234 
  
(0.320) (0.121) (0.165) (0.427) (0.183) (0.218) 
Pseudo R2   0.1342 0.1728 0.1573 0.0575 0.0910 0.0742 
Observations   2 595 4 057 3 889 2 595 4 060 3 908 











Panel C – Issuer rating: Moody’s, Industry: Financial 
    
Dependent variable - Issuer rating 
upgrade by Moody's 
Dependent variable - Issuer rating 
downgrade by Moody's 
        




































        Upgrade  of Sovereign by 
Moody's 
 
0.458*** 0.607*** 0.201*** 
   
  
(0.082) (0.118) (0.033) 
   Upgrade  of Issuer by S&P 
 
0.192*** 0.015 0.037 
   
  
(0.039) (0.023) (0.024) 
   Upgrade  of Issuer by Fitch 
 
0.097 0.303*** 0.050* 
   
  
(0.061) (0.069) (0.027) 
   Downgrade of Sovereign by 
Moody's 
    
-0.485*** -0.081*** -0.010 
     
(0.084) (0.028) (0.020) 
Downgrade of Issuer by S&P 
    
-0.189*** 0.052** 0.045* 
     
(0.039) (0.024) (0.025) 
Downgrade of Issuer by Fitch 
    
-0.041 0.028 0.033 
     
(0.048) (0.029) (0.030) 
Sovereign rating by Moody's 
 
-0.018 0.003 0.009* -0.012 0.015** -0.008 
  
(0.014) (0.006) (0.005) (0.014) (0.006) (0.007) 
Non-investment grade issuer 
 
-0.353** -0.011 0.029 -0.390** -0.135*** 0.092** 
  




0.474*** 0.067 0.033 0.517*** 0.054 0.063 
  
(0.141) (0.047) (0.037) (0.149) (0.072) (0.069) 
Moody's industry market share 
 
89.031*** -43.147*** -1.052 86.166*** 18.423*** 5.150*** 
  
(16.600) (13.377) (1.023) (17.831) (6.938) (1.702) 
        Pseudo R2   0.4823 0.8019 0.5575 0.476 0.3835 0.2809 
Observations   289 411 575 289 631 632 





Panel D – Issuer rating: Moody’s, Industry: Non-financial 
 
    
Dependent variable - Issuer rating 
upgrade by Moody's 
Dependent variable - Issuer rating 
downgrade by Moody's 
        













































                
Upgrade  of Sovereign by Moody's 
 
-0.012 0.026 0.042* 
   
  
(0.025) (0.017) (0.023) 
   Upgrade  of Issuer by S&P 
 
0.093*** 0.075*** 0.087*** 
   
  
(0.010) (0.007) (0.008) 
   Upgrade  of Issuer by Fitch 
 
0.087*** 0.068*** 0.057*** 
   
  
(0.017) (0.012) (0.015) 
   Downgrade of Sovereign by 
Moody's 
    
0.014 -0.022* 0.005 
     
(0.039) (0.013) (0.009) 
Downgrade of Issuer by S&P 
    
-0.016 0.029*** 0.008 
     
(0.012) (0.007) (0.009) 
Downgrade of Issuer by Fitch 
    
0.043** 0.003 0.007 
     
(0.019) (0.013) (0.020) 
Sovereign rating by Moody's 
 
0.006 -0.003 0.001 -0.006 0.016** 0.010*** 
  
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) 
Non-investment grade issuer 
 
-0.006 0.003 0.014* 
-
0.046*** -0.027** 0.003 
  
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) 
Non-investment grade sovereign 
 
-0.068** 0.005 0.007 -0.017 -0.058 -0.076** 
  
(0.032) (0.021) (0.024) (0.045) (0.044) (0.036) 
Moody's industry market share 
 
0.175 -0.043 0.666** 0.171 -0.328** 0.705* 
  
(0.259) (0.108) (0.285) (0.350) (0.162) (0.390) 
        Pseudo R2   0.1906 0.2386 0.1930 0.0599 0.0791 0.0680 
Observations   2 567 3 994 3 882 2 567 4 060 3 908 
Note: (1) The table presents the results of probit estimation (Eq. (3.2) and Eq. (3.3)) with robust standard 
errors. It reports the impact of own/other agency’s sovereign/issuer ratings on the probability of the issuer 
rating change (marginal effects) originated by S&P and Moody’s. The dependent variable is a binary 
variable for rating upgrade/downgrade observed at the end of years 2005-2013 for a sample of 2 486 
financial and non-financial institutions. Rating downgrades and upgrades are examined separately due to 
their different determinants. The determinants of issuer rating changes are presented for three different 
periods: pre-crisis period (2005-2007), subprime lending crisis (2008-2010) and sovereign debt crisis 
(2011-2013). The impact of financial and macroeconomic data on issuer rating change is presented in 
Table 3.A.4. (2) Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 






The rating downgrade/upgrade of the competitor is statistically significant at the 
1% level in all examined time windows. In line with expectations, the more time that 
has passed after the leader’s rating action, the less likely it is that the follower will 
downgrade/upgrade its rating (i.e. the impact of a 1-notch rating change is more 
substantial in magnitude than a 2-notch rating change). Comparing the reaction of one 
rating agency 1-15 days after the other agency’s downgrade/upgrade, the following can 
be concluded: (1) Moody’s issuer downgrade/upgrade increases the likelihood of S&P’s 
issuer downgrade/upgrade by 25-30% on average (Panel A and Panel B); (2) S&P’s 
issuer downgrade/upgrade increases the likelihood of Moody’s issuer 
downgrade/upgrade by only 15-19% on average (Panel C and Panel D). This suggests 
that S&P is more likely to be the follower in rating actions when compared to Moody’s. 
The results do not vary substantially for financial and non-financial institutions. Overall, 
rating actions are less likely to be affected by the agency’s own previous rating 
downgrades/upgrades. The result is qualitatively similar to the findings of Alsakka and 
Gwilym (2010), which show that Moody’s is the first mover on the sovereign credit 
rating market. 
After measuring market reaction (stock return movement) to rating outlook73 
changes, Bannier and Hirsch (2010) argue that outlooks have not only an informative 
role, but serve as early warning indicators.  As a robustness check, a model utilizing 
rating outlook changes was also estimated. However, the results of model (3.4) and 
(3.5) with rating outlook are very similar to those predicted using credit rating changes; 




                                                 
 
73 “A rating outlook assesses the potential direction of a long-term credit rating over the intermediate term 
(typically six months to two years). In determining a rating outlook, consideration is given to any changes 
in the economic and/or fundamental business conditions. An outlook is not necessarily a precursor of a 
rating change.” 





Table 3.6: Leader-follower relationship between S&P and Moody’s 
Panel A - Follower: S&P, Industry: Financial 























     Downgrade by Moody's in previous 1-15days   -0.245*** -0.015*** 0.283*** 0.071*** 
  
(0.025) (0.003) (0.030) (0.008) 
Downgrade by Moody's in previous 16-90days 
 
-0.204*** -0.012*** 0.235*** 0.059*** 
  
(0.017) (0.003) (0.021) (0.006) 
Downgrade by Moody's in previous 91-180days 
 
-0.121*** -0.007*** 0.140*** 0.035*** 
  
(0.029) (0.002) (0.034) (0.009) 
Downgrade by Moody's in previous 180 and more days 
 
-0.126*** -0.008*** 0.145*** 0.036*** 
    (0.025) (0.002) (0.029) (0.007) 
Upgrade by Moody's in previous 1-15days   0.249*** 0.015*** -0.288*** -0.072*** 
  
(0.048) (0.004) (0.056) (0.015) 
Upgrade by Moody's in previous 16-90days 
 
0.239*** 0.015*** -0.277*** -0.069*** 
  
(0.030) (0.003) (0.035) (0.010) 
Upgrade by Moody's in previous 91-180days 
 
0.275*** 0.017*** -0.318*** -0.079*** 
  
(0.032) (0.003) (0.036) (0.012) 
Upgrade by Moody's in previous more than 180 days 
 
0.162*** 0.010*** -0.188*** -0.047*** 
    (0.021) (0.002) (0.024) (0.007) 
Downgrade by S&P in previous 1-15days 
 
-0.135*** -0.008*** 0.156*** 0.039*** 
  
(0.046) (0.003) (0.053) (0.014) 
Downgrade by S&P in previous 16-90days 
 
-0.177*** -0.011*** 0.204*** 0.051*** 
  
(0.023) (0.002) (0.027) (0.008) 
Downgrade by S&P in previous 91-180days 
 
-0.172*** -0.010*** 0.199*** 0.049*** 
  
(0.027) (0.003) (0.032) (0.009) 
Downgrade by S&P in previous more than 180 days 
 
-0.107*** -0.006*** 0.123*** 0.031*** 
  
(0.024) (0.002) (0.030) (0.008) 
Upgrade by S&P in previous 1-15days   0.033 0.002 -0.038 -0.010 
  
(0.027) (0.002) (0.031) (0.008) 
Upgrade by S&P in previous 16-90days 
 
 -   -   -   -  
  
 -   -   -   -  
Upgrade by S&P in previous 91-180days 
 
0.153*** 0.009*** -0.177*** -0.044*** 
  
(0.039) (0.003) (0.046) (0.012) 
Upgrade by S&P in previous more than 180 days 
 
0.065** 0.004** -0.075** -0.019** 
  
(0.031) (0.002) (0.035) (0.009) 
Observations 
 
 3 766  
Pseudo R2   0.0862  







Panel B - Follower: S&P, Industry: Non-financial 
 


















more than 2 
notches 
   
    Downgrade by Moody's in previous 1-15days  -0.305*** -0.041*** 0.296*** 0.075*** 
 
 (0.015) (0.004) (0.015) (0.005) 
Downgrade by Moody's in previous 16-90days  -0.262*** -0.035*** 0.254*** 0.065*** 
 
 (0.014) (0.003) (0.014) (0.004) 
Downgrade by Moody's in previous 91-180days  -0.179*** -0.024*** 0.173*** 0.044*** 
 
 (0.020) (0.003) (0.019) (0.005) 
Downgrade by Moody's in previous more than 180 days  -0.063** -0.008** 0.061** 0.016** 
   (0.027) (0.004) (0.027) (0.007) 
Upgrade by Moody's in previous 1-15days  0.309*** 0.041*** -0.299*** -0.076*** 
 
 (0.024) (0.004) (0.023) (0.007) 
Upgrade by Moody's in previous 16-90days  0.319*** 0.043*** -0.309*** -0.079*** 
 
 (0.019) (0.003) (0.018) (0.006) 
Upgrade by Moody's in previous 91-180days  0.265*** 0.035*** -0.256*** -0.065*** 
 
 (0.019) (0.003) (0.019) (0.006) 
Upgrade by Moody's in previous more than 180 days  0.186*** 0.025*** -0.180*** -0.046*** 
   (0.014) (0.002) (0.013) (0.004) 
Downgrade by S&P in previous 1-15days  0.121* 0.016* -0.117* -0.030* 
 
 (0.065) (0.009) (0.063) (0.016) 
Downgrade by S&P in previous 16-90days  -0.193*** -0.026*** 0.187*** 0.047*** 
 
 (0.016) (0.003) (0.016) (0.004) 
Downgrade by S&P in previous 91-180days  -0.174*** -0.023*** 0.168*** 0.043*** 
 
 (0.018) (0.003) (0.017) (0.005) 
Downgrade by S&P in previous more than 180 days  -0.030** -0.004** 0.029** 0.007** 
 
 (0.015) (0.002) (0.014) (0.004) 
Upgrade by S&P in previous 1-15days  -0.008 -0.001 0.007 0.002 
 
 (0.012) (0.002) (0.011) (0.003) 
Upgrade by S&P in previous 16-90days   -   -   -   -  
 
  -   -   -   -  
Upgrade by S&P in previous 91-180days  0.075** 0.010** -0.073** -0.018** 
 
 (0.035) (0.005) (0.034) (0.009) 
Upgrade by S&P in previous more than 180 days  0.097*** 0.013*** -0.094*** -0.024*** 
 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.010) (0.003) 
Observations  10 872 
Pseudo R2  0.0748 






Panel C - Follower: Moody’s, Industry: Financial 
 























        
Downgrade by S&P in previous 1-15days   -0.140*** -0.029*** 0.156*** 0.062*** 
  
(0.019) (0.005) (0.021) (0.009) 
Downgrade by S&P in previous 16-90days 
 
-0.153*** -0.032*** 0.171*** 0.068*** 
  
(0.014) (0.005) (0.016) (0.007) 
Downgrade by S&P in previous 91-180days 
 
-0.102*** -0.021*** 0.113*** 0.045*** 
  
(0.025) (0.006) (0.027) (0.011) 
Downgrade by S&P in previous more than 180 days 
 
-0.095*** -0.020*** 0.106*** 0.043*** 
    (0.016) (0.004) (0.018) (0.007) 
Upgrade by S&P in previous 1-15days   0.186*** 0.039*** -0.207*** -0.083*** 
  
(0.064) (0.014) (0.071) (0.029) 
Upgrade by S&P in previous 16-90days 
 
0.218*** 0.046*** -0.243*** -0.097*** 
  
(0.022) (0.006) (0.024) (0.012) 
Upgrade by S&P in previous 91-180days 
 
0.142*** 0.030*** -0.158*** -0.063*** 
  
(0.027) (0.006) (0.030) (0.013) 
Upgrade by S&P in previous more than 180 days 
 
0.125*** 0.026*** -0.140*** -0.056*** 
    (0.013) (0.004) (0.015) (0.007) 
Downgrade by Moody's in previous 1-15days   -0.149** -0.032** 0.166** 0.067** 
  
(0.059) (0.013) (0.066) (0.027) 
Downgrade by Moody's in previous 16-90days 
 
-0.132*** -0.028*** 0.147*** 0.059*** 
  
(0.021) (0.005) (0.023) (0.010) 
Downgrade by Moody's in previous 91-180days 
 
-0.134*** -0.028*** 0.149*** 0.060*** 
  
(0.019) (0.005) (0.021) (0.008) 
Downgrade by Moody's in previous more than 180 days 
 
0.004 0.001 -0.005 -0.002 
    (0.024) (0.005) (0.027) (0.011) 
Upgrade by Moody's in previous 1-15days 
 
0.045 0.009 -0.050 -0.020 
  
(0.139) (0.029) (0.154) (0.062) 
Upgrade by Moody's in previous 16-90days 
 
0.010*** 0.002*** -0.011*** -0.004*** 
  
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Upgrade by Moody's in previous 91-180days 
 
0.061 0.013 -0.068 -0.027 
  
(0.075) (0.016) (0.084) (0.034) 
Upgrade by Moody's in previous more than 180 days 
 
0.105*** 0.022*** -0.117*** -0.047*** 
  
(0.013) (0.003) (0.015) (0.007) 
Observations 
 
 3 766  
Pseudo R2    0.0973  








Panel D - Follower: Moody’s, Industry: Non-financial 




















           
Downgrade by S&P in previous 1-15days  -0.175*** -0.015*** 0.190*** 0.031*** 
 
 (0.010) (0.002) (0.011) (0.003) 
Downgrade by S&P in previous 16-90days  -0.166*** -0.014*** 0.180*** 0.030*** 
 
 (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) 
Downgrade by S&P in previous 91-180days  -0.143*** -0.012*** 0.155*** 0.025*** 
 
 (0.012) (0.002) (0.012) (0.003) 
Downgrade by S&P in previous more than 180 days  -0.064*** -0.006*** 0.069*** 0.011*** 
   (0.014) (0.001) (0.015) (0.003) 
Upgrade by S&P in previous 1-15days  0.178*** 0.015*** -0.194*** -0.032*** 
 
 (0.013) (0.002) (0.014) (0.003) 
Upgrade by S&P in previous 16-90days  0.160*** 0.014*** -0.174*** -0.029*** 
 
 (0.009) (0.002) (0.010) (0.003) 
Upgrade by S&P in previous 91-180days  0.181*** 0.016*** -0.197*** -0.032*** 
 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.012) (0.003) 
Upgrade by S&P in previous more than 180 days  0.128*** 0.011*** -0.140*** -0.023*** 
   (0.008) (0.001) (0.009) (0.002) 
Downgrade by Moody's in previous 1-15days  -0.022 -0.002 0.024 0.004 
 
 (0.044) (0.004) (0.048) (0.008) 
Downgrade by Moody's in previous 16-90days  -0.128*** -0.011*** 0.139*** 0.023*** 
 
 (0.014) (0.002) (0.015) (0.003) 
Downgrade by Moody's in previous 91-180days  -0.148*** -0.013*** 0.161*** 0.026*** 
 
 (0.014) (0.002) (0.015) (0.003) 
Downgrade by Moody's in previous more than 180 days  0.012 0.001 -0.013 -0.002 
   (0.030) (0.003) (0.033) (0.005) 
Upgrade by Moody's in previous 1-15days  - - - - 
 
 - - - - 
Upgrade by Moody's in previous 16-90days  0.087*** 0.008*** -0.094*** -0.015*** 
 
 (0.032) (0.003) (0.034) (0.006) 
Upgrade by Moody's in previous 91-180days  0.129*** 0.011*** -0.140*** -0.023*** 
 
 (0.033) (0.003) (0.036) (0.006) 
Upgrade by Moody's in previous more than 180 days  0.092*** 0.008*** -0.100*** -0.016*** 
 
 (0.013) (0.001) (0.014) (0.003) 
Observations  10 872 
Pseudo R2  0.1500 
Note: (1) The table presents the results of ordered logit estimation (Eq. (4) and Eq. (5)) with robust 
standard errors. It reports the impact of potential leader’s/follower’s rating action on the probability of the 
follower’s rating upgrade/downgrade (marginal effects). The results are based on the sample of daily 
rating changes between December 2005 and October 2014 originated by S&P and Moody’s. The 
dependent variable is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the follower upgraded/downgraded the 
issuer by one/two or more notches. The independent variables are dummy variables taking the value of 1 
if the issuer is upgraded/ downgraded by the potential leader/follower in four previous time windows (1-
15 days, 16-90 days, 91-180 days, more than 180 days). (2) Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, 





The recent financial crisis has prompted increased analysis of the quality of credit 
ratings. Several issues focused the attention of the financial market on credit ratings: (1) 
significant but slow credit rating fluctuations over the past decades, (2) Basel III 
continuing to give high prominence to ratings in bank capital requirements, (3) 
excessive power of ratings to influence market expectations. 
This paper contributes to the recent related literature in several ways. First, 
empirical evidence suggests that there is a statistically significant difference in the 
rating evaluations of the two incumbent credit rating agencies. While Moody’s is 
consistently more conservative in its assessment of default risk for non-financial 
institutions, S&P is consistently more conservative in its assessment of default risk for 
financial institutions. The two rating agencies systematically agree in credit ratings only 
in the Communications and Technology industry sectors. The difference between S&P 
and Moody’s credit ratings has deepened over time, becoming the most substantial 
during the sovereign debt crisis from 2011 to 2013.  
Second, empirical evidence indicates that Fitch’s increasing market share has a 
positive and statistically significant effect on the rating split between S&P and Moody’s 
in the non-financial sectors. This might be because some rating agencies might prefer to 
protect their reputational capital by assigning timely and accurate ratings; other rating 
agencies might prefer to increase their own profits (ratings are issuer-paid) by assigning 
more favorable ratings. Thus, instead of promoting rating competition, the reporting 
requirements about financial data should be vastly enhanced to reduce sole reliance on 
credit ratings. The findings of this paper also imply that rating shopping (acquiring an 
additional rating opinion) fosters further disagreement between rating agencies, and 
hence reinforces the use of ‘second best’ issuer rating for regulatory purposes. 
Third, this paper confirms that sovereign ratings remain significant determinants 
of issuer ratings in the case of financial institutions, even though S&P gradually 
increases and Moody’s gradually relaxes its weight. For non-financial institutions, the 
approach of rating agencies is exactly the opposite. While S&P issuer ratings reflect 




by the issuer’s country rating. The findings suggest that sovereign ceilings constitute a 
potential source of negative externality for financial institutions in low- rated countries, 
given that the financial health (rating) of the issuer is much stronger than of the parent 
company. 
Lastly, the empirical results of this paper strongly support the idea that the rating 
actions of one agency are considerably influenced by the prior ratings of other agencies. 
When compared to Moody’s, S&P is a follower in its rating actions for both financial 
and non-financial institutions. Further research should examine at what point financial 
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Table 3.A.1: Descriptive statistics by rating agency 
Panel A – Average rating by industry sector 
Industry sector S&P Moody’s Fitch 
Financial 8.4 8.6 7.6 
Basic Materials 10.1 9.8 8.8 
Communications 11.0 10.7 9.4 
Consumer, Cyclical 11.0 11.6 11.1 
Consumer, Non-cyclical 9.5 9.7 8.3 
Diversified 9.3 9.1 7.7 
Energy 10.9 10.9 9.4 
Industrial 9.8 10.2 8.6 
Technology 9.6 9.3 8.2 
Utilities 8.8 8.8 8.3 
 
Panel B – Geographical coverage by rating agency 
Region S&P Moody’s Fitch 
United States 57% 60% 63% 
Euro Area  16% 15% 15% 
Japan 8% 8% 14% 
Other Advanced Economies 6% 4% 1% 
Commonwealth of Independent States 6% 5% 2% 
Emerging and Developing Asia 4% 5% 3% 
Emerging and Developing Europe 1% 1% 0% 
Latin America and the Caribbean 1% 1% 2% 
Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan 1% 1% 0% 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0% 0% 0% 
Note: The descriptive statistics are based on the sample of 2 486 issuer ratings assigned as at the end of 
2013. The credit ratings in Panel A are mapped into 21 numerical values, where AAA is the best rating 
category and SD/D (semi-default/default) is the worst rating category. In particular, A- = 7, BBB+ = 8, 






Table 3.A.2: Mean financial statistics per rating grade 
Panel A – Financial sector: Banks 
                in % 




























 AAA  N/A 2.0 N/A 1.0 0.3 7.3 61.4 59.9 
 AA  12.0 30.0 104.3 1.2 0.6 10.8 131.1 60.3 
 A  11.4 111.0 77.2 2.4 0.6 5.8 108.4 68.2 
 BBB  12.3 62.0 134.5 3.2 0.5 5.7 94.8 80.0 
 BB  12.8 26.0 93.1 3.0 0.6 5.0 94.1 76.6 
 B  14.7 10.0 97.1 5.4 0.7 4.1 109.1 72.1 
 CCC  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 C  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 NR  11.4 59.0 117.4 2.1 0.6 6.4 82.8 88.0 
 
Panel B – Non-financial sector: Consumer-Cyclical 












Total Equity /  
Total 
Liabilities 
Net Sales / 
Total Assets 
AAA N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
AA 16.9 36.4 1.7 99.7 82.2 
A 10.6 20.9 1.6 54.2 78.9 
BBB 10.3 12.6 1.7 63.8 84.6 
BB 14.1 4.9 1.6 53.7 77.9 
B 9.8 -12.6 1.3 26.6 99.5 
CCC 4.2 -19.7 0.0 29.1 71.8 
C -127.9 -52.0 -0.7 -29.5 67.4 
NR 18.9 13.8 1.7 127.0 103.2 
Note: (1) The summary statistics are based on financial statement data from the end of 2009 credit rating 
assigned by S&P. As several indicators provide meaningful interpretation only if evaluated within the 
same sector, the table summarizes the financial ratios of only two industry sub-sectors. Based on the total 
number of observations in the dataset, the industry sub-sectors of banks and cyclical consumer goods 
were chosen to illustrate the financial indicators of the financial and non-financial sectors. (2) NR denotes 





Table 3.A.3: Credit rating interpretation and numeric scales 
Original rating grades Interpretation New rating grades 
S&P/ 
Fitch Moody's   
Fine scale Wide scale 
Numeric Letter Numeric Letter 
  Investment grades     
AAA AAA Extremely strong capacity to meet financial 
commitments 
1 AAA 1 AAA 
AA+ Aa1 
Very strong capacity to meet financial 
commitments 
2 AA+ 2 AA 
AA Aa2 3 AA 2 AA 
AA- Aa3 4 AA- 2 AA 
A+ A1 Strong capacity to meet financial 
commitments, but somewhat susceptible to 
adverse economic conditions and changes 
in circumstances. 
5 A+ 3 A 
A A2 6 A 3 A 
A- A3 7 A- 3 A 
BBB+ Baa1 Adequate capacity to meet financial 
commitments, but more subject to adverse 
economic conditions 
8 BBB+ 4 BBB 
BBB Baa2 9 BBB 4 BBB 
BBB- Baa3 Considered lowest investment grade by 
market participants 
10 BBB- 4 BBB 
  Non- investment (speculative) grades     
BB+ Ba1 Less vulnerable in the near-term but faces 
major ongoing uncertainties to adverse 
business, financial and economic 
conditions 
11 BB+ 5 BB 
BB Ba2 12 BB 5 BB 
BB- Ba3 13 BB- 5 BB 
B+ B1 More vulnerable to adverse business, 
financial and economic conditions but 
currently has the capacity to meet financial 
commitments 
14 B+ 6 B 
B B2 15 B 6 B 
B- B3 16 B- 6 B 
CCC+ Caa1 Currently vulnerable and dependent on 
favorable business, financial and economic 
conditions to meet financial commitments. 
17 CCC+ 7 CCC 
CCC Caa2 18 CCC 7 CCC 
CCC- Caa3 19 CCC- 7 CCC 
CC Ca Currently highly vulnerable 20 CC 8 CC 
C C Currently highly vulnerable obligations 
and other defined circumstances 
21 C 9 C 
SD/D  Payment default on financial commitments 21   9 D 
Note: (1) The credit ratings are mapped into 21 numerical values, where AAA is the best rating category 
and SD/D (semi-default/default) is the worst rating category. (2) The interpretation of credit ratings is 






Table 3.A.4: Determinants of issuer rating change 
Panel A – Issuer rating: S&P, Industry: Financial 
    
Dependent variable - Issuer 
rating upgrade by S&P 
 
Dependent variable - Issuer 
rating downgrade by S&P 
         





































Total asset   -0.000* 0.000** -0.000   -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return on assets 
 
-0.023 -0.007 0.019** 
 
-0.003 -0.023 0.006 
  
(0.033) (0.009) (0.009) 
 
(0.036) (0.014) (0.014) 
Common equity to total assets 
 
-0.015* 0.003 -0.000 
 
-0.021** 0.002 0.003 
  
(0.008) (0.002) (0.003) 
 
(0.009) (0.003) (0.004) 
Total loans to total deposits 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000*** -0.000 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Deposits to funding 
 
-0.003* 0.001** 0.000 
 
-0.003* -0.000 -0.002** 
   (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)   (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
1Y change in Return on assets   0.019* 0.000 -0.003***   -0.013 0.001*** -0.002*** 
  
(0.011) (0.000) (0.001) 
 
(0.012) (0.000) (0.001) 
1Y change in Net interest margin 
 
0.065 0.024** 0.071 
 
0.072 0.092*** 0.096 
  
(0.054) (0.011) (0.043) 
 
(0.059) (0.032) (0.069) 
1Y change in  Common equity to total assets -0.143 -0.044 0.004 
 
0.076 -0.041 0.059*** 
  
(0.137) (0.060) (0.005) 
 
(0.128) (0.073) (0.022) 
1Y change in Loan loss reserves to non-performing assets -0.012 -0.066 -0.023 
 
-0.004 0.000*** -0.026 
  
(0.011) (0.044) (0.025) 
 
(0.008) (0.000) (0.047) 
1Y change in Non-performing assets to total assets 0.026 -0.037 -0.016 
 
0.038* -0.001 -0.033 
  
(0.021) (0.025) (0.031) 
 
(0.022) (0.007) (0.040) 
     















1Y change in Total loans to total deposits -0.031 -0.003 0.060 
 
0.111 0.127 -0.306* 
  
(0.211) (0.081) (0.124) 
 
(0.194) (0.130) (0.176) 
1Y change in Deposits to funding 
 
0.462** -0.149 0.097 
 
0.602*** 0.155 -0.125 
    (0.202) (0.114) (0.120)   (0.185) (0.140) (0.176) 
Current account to GDP   -0.014*** -0.001 0.000   -0.011*** -0.006** -0.000 
  
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
GDP per capita 
 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000** 
 
-0.000 0.000 -0.000** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1Y change in Current account to GDP 
 
-0.022*** -0.004 -0.001 
 
-0.024*** -0.010** 0.013 
  
(0.006) (0.003) (0.007) 
 
(0.009) (0.005) (0.021) 
1Y GPD growth 
 
-0.013 -0.002 -0.024*** 
 
-0.016 -0.010** -0.042*** 
  
(0.009) (0.004) (0.006) 
 
(0.013) (0.004) (0.008) 
1Y change in GDP per capita 
 
0.536 0.406*** 1.176*** 
 
0.729 0.436** 1.430*** 
  
(0.685) (0.141) (0.288) 
 
(0.765) (0.211) (0.293) 
1Y change in Inflation 
 
0.002 0.001 -0.008* 
 
0.004 -0.000 -0.007 
  
(0.013) (0.002) (0.005) 
 
(0.015) (0.004) (0.005) 
Euro Area  -0.251*** 0.059 -0.068  -0.240** -0.037 -0.002 
  (0.088) (0.048) (0.087)  (0.100) (0.058) (0.078) 
Emerging and Developing Europe  0.066 0.028 0.046  -0.032 -0.082 0.249** 
  (0.186) (0.040) (0.074)  (0.207) (0.102) (0.111) 
Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan  0.241* 0.019 -0.027  0.236 0.036 -0.067 
  (0.125) (0.044) (0.054)  (0.146) (0.060) (0.074) 
Pseudo R2   0.2804 0.3506 0.3335   0.2172 0.3860 0.3197 
Observations   293 496 638   293 631 638 





Panel B – Issuer rating: S&P, Industry: Non-financial 
    
Dependent variable – 
Issuer rating upgrade 
by S&P 
 
Dependent variable –  
Issuer rating downgrade 
by S&P 












































Total asset   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000   -0.000 0.000 -0.000** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Earnings per Share 
 
-0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
 
-0.000** -0.000** -0.000* 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Retained Earnings /Total Assets 
 
-0.000** 0.000 -0.000 
 
0.000 -0.000 0.000 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Earnings before Interest and Taxes /Total Assets 0.007*** 0.005** -0.000 
 
0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Total Equity / Total Liabilities 
 
-0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 
 
-
0.001*** -0.000** -0.000*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Net Sales /Total Assets 
 
0.000 0.000** 0.000 
 
-0.000 0.000 -0.000 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1Y change in Working capital /  Total Assets 0.001 0.000** 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
1Y change in Retained Earnings / Total Assets -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** 
 
-0.002 -0.000 -0.001*** 
  
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
1Y change in Earnings before Interest and Taxes / Total Assets 0.001 0.000 0.002** 
 
0.001 0.000 0.002 
  
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) 
1Y change in Total Equity / Total Liabilities -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 
-0.001 0.001 -0.002* 
    (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)   (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Current account to GDP 
 
0.005** 0.001 0.003* 
 
0.007*** -0.000 0.003 
  
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
       











GDP per capita 
 
-0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
-0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation 
 
0.001 -0.004 0.006 
 
0.009 -0.003 -0.001 
  
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) 
 
(0.008) (0.004) (0.005) 
1Y change in Current account to GDP -0.002 -0.001 0.019**   -0.006 0.000 0.008 
  
(0.004) (0.001) (0.009) 
 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.007) 
1Y GPD growth 
 
-0.008 0.002 -0.006 
 
-0.017 -0.002 -0.009 
  
(0.008) (0.002) (0.004) 
 
(0.011) (0.003) (0.005) 
1Y change in GDP per capita 
 
0.312 0.218** 0.114 
 
0.436 0.023 0.084 
  
(0.221) (0.085) (0.124) 
 
(0.300) (0.123) (0.122) 
1Y change in Inflation 
 
0.003 -0.006** 0.000 
 
-0.003 -0.006 -0.000 
  
(0.006) (0.002) (0.000) 
 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.001) 
Japan  -0.039 -0.095*** -0.151***  -0.127** -0.258*** -0.211*** 
  (0.041) (0.025) (0.029)  (0.054) (0.037) (0.029) 
Other Advanced Economies  -0.088*** -0.044*** -0.053***  
-
0.102*** -0.040* -0.049** 
  (0.032) (0.015) (0.016)  (0.038) (0.022) (0.019) 
Emerging and Developing Asia  -0.166* -0.032 0.043  -0.148 -0.103* -0.002 
  (0.086) (0.039) (0.038)  (0.109) (0.061) (0.052) 
Emerging and Developing Europe  0.055 -0.048   0.275** -0.113 -0.076 
  (0.078) (0.073)   (0.113) (0.111) (0.098) 
Latin America and the Caribbean  -0.082 0.004 0.006  -0.144* -0.005 -0.004 
    (0.061) (0.030) (0.032)   (0.082) (0.045) (0.041) 
Basic Materials   -0.021 0.005 0.025   -0.001 0.102*** 0.037 
  (0.045) (0.025) (0.035)  (0.060) (0.039) (0.045) 
Communications  -0.059** 0.014 0.027  -0.004 0.085*** 0.021 
  (0.028) (0.020) (0.031)  (0.035) (0.031) (0.042) 
Consumer, Cyclical  -0.027 -0.004 0.057*  0.020 0.142*** 0.079* 
  (0.027) (0.021) (0.030)  (0.035) (0.031) (0.041) 
Consumer, Non-cyclical  -0.086* -0.012 0.004  -0.030 0.019 -0.005 
    (0.046) (0.019) (0.030)   (0.060) (0.028) (0.039) 
Pseudo R2   0.1342 0.1728 0.1573   0.0575 0.0910 0.0742 
Observations   2 595 4 057 3 889   2 595 4 060 3 908 





Panel C – Issuer rating: Moody’s, Industry: Financial 
    
Dependent variable –  
Issuer rating upgrade by 
Moody's 
 
Dependent variable – 
 Issuer rating downgrade 
by Moody's 






































Total asset   -0.000 0.000** -0.000   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Earnings per Share 
 
0.000 0.000*** -0.000 
 
0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return on assets 
 
0.039 0.046** -0.002 
 
0.047 -0.019 -0.016 
  
(0.030) (0.018) (0.007) 
 
(0.031) (0.015) (0.019) 
Net interest margin 
 
-0.000 0.000*** -0.000 
 
-0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Common equity to total assets 
 
-0.005 0.024*** -0.005** 
 
-0.012* -0.018*** 0.001 
  
(0.007) (0.006) (0.002) 
 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
Loan loss reserves /Non-performing assets 
 
-0.000 -0.000** -0.000 
 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Non-performing assets / Total assets 
 
-0.004 0.031** 0.008* 
 
-0.002 0.013* -0.007 
  
(0.016) (0.012) (0.005) 
 
(0.016) (0.007) (0.006) 
Total loans to total deposits 
 
0.000 0.000** 0.000 
 
-0.000 -0.000 0.000 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Deposits to funding 
 
0.003* 0.000 -0.002** 
 
0.003* -0.003*** -0.005*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
1Y change in Return on assets   -0.017 -0.009** -0.000   -0.058*** 0.000* 0.002 
  
(0.013) (0.004) (0.000) 
 
(0.014) (0.000) (0.002) 
1Y change in Net interest margin 
 
0.008 0.010 -0.061 
 
0.022 0.014 -0.171* 
  
(0.052) (0.018) (0.043) 
 
(0.056) (0.031) (0.103) 
1Y change in Common equity / Total Assets 
 
0.060 0.037 -0.007 
 
0.057 0.083 -0.022* 
  
(0.132) (0.034) (0.007) 
 
(0.149) (0.067) (0.012) 
1Y change in Loan loss reserves to non-performing assets -0.008 -0.075** 0.054** 
 
-0.004 0.000*** 0.061 
  
(0.048) (0.032) (0.025) 
 
(0.052) (0.000) (0.046) 
      















1Y change in Non-performing assets to total assets -0.015 -0.158** -0.012 
 
-0.013 -0.002 -0.005 
  
(0.019) (0.063) (0.053) 
 
(0.021) (0.008) (0.039) 
1Y change in Deposits to funding 
 
0.049 -0.310** 0.136 
 
0.185 -0.120 -0.298 
   (0.192) (0.143) (0.102)   (0.172) (0.152) (0.205) 
Current account to GDP   0.001 0.008*** -0.008**   0.001 0.002 -0.001 
  
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
GDP per capita 
 
0.000 -0.000** -0.000 
 
0.000** 0.000 0.000 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation 
 
-0.005 0.004 -0.003 
 
-0.007 0.004* -0.011* 
   (0.010) (0.003) (0.005)   (0.011) (0.003) (0.007) 
1Y change in Current account to GDP 
 
-0.002 0.003*** -0.004 
 
-0.002 0.004*** -0.022** 
  
(0.005) (0.001) (0.003) 
 
(0.006) (0.001) (0.009) 
1Y GPD growth 
 
-0.020* 0.045*** -0.004 
 
-0.020* -0.001 -0.025*** 
  
(0.011) (0.010) (0.005) 
 
(0.011) (0.004) (0.009) 
1Y change in GDP per capita 
 
3.778*** 0.201 -0.037 
 
3.895*** -0.238 0.899** 
  
(0.739) (0.197) (0.141) 
 
(0.735) (0.211) (0.359) 
1Y change in Inflation 
 
-0.020 0.025*** 0.007*** 
 
-0.016 -0.011*** -0.002 
  
(0.018) (0.006) (0.003) 
 
(0.016) (0.004) (0.003) 












(0.089) (0.053) (0.084) 
Other Advanced Economies 
 
-0.357*** 0.056 -0.061 
 
-0.412*** -0.037 -0.007 
  
(0.098) (0.053) (0.041) 
 
(0.102) (0.060) (0.071) 
Emerging and Developing Asia 
 
-0.344* -0.363*** -0.175*** 
 
-0.427** -0.150* 0.137* 
  
(0.192) (0.123) (0.067) 
 
(0.201) (0.084) (0.078) 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
-0.421*** -0.304*** -0.171*** 
 
-0.522*** -0.135* -0.054 
   (0.152) (0.104) (0.056)   (0.162) (0.079) (0.084) 
Pseudo R2   0.4823 0.8019 0.5575   0.476 0.3835 0.2809 
Observations   289 411 575   289 631 632 






Panel D – Issuer rating: Moody’s, Industry: Non-financial 
    
Dependent variable –  
Issuer rating upgrade by 
Moody's 
 
Dependent variable –  
Issuer rating downgrade by 
Moody's 












































Total asset   0.000 0.000 -0.000* 
 
0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Earnings before Interest and Taxes / 
Total Assets 0.004*** 0.000 0.003** 
 
0.002 -0.001 0.000 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Equity /  
Total Liabilities 
 
-0.000* -0.000 -0.000 
 
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Net Sales / 
Total Assets 
 
0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1Y change in Earnings per Share/ Total Assets 0.001* -0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 -0.000 0.000 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1Y change in Retained Earnings / Total Assets 0.000 -0.000 0.002** 
 
0.000 -0.000 0.000 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
1Y change in Earnings before Interest and Taxes / Total Assets -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
0.000 0.000** 0.000 
  
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) 
1Y change in Total Equity / Total Liabilities -0.002 -0.000 -0.001* 
 
0.002 -0.000 -0.002** 
  
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.001) 
1Y change in Net Sales /Total Assets 0.017** 0.001 -0.012 
 
0.005 -0.002 -0.007 
    (0.008) (0.001) (0.015) 
 
(0.015) (0.004) (0.028) 
Current account to GDP  0.004** -0.000 -0.002  0.004* 0.002 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Inflation  -0.001 -0.007** -0.004  -0.009 -0.007** -0.007 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) 






1Y GPD growth  -0.005 0.001 -0.000  -0.001 -0.003 -0.013*** 
  (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)  (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) 
1Y change in GDP per capita  -0.077 0.260** 0.050  0.295 0.052 0.163* 
  (0.160) (0.104) (0.093)  (0.224) (0.109) (0.094) 
1Y change in Inflation 
 
0.003 0.004* 0.000 
 
-0.000 0.001 0.001 
  
(0.005) (0.002) (0.001) 
 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.001) 
Euro Area   -0.062** -0.026** -0.043**  -0.087*** -0.023 -0.028 
  (0.025) (0.013) (0.017)  (0.032) (0.018) (0.024) 
Japan  -0.073*** -0.082*** -0.109***  -0.160*** -0.147*** -0.129*** 
  (0.028) (0.021) (0.024)  (0.037) (0.028) (0.024) 
Other Advanced Economies  -0.053** -0.029* -0.027**  -0.089*** -0.049*** -0.049*** 
  (0.025) (0.015) (0.013)  (0.031) (0.019) (0.017) 
Emerging and Developing Asia  -0.073 -0.057 -0.079**  -0.060 -0.156** 0.012 
  (0.059) (0.035) (0.036)  (0.085) (0.061) (0.050) 
Latin America and the Caribbean  -0.062 -0.043 -0.026  -0.036 -0.131** -0.032 
    (0.049) (0.036) (0.027)   (0.069) (0.051) (0.041) 
Basic Materials  -0.005 0.012 0.099**  -0.003 0.039* 0.086 
  (0.019) (0.015) (0.047)  (0.028) (0.024) (0.063) 
Communications  -0.005 0.013 0.074*  0.003 0.021 0.074 
  (0.019) (0.015) (0.045)  (0.026) (0.023) (0.060) 
Consumer, Cyclical  -0.036* 0.014 0.099***  -0.013 0.083*** 0.081 
  (0.020) (0.015) (0.036)  (0.025) (0.022) (0.050) 
Consumer, Non-cyclical  -0.046** 0.015 0.102**  -0.013 0.009 0.085 
  (0.023) (0.016) (0.046)  (0.032) (0.023) (0.063) 
Energy  -0.013 0.025* 0.092**  0.001 0.044** 0.079 
  (0.022) (0.013) (0.038)  (0.029) (0.021) (0.052) 
Industrial  -0.048 0.006 0.075**  -0.065 0.030 0.041 
  (0.039) (0.014) (0.035)  (0.052) (0.020) (0.047) 
Pseudo R2   0.1906 0.2386 0.1930 
 
0.0599 0.0791 0.0680 
Observations   2 567 3 994 3 882 
 
2 567 4 060 3 908 
Note: (1) The table presents the impact of financial and macroeconomic data on the probability of the issuer rating change (marginal effects) from the probit 
estimation (Eq. (3.2) and Eq. (3.3)). It summarizes the remaining (statistically significant) determinants of issuer rating change not presented in Table 3.5. The 
dependent variable is a binary variable for rating upgrade/downgrade observed at the end of years 2005-2013 for the sample of  
2 486 financial and non-financial institutions. (2) The reference for regions is the United States, and the reference for the industry sector is the Financial sector. 
(3) Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
